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When are people more likely to evaluate race-targeted government assistance 
based on ideological principles rather than racial prejudice? In order to answer this 
question, it is necessary to understand the mechanisms by which prejudice influences 
political attitudes. In this dissertation, I develop a theoretical model for explaining how 
deep-seated, automatic group biases interact with higher-order, ideological principles in 
order to influence attitudes toward race-targeted government assistance. I suggest group-
based principles are more important than individualistic values or ingroup favoritism in 
explaining race-targeted policy attitudes. I argue that when people evaluate race-targeted 
policies, controlled neural processes translate automatic neural processes into broad 
group-based principles, which then become the primary tool people use to evaluate race-
targeted policies. As such, the degree to which people’s race-targeted policy opinions are 
driven by principles rather than automatic group biases is a function of how much 
controlled processing has occurred. I find support for this model across an array of 
empirical investigations. In a survey experiment, I find group-based principles to 
outperform an array of other constructs in predicting race-targeted policy attitudes. Then, 
in a laboratory experiment, I replicate the primary findings from the survey experiment 
and show further that the only influence ingroup favoritism has on race-targeted policy 
   
   
attitudes is through automatic, implicit processes. Further, group-based principles are 
comprised of a combination of ingroup bias and individualistic values. Next, I investigate 
the translation process from automatic to controlled processes by examining the 
implications of discrepancies between people’s implicit and explicit attitudes – known as 
implicit ambivalence. I find that individuals with the most “resolved” racial attitudes are 
the most likely to evaluate race-related political objects ideologically. Finally, I directly 
examine the automatic and controlled neural processes hypothesized to underlay this 
model by using functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). I find evidence that 
activation in brain regions implicated in controlled processing is associated with explicit 
evaluations of race, and this relationship is strongest among individuals with more 
extreme group-based principles. I conclude by discussing implications of this model for 
existing literature as well as possible public policy interventions for reducing the role of 
prejudice in politics.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Lizard Brain Meets  Higher-Order Thinking 
“There's no reason that we should give up that lever on people's behavior - namely, 
the inhibition systems of the brain - just because we're coming to understand more 
about the temptation systems.” 
- Stephen Pinker1 
 
 How much control do people have over their racial attitudes and behaviors? 
The answer to this question holds considerable implications for not only how 
individuals of different races interact with one another in face-to-face situations, but 
also how racial groups interact broadly, whether people think the government should 
play a role in encouraging group equality, and how societal resources are distributed 
across groups through government. If it were up to “controlled,” conscious 
motivations alone, perhaps most people would maintain a consistently egalitarian set 
of attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors. However, we know from decades of research in 
social and evolutionary psychology that humans are deeply engrained with 
motivations to favor ingroups and derogate outgroups. Even beyond ingroups and 
outgroups, individuals are often motivated to preserve hierarchy within groups such 
that the dominant members stay on top and the subordinate members stay on the 
bottom. It can be comforting to think that if we want to, we can override whatever 
prejudiced instincts we might have and treat individuals the same regardless of race, 
but subconscious, unintentional group biases can influence a wide swath of attitudes 
and behaviors even among individuals who for the most part embrace egalitarian 
values. The central question of this dissertation is: how do “higher-level,” conscious 
                                                 
1 Pinker, S. (2008). A biological understanding of human nature. In Brockman, J. 
(Ed.), Science at the Edge: Conversations with Leading Scientific Thinkers of 
Today (pp. 37-56). New York, NY: Sterling Publishing Company. 
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values, beliefs, and ideological thinking interact with primal, often nonconscious 
group-based motivations to influence attitudes toward race-targeted policies?  
Answering this question is a crucial first step to answering another, more 
normatively motivated question: can “higher- level,” conscious thoughts and beliefs 
override group biases? On the one hand, egalitarian principles pervade Western 
culture, children are taught from a young age that racism is bad, and all in all, overt 
forms of racial discrimination have decreased substantially over the past several 
decades. On the other hand, it is abundantly clear that racial prejudice has not 
vanished. Instead, covert and implicit forms of racial biases continue to cast a shadow 
on virtually every facet of society, from who gets hired for jobs, to the probability of 
being shot during an altercation with law enforcement, to whether or not a patient is 
prescribed painkillers by a doctor, to who people find sexually attractive. Despite 
people’s ability to, under many circumstances, inhibit racial biases – despite human-
made institutions created to instill egalitarian norms and human beings’ ability in 
many cases to abide by the norms set forth by those institutions – we seem continually 
compelled by a puppet master from our evolutionary past to prefer a government set 
up so that our group gets first dibs.  
A substantial literature exists in political science and psychology that speaks 
to the above question in the context of studying attitudes toward race-targeted 
policies. In addressing this question, which some have referred to as the “principles or 
prejudice” question, scholars have debated whether opposition to policies like 
affirmative action is based on individualistic principles – e.g., the belief that everyone 
should “pull themselves up by their bootstraps” – or racial prejudice. The empirical 
evidence is largely mixed, which is likely at least in part due to some conceptual 
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ambiguity. Although much of the literature addresses how individualism and racial 
prejudice might interact, researchers have essentially skipped answering the central 
question of this dissertation – that is, how “higher- level” processes interact with 
automatic group biases – and so we never gained an understanding of the 
psychological processes that “principles” and “prejudice” actually reflect. Do the 
effects of individualism simply indicate socially acceptable expressions of deep-
seated group biases, or are people genuinely capable of inhibiting their biases and 
adhering to a consciously held ethos?  
There has been an explosion of research in psychology, economics, 
neuroscience, and more recently political science showing that people’s attitudes and 
behaviors – including those related to political outcomes – are driven largely by 
imperceptible, automatic biological processes that hum along under the surface of 
conscious awareness (e.g., Eagleman 2011; Gazzaniga 2012; Hibbing, Smith, and 
Alford 2013; Kahneman 2011; Lodge and Taber 2013; Marcus 2013). Many attitudes 
people have and decisions they make are easily interpreted as the result of conscious 
deliberation, when in reality they are heavily influenced by forces operating 
subconsciously. Messy, foul-smelling rooms can influence people’s moral judgments 
(Schnall, Haidt, Clore, and Jordan 2008). Disease salience can make people more 
likely to oppose gay marriage (Faulkner, Schaller, Park, and Duncan 2004). Room 
temperature can influence people’s views on global warming (Risen and Critcher 
2011). Drinking Sprite, which increases blood glucose levels, can decrease support 
for social welfare (Aarøe and Petersen 2013). Exemplifying perhaps the most 
imperceptible forces on political opinions and behavior is the work showing that 
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political ideology is between 25% and 60% genetically heritable (e.g., Alford, Funk, 
and Hibbing 2005; Hatemi et al. 2010; Hatemi et al. 2014; Settle et al. 2010).  
This work seems to fly in the face of traditional theories of human decision 
making that assume individuals weigh costs and benefits, deliberate about important 
decisions, and in particular relation to this dissertation, form political opinions based 
on careful consideration of issues in relation to one’s own consciously held values. 
Accordingly, it is reasonable to expect that in the domain of race-targeted government 
assistance, despite conscious efforts, deep-seated motivations to favor one’s ingroup 
will continue to dominate people’s evaluations. In other words, genuine adherence to 
“principles” may not stand a chance in the face of automatic group biases.  
Yet a substantial amount of evidence supports the idea that people are indeed 
capable of doing exactly these things, under some circumstances. “System 2” 
thinking, or thinking that is slow, deliberate, and analytical, is readily acknowledged 
by many scholars as existing alongside “System 1” thinking, which is fast, automatic, 
and instinctual (Kahneman 2011; Stanovich 2004). A stable personality trait shown to 
vary significantly across people is Need for Cognition (NFC), which is the degree to 
which someone is motivated to think effortfully and solve complex problems 
(Cacioppo and Petty 1982), suggesting there is at least some variation in the degree to 
which people utilize what might be called “System 2” thinking. Although many of the 
assumptions of rational choice theories of voting behavior (e.g. Arrow 1963; Downs 
1957; Muller and Satterthwaite 1977) have often been lambasted by proponents of 
behavioral models (e.g. Green and Shapiro 1994), in the aggregate, some rational 
choice models do fairly well at predicting voting patterns (e.g. Feddersen, Gailmard, 
and Sandroni 2009; Levine and Palfrey 2007). In many cases, it is hard to argue that 
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humans do not possess some ability to weigh costs and benefits, even if the weighing 
of costs and benefits is constrained substantially by affective processes and attentional 
limits (Simon 1946; 1982). Most proponents of the role of nonconscious processes 
readily acknowledge some role – even a substantial role – for conscious factors 
influencing people’s attitudes and behavior (e.g. Jost et al. 2003; Lodge and Taber 
2013; Mondak 2010; Smith, Oxley, Hibbing, Alford, and Hibbing 2011). “Strategic” 
behavior based on expected utility is particularly evident among political elites (e.g. 
Aldrich 1995; Downs and Rocke 1994; Fearon 1994), who are presumably just as 
human as anyone else. Even rhesus monkeys have shown evidence of behavior 
consistent with utility maximization (Pastor-Bernier, Plott, and Schultz 2017).  
With regard to race, a great deal of work has shown that individuals vary in 
the degree to which they are motivated to inhibit racial biases, and that through top-
down neural processes individuals can often inhibit prejudiced behavior (Cunningham 
et al. 2004; Plant and Devine 1998; Stanley, Phelps, and Banaji 2008). Specifically 
regarding attitudes toward race-based government assistance, although many scholars 
maintain that the predominant factor driving opposition to such policies is racial 
prejudice (e.g., Henry and Sears 2002; Kinder and Sears 1981; Reyna, Henry, 
Korfmacher, & Tucker 2005), the empirical evidence nonetheless suggests ostensibly 
nonracial ideological principles play at least a substantial role, if not the predominant 
role (Sniderman, Crosby, and Howell 2000; Sniderman et al. 1996). If people are 
indeed able to consciously deliberate to exert influence over deep-seated biases, then 
it is plausible that individuals can override racial biases when evaluating race-targeted 
policies; even further, it is possible that under the right conditions, nonconscious 
motivations may even become trivial in comparison to conscious considerations. 
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The main takeaway from the research described above is that although 
burgeoning literatures in psychology, economics, and political science shed light on 
the deep-seated, gut-level motivations that silently drive human behavior, other recent 
work shows that these forces are not the be-all and end-all. Just as millennia-old 
evolutionary selection processes have imbued humans with tribal motivations to favor 
ingroups and avoid outgroups, more recent (though still millennia-old), human-
specific evolutionary selection processes have endowed humans with existential 
motivations, “principled” ideological beliefs and thoughts, the ability to deliberately 
estimate costs and benefits, and the capacity to evaluate issues in relation to 
consciously held values.  
In this dissertation, I develop a theoretical model that updates our 
understanding of political cognition by extending work on nonconscious, primal 
factors that drive human behavior in combination with the ability of humans to 
consciously engage with their environment and carefully evaluate issues according to 
ideological principles. I focus particularly on political cognition as it relates to race-
related political attitudes because the influence of racial prejudice in politics is an oft-
studied and central topic in political psychology, and because there are clear 
implications for how automatic biases might interact with higher- level principles 
when people evaluate race-related political issues. I utilize a variety of survey and 
experimental designs, as well as an examination of neural activity via functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), to study the degree to which individuals’ race-
targeted policy attitudes are influenced by sheer ingroup bias, ideological principles, 
and the interaction of these two broad categories of factors.  
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In the remainder of this chapter, I outline two broad schools of thought 
underlying how we understand political cognition and how most contemporary work 
suggests some middle ground between these schools of thought likely holds the most 
promise for advancing understandings of political attitudes. Next, I describe the state 
of the political science literature that seeks to understand attitudes toward government 
assistance, and in particular whether “principles” or “prejudice” are primarily 
responsible for opposition to policies like affirmative action. I explain how the most 
recent work on this topic acknowledges to some degree how automatic processes 
might interact with conscious perceptions and attitudes to influence policy opinions, 
but this work nonetheless fails to fully explicate the implications of these different 
processes. I leverage neuroscience and evolutionary psychology literature on how 
human-specific, evolutionarily young neural systems have evolved on top of basic, 
evolutionarily old systems in order to explain how nonconscious and conscious 
processes may interact to influence policy attitudes. Then, I summarize where the 
political science literature has left us, and how acknowledging the interaction between 
deep-seated nonconscious motivations and higher- level ideological principles is 
necessary to understand the psychological mechanisms of how people evaluate race-
targeted government assistance. Thus, ultimately, and perhaps somewhat 
unsatisfyingly, I suggest the answer to the question of whether “principles” or 
“prejudice” underlay race-targeted policy attitudes is: both do. However, this answer 
has less to do with the main effects of two distinct psychological variables and more 
to do with the neural processes that force principles and prejudice to interact with one 
another. Finally, I describe several caveats regarding the framework I am proposing 
before outlining the remaining chapters of the dissertation.  
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Two Schools of Thought about Political Thought 
 An overarching distinction can be made in political science between work that 
focuses on the controlled, conscious factors influencing political outcomes and work 
that focuses on the automatic, often nonconscious factors influencing these outcomes. 
I refer to these branches of work as emanating from distinct schools of thought 
throughout this dissertation, but this distinction is intended as an illustrative tool 
rather than an accurate depiction of discrete classes of political science scholarship. 
The two schools of thought I describe do not embody all political science research, 
and in fact most contemporary work on political attitudes and behavior readily 
acknowledges both schools of thought. Nonetheless, these two schools of thought can 
be seen as reflecting the ends of a spectrum upon which models of political attitudes 
and behavior lay. 
One branch of political science research, a school of thought I refer to as the 
“Conscious Considerations” School of Thought (CCSoT), is comprised of work that 
draws from a wide range of political science subfields and is centrally concerned with 
studying the conscious decisions individuals make when evaluating political objects 
(e.g., issues, candidates, parties, policies, or anything political that individuals may 
form an opinion on). The CCSoT encompasses research on topics such as candidate 
evaluations, elite decision making, international diplomacy, war, trade, judicial 
behavior, issue attitudes, vote choice, political participation, interest group behavior, 
and many others, but the central tenet of the CCSoT is that individuals are to be 
viewed as self-aware actors who consider information from their environment and 
behave accordingly. This school of thought is heavily influenced by work in rational 
choice and economics, as the conscious considerations studied under this school of 
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thought often amount to what is referred to as a “utility function” in econometrics 
literature. Yet it is not limited to these perspectives. Rather, sociological and 
psychological work on the influence of social movements, stereotypes and culturally 
or historically imbued knowledge could also fall under the umbrella of the CCSoT. 
The CCSoT has been an integral part of understanding political behavior since 
before political science was recognized as a discipline, and it largely remains central 
to the field, but work building on neuroscience as well as social and evolutionary 
psychology has gained a significant amount of traction in the field over recent 
decades. This body of political science research, which I refer to as the 
“Nonconscious Motivations” School of Thought (NMSoT), is also comprised of work 
in a fairly wide range of political science subfields, but is predominantly made up of 
work in political psychology, political behavior, and more recently, biology and 
politics and political neuroscience. Scholarship advancing the NMSoT hasprimarily 
(although not entirely) centered on a narrower range of topics than work on the 
CCSoT – topics such as political ideology, candidate evaluations, vote choice, issue 
stances, and political participation – largely because of the relative youth of this 
school of thought and the direct relevance of these topics to psychology (for counter-
examples, see e.g., Gibson 1981; Klein and Mitchell 2010; McDermott 2004; Mutz 
and Kim 2016). The NMSoT is primarily concerned with the deep-seated, 
evolutionarily imbued, often nonconscious neural and biological factors that drive 
people’s political attitudes and behavior. A cornerstone of this school of thought is 
that the bulk of factors driving human behavior lay outside of conscious awareness, 
and that the effects of conscious considerations such as those studied under the 
CCSoT pale in comparison to the power of primal, nonconscious motivations. In fact, 
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some scholars subscribing mostly to the NMSoT have suggested conscious attempts 
to “control” one’s attitudes and behaviors are merely post-hoc rationalizations of 
mental processes that have occurred long before the individual is aware of the issue 
(e.g., Eagleman 2011; Kahneman 2011; Lodge and Taber 2013; Pinker 2002; 2008).  
A good deal of empirical work has supported both the CCSoT and the NMSoT 
in relation to politics, and as mentioned earlier, most contemporary scholars 
acknowledge both. In line with the CCSoT, individuals do seem to consciously 
weight costs and benefits pertaining to politics in some circumstances (e.g. Aldrich 
1995; Downs and Rocke 1994; Fearon 1994; Simon 1982). Walter Lippmann spoke 
explicitly of the “images in our heads” that we construct to evaluate the political 
world (1946), and a tremendous amount of work has since shown consciously held 
perceptions acquired through culture, the media, or parental socialization to be 
integral to political cognition (Iyengar and Kinder 2010; Jenning, Stoker, and Bowers 
2009; Zaller 1992), including race-related political cognition (Hurwitz and Peffley 
1997; Peffley, Hurwirtz, and Sniderman 1997; Kinder and Sears 1981).  
However, in line with the NMSoT, “hot” affective responses to political 
stimuli often predict political attitudes and behaviors better than “cool” deliberative 
thought (Lodge and Taber 2005; 2013; Redlawsk 2002). Activity in the sympathetic 
nervous system (electrodermal activity, or EDA) independently predicts a range of 
political attitudes (Dodd et al. 2012; Gruszczynski et al. 2013; Mutz and Reeves 
2005). Baseline levels of cortisol – a hormone associated with stress – predict voter 
turnout (French et al. 2014; Neiman et al. 2015). As already mentioned, political 
ideology is estimated to be between 25% and 60% genetically heritable (e.g., Alford, 
Funk, and Hibbing 2005; Hatemi et al. 2010; Hatemi et al. 2014; Settle et al. 2010). 
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With regard to race, environmental cues need not be explicitly tied to race to evoke 
prejudiced responses (Hurwitz and Peffley 2005; Mendelberg 2001; Valentino, 
Hutchings, and White 2002; but see Huber and Lapinski 2006). Critically, however, 
most of this work advancing the NMSoT has not done so by ignoring the CCSoT, and 
it has often been that case the scholars studying nonconscious motivations argue that 
the manifestations of nonconscious motivations are often shaped by contextual forces 
and conscious processes (e.g. Jost et al. 2003; Mondak 2010; Smith et al. 2011).  
A particularly important strand of research on nonconscious motivations is 
work on implicit racial attitudes. Implicit measures of racial attitudes utilize computer 
tasks to gauge the associations people have between racial groups and positive or 
negative words or images. Implicit measures such as the Implicit Association Test 
(IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 1998) and Affect Misattribution Procedure 
(AMP; Payne et al. 2005) tap automatic mental processes that occur before 
individuals have the chance to edit their responses consciously, and have been shown 
to be valid independent predictors of a wide range of race-related variables (Fazio, 
Jackson, Dunton, and Williams 1995; Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, and Banaji 
2009; Olson and Fazio 2009).  
Ultimately, there is overlap between the CCSoT and NMSoT, but a critical set 
of tenets of each school of thought nonetheless differentiate the factors emphasized by 
the two. In their extreme forms, the two schools of thought may be best thought of as 
two incomplete regression equations. The CCSoT focuses centrally on conscious 
factors influencing human attitudes and behavior and tends to leave nonconscious 
factors to the error term. For example, research falling strictly under the purview of 
the CCSoT might aim to understand attitudes and behavior by focusing on factors 
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related to the values and beliefs by which individuals aim to abide, the stereotypes 
upon which people form beliefs, the weighing of costs and benefits that goes into a 
decision, or conscious reactions to life events or events in the world (Equation 1, E.1). 
Conversely, factors related to the NMSoT might include genetic predispositions (or 
other prenatal factors), individual differences in personality traits, nonconscious 
physiological responses to environmental stimuli, or implicit associations (Equation 
2, E.2).  
E.1: Attitude or Behavior = Consciously Held Beliefs and Values + 
Conscious Decisions + Conscious Reactions to Life Events + e 
 
E.2: Attitude or Behavior = Genetic Predispositions + Personality Traits + 
Physiological Responses to Environment + Implicit Preferences and Biases + 
e 
 
This is not an exclusive list of the factors emanating from each school of thought, 
but rather examples of factors that reflect each. Other factors may be studied within 
each school of thought, but in this dissertation a set of central tenets unites those 
within each incomplete equation. Table 1.1 contains the central tenets of each school 
of thought. 
Table 1.1. Basic Tenets of Nonconscious Motivations School of Thought 
(NMSoT) versus Conscious Considerations School of Thought (CCSoT) 
NMSoT CCSoT 
 Not necessarily human-specific  Human-specific 
 Based largely in the limbic 
system 
 Based largely in the frontal 
cortical regions 
 Evolutionarily “older” brain 
regions and neural networks 
 Evolutionarily “younger” brain 
regions and neural networks 
 Manifests as attitudes/behaviors 
that are fairly ubiquitous across 
contexts and domains 
 Manifests as attitudes/behaviors 
that vary across contexts and 
domains 
 Most ubiquitous features in 
relation to race and politics: 
ingroup favoritism/group biases 
 Most ubiquitous features in 
relation to race and politics: 
existential thought/ideological 
principles 
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To reiterate, the tendency for research to acknowledge one school of thought 
while neglecting the other is not universal and the distinction between the CCSoT and 
NMSoT is mainly illustrative, as many studies do indeed model the effects of both 
conscious and nonconscious motivations (e.g., Balzer and Jacobs 2011; Ditonto, Lau, 
and Sears 2013; Greenwald et al. 2009; Smith et al. 2011; Wagner et al. 2015). 
However, even work taking into account the direct effects of both conscious and 
nonconscious factors mostly fails to account for the interaction between them, and 
instead focuses primarily on comparing effect sizes to determine which exerts a 
stronger influence. The missing component here is the unique contribution of the 
processes that occur when automatic, often nonconscious factors are translated into 
conscious considerations, beliefs, and ideological principles.  
 The model I develop in this dissertation seeks to draw on both the CCSoT and 
the NMSoT in the context of race and politics, as there are clear implications for each 
school of thought in this literature. Most of the political science work on the topic 
stems from the CCSoT, focusing mainly on how historically imbued knowledge about 
racial conflict, consciously held racial stereotypes, and egalitarian values affect 
people’s attitudes toward race-targeted government assistance. However, psychology 
work has been more likely to acknowledge NMSoT factors, and more recent political 
psychology research on race-related political attitudes has embraced the NMSoT in a 
variety of ways, such as comparing the effects of self-reported racial attitudes to those 
of implicit measures of racial attitudes when predicting an array of race-related 
political attitudes (e.g., Ditonto, Lau, and Sears 2013; Greenwald et al. 2009; Payne, 
Krosnick, Pasek, and Lelkes 2010). However, all of this work nonetheless stops short 
of acknowledging that deep-seated motivations to favor ingroups, higher-order 
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thinking aimed at inhibiting those deep-seated motivations, and ideological principles 
such as a belief in limited government all interact with one another. How do people 
evaluate policies such as affirmative action for Blacks when their gut-level group 
biases, conscious beliefs about racial equality, and ideological values are all pulling in 
different directions? To rephrase the first question posed in this chapter, how much 
influence, if any, do the conscious beliefs and intentions highlighted by the CCSoT 
have over people’s evaluations of race-related political objects in spite of the deep-
seated motivations emphasized by the NMSoT?  
The “Principles or Prejudice” Literature in Political Science  
 It is uncontroversial in the majority of academic literature that despite societal 
norms of racial tolerance and notable decreases in overt racism, racial prejudice still 
exists at substantial levels in the United States. Yet what has been less clear is how, 
exactly, such prejudice manifests itself in light of pressures toward political 
correctness and egalitarian values, and the degree to which prejudice subverts 
pressures toward political correctness and egalitarianism to influence policy opinions. 
A lengthy debate in political science has occurred over the past several decades 
regarding whether people oppose government assistance to Blacks because the 
recipients are Black or because such policies are perceived as violating individualistic 
values. Both sides of the debate fall mainly under the CCSoT, but the early work in 
this debate was conducted before the NMSoT was even beginning to be integrated 
into political science and more recent work has taken into account NMSoT factors to 
some degree.  
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CCSoT Work on “Principles versus Prejudice” 
Symbolic racism was among the first and most influential concepts introduced 
to explain opposition to race-based policies as a function of covert racial prejudice 
that has developed in the public sphere as a reaction to decreasing social acceptability 
of explicit racism. It is hypothesized to be a blend of negative affect toward Blacks 
and conservative individualistic values, and consists of the beliefs that 1) racial 
discrimination is no longer a barrier for Blacks, 2) Blacks' disadvantages are due to 
their own reluctance to take personal responsibility for their lives, and 3) as such, 
efforts to aid Blacks are unwarranted (Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears and Henry 2003; 
Sears, van Laar, Carrillo, and Kosterman 1997). The same basic logic underlays the 
development of several other concepts such as modern racism (McConahay 1986), 
racial resentment (Kinder and Sanders 1996), and laissez-faire racism (Bobo and 
Smith 1998), among others. Proponents of this general viewpoint suggest that racial 
prejudice is the key catalyst of opposition to policies like affirmative action, and that 
prejudice and ideological principles like individualism cannot be entirely disentangled 
because contemporary individualism serves merely as a socially acceptable vehicle 
for expressing prejudice. According to Kinder and Mendelberg (2000), 
“today...prejudice is expressed primarily in the language of individualism; today 
individualism is part of racism” (p. 61). It is thus suggested that when the recipients of 
government assistance are Black, racial prejudice guised as individualism will lead to 
opposition to such assistance. 
This viewpoint, however, was challenged on both methodological and 
theoretical grounds. Sniderman and colleagues primarily led the charge in proposing 
that individualistic values associated with conservatism are distinct from race-specific 
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attitudes and that when both are taken into account, nonracial individualistic values 
account for the majority of variance in race-based policy opinions (e.g., Sniderman 
and Carmines 1997; Sniderman et al. 2000; Sniderman and Tetlock 1986). The 
Symbolic Racism Scale (Kinder and Sears 1981; Henry and Sears 2002), according to 
Sniderman and colleagues, is a poor indicator of prejudice because it is confounded 
with conservative principles. Further, opposition to affirmative action based on 
individualistic principles is higher among conservatives, and conservatives tend to be 
relatively unaffected by whether the targets of a policy are Black or of some other 
particular group (e.g., Sniderman & Carmines, 1997; Sniderman et al., 1991; 
Sniderman et al., 1996). Accordingly, the reason for opposition to race-based policies 
is not the recipients' race by itself, but rather conservative, individualistic values. In 
other words, unless the target group of government assistance is perceived as 
violating individualistic values, which Blacks so often are perceived as doing, the race 
of the target group alone will not yield opposition to assistance.  
Proponents of both sides of the “principles or prejudice” debate would fall 
largely under the umbrella of the CCSoT because the primary factors proposed to 
underlay race-based policy attitudes all involve consciously held beliefs. The 
difference between the two sides of the debate boils down to whether race-targeted 
policy support is driven by beliefs about discrimination and the work ethic of Blacks 
or beliefs about how involved government should be in ensuring group equality. 
Scholars engaged in this literature have examined the roles of ideological values, 
stereotypes, and beliefs but an account of stable personality traits, implicit 
preferences, or any other factor highlighted in the NMSoT remains absent throughout 
early work.  
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Principles or (Implicit?) Prejudice: Bringing in the NMSoT 
 Despite the lack of acknowledgement of NMSoT factors by most work on the 
“principles or prejudice” question, scholars studying racial attitudes more broadly 
have incorporated measures of deep-seated, automatic group biases into their 
understandings of prejudice for decades. The seminal work on aversive racism by 
Dovidio and Gaertner showed that although direct, explicit measures of racial 
attitudes suggest prejudice has decreased substantially since the Civil Rights era, 
when people have the opportunity to rationalize or explain away prejudiced attitudes 
or behavior, high levels of prejudice and discrimination are unveiled (Gaertner and 
Dovidio 1977; 1986; Dovidio and Gaertner 2000). Since this research was conducted, 
various indirect measures of racial attitudes have been developed to gauge racial 
preferences in a way that avoids influence from people’s conscious attempts to tailor 
or edit their responses. For example, it has been shown that physiological responses to 
members of racial outgroups independently predict racial policy attitudes (Smith et al. 
2011), fear responses to males of one’s same race become extinct quicker than fear 
responses to males of another race (Olsson, Ebert, Banaji, and Phelps 2005), and 
activation in the startle and frown muscles in the face is greater when responding to 
racial outgroup members than racial ingroup members (Dambrun, Despres, and 
Guimond 2003; Vanman et al. 2004). The implication of these findings is that when it 
comes to racial attitudes, individuals have a motivation to edit or hide their opinions, 
and are often even unaware of their deep-seated preferences, and so simply asking for 
their opinions through survey self-reports can be incredibly problematic.  
 The primary workhorse when it comes to indirect measures of racial attitudes 
has been implicit association measures. As described earlier, implicit association 
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measures are an accessible and feasible means of gauging automatic biases with 
large-N survey and experimental samples. These measures are central to the NMSoT 
because they tap reflexive biases that are presumably unaltered by conscious 
deliberation and effortful thought (see Olson and Fazio 2009), and some work has 
even shown that implicit racial biases but not explicit racial biases are associated with 
activation in limbic regions of the brain such as the amygdala (Phelps et al. 2000). 
With regard to the relationship between racial attitudes and political opinions and 
behaviors, the use of implicit association measures has been critical. Anti-black 
implicit biases measured via the IAT have been shown to predict a range of political 
outcomes such as negative attitudes toward former President Barack Obama and 
opposition to the Affordable Care Act (Greenwald, Smith, Sriram, Bar-Anan, and 
Nosek 2009; Knowles, Lowery, and Schaumberg 2010). The IAT has also been used 
to show that Anti-Latino implicit biases predict conservative immigration attitudes 
(Pérez 2010; Pérez 2016). The AMP has also been instrumental in shedding light on 
how implicit prejudice influences political attitudes, as anti-Black implicit biases 
using the AMP have been shown to predict lower probabilities of having voted for 
Barack Obama in the 2008 presidential election, negative feelings toward Barack 
Obama as well as the idea of a Black president more broadly, and opposition to race-
targeted policies such as affirmative action (Ditonto, Lau, and Sears 2013; Finn and 
Glaser 2010; Greenwald et al. 2009; Pasek et al. 2009; Payne, Krosnick, Pasek, and 
Lelkes 2010; Segura and Valenzuela 2010).  
Mediation of Implicit Measures by Explicit Measures 
 The research using implicit racial attitude measures to predict political 
outcomes has shown that automatic group biases predict political opinions in a 
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manner consistent with the broader tenets of the NMSoT. However, crucially, much 
of this work has also shown that the role of implicit attitudes is often mediated by the 
role of explicit attitudes (Ditonto, Lau, and Sears 2013; Finn and Glaser 2010; Payne, 
Krosnick, Pasek, and Lelkes 2010), suggesting the political attitudes and behaviors 
political scientists are often interested in studying may be better predicted by 
measures of conscious, controlled processing than by measures of quick, reflexive 
preferences. This makes sense if the political variables being studied are 
conceptualized and measured in a way that they are influenced by the controlled 
processing that implicit measures are specifically designed to ignore, such as social 
desirability or consciously held stereotypes. In other words, CCSoT factors may 
matter more than NMSoT factors in predicting political outcomes because the 
psychological processes that occur when reporting political opinions or behaving 
politically are more similar to the processes that occur when reporting racial attitudes 
consciously than they are to the processes that underlay implicit racial attitude 
measures.  
 The work described above has not been interpreted in terms of the CCSoT or 
NMSoT, or in terms of “principles or prejudice” for that matter. Instead, this research 
has been mainly framed as a demonstration of the utility of implicit attitude measures 
compared to explicit attitude measures, or a methodological contribution to the study 
of prejudice. But is the full extent of these findings methodological, or are there 
substantial theoretical implications of the dominant role of explicit racial attitudes 
(rather than implicit racial attitudes) in predicting race-related political outcomes? If 
we are really only interested in public expressions of political opinions, do we really 
need to be concerned with implicit preferences? I suggest even in the case that the 
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political outcomes we are interested in are overt and explicit, implicit, automatic 
processes are still crucial. I suggest this work reflects the interaction between NMSoT 
and CCSoT factors. 
From the viewpoints of social neuroscience and evolutionary psychology, it 
makes sense that measures of controlled processes such as explicitly reported racial 
preferences are more correlated with political outcomes than IAT or AMP scores 
because policy attitudes, vote choice, and self-reported racial preferences all 
presumably involve a relatively high level of deliberation and effortful thought. 
However, in this dissertation I suggest the interaction between automatic and 
controlled processes strongly influences the overt political expressions that people 
ultimately exhibit. Further, the work mentioned above on implicit racial attitudes and 
political outcomes has yet to incorporate implicit measures into the “principles or 
prejudice” framework. Specifically, how do ideological values, or principles, fit into 
the picture?  
Group-Based Principles 
 There is some existing work in the race and politics literature that I suggest 
acknowledges the role of ideological values in conjunction with the interaction 
between automatic and controlled processes without necessarily knowing it. Work on 
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, and Malle 1994) 
has become a cornerstone of the literature on how group-based attitudes influence 
political opinions, and represents psychological motivations to endorse hierarchy in 
society and strive for a system in which some groups dominate others (Pratto, 1999; 
Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius, 1993; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Sidanius et al., 1996; 
Sidanius, Levin, & Federico, 2001; but see more recent work on SDO as discussed in 
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Chapter 2). It has been offered as a theory to explain racial prejudice from a broad 
standpoint that acknowledges multiple levels of analysis and the various forces that 
ultimately create group-based inequality in society, including societal institutions that 
reinforce hierarchy, “real” conflict between groups over scarce resources, learned 
stereotypes about different groups, and psychological motivations to favor ingroups 
and derogate outgroups. Some work has even addressed the potential for evolutionary 
selection processes to drive individual differences in SDO (e.g., Pratto, Sidanius, and 
Levin 2006), although most SDO work does not put much attention on evolutionary 
factors. As such, the construct of SDO, though measured as a set of survey items, can 
be thought of as representing a combination of what would be referred to in this 
dissertation as CCSoT and NMSoT factors.  
 SDO research also addresses the role of ideological values. Individual 
differences in SDO are thought to correspond to differences in the “legitimizing 
myths” people subscribe to in order to rationalize or justify group-based inequality. 
Legitimizing myths are defined as “consensually held values, attitudes, beliefs, 
stereotypes, and cultural ideologies” (Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin 2006, p. 275). One of 
the most prominent legitimizing myths in contemporary society, according to Pratto, 
Sidanius, and colleagues, is individualism. Based on this hypothesized relationship 
between SDO and individualism, SDO has made its way into the conversation on 
“principles or prejudice.” It has been shown that SDO is highly predictive of race-
targeted policy attitudes and also explains the relationship between principled 
arguments against race-targeted policies and racial prejudice (Sidanius, Pratto, & 
Bobo, 1996). Further, Federico and Sidanius (2002) provided evidence that principled 
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objections to race-targeted policies are more associated with group-based dominance 
than they are with nonracial individualism. 
 SDO may therefore reasonably be seen as emanating from the interaction 
between deep-seated group biases and higher-order, learned values such as 
individualism. Humans have been shown to be driven largely by automatic, often 
innate motivations to favor ingroups. However, such motivations are not expressed 
without being filtered through societal norms and institutions, and so higher-order 
“principles” – i.e. legitimizing myths, which can be hierarchy-enhancing or hierarchy-
attenuating – interact with automatic group biases to form broad group-based belief 
systems, such as SDO. Thus, SDO is not purely an indicator of innate motivations to 
favor ingroups or higher-order ideological values, but rather it is the product of the 
interaction between the two. The implications of the role of SDO are therefore distinct 
from the implications of the roles of “principles” or “prejudice” separately. Unlike 
with “prejudice” alone, high levels of SDO imply support for group-based inequality 
in a way that does not necessarily favor the ingroup, but instead applies a uniform set 
of preferences across all groups. Yet unlike with “principles” alone, high levels of 
SDO also do not imply a lack of group-based discrimination, but instead entail 
support for a system in which some groups dominate others. I refer to constructs like 
SDO, which seem to lay at the intersection of innate group biases and higher-order 
values, as group-based principles. The central thesis of this dissertation is that it is 
group-based principles, which represent the interaction between automatic group 
biases and higher-order principles, rather than automatic group biases or ideological 
principles alone that drive opinions toward race-targeted government assistance.  
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 Although it is uncontroversial that SDO reflects an interaction between group-
based biases and ideological values, the SDO literature nonetheless does not engage 
with the distinction between automatic and controlled processes. Sidanius and 
colleagues draw on sociological models such as the group positions model (Blumer 
1961), the expectation states model (Berger et al. 1970), the realistic group conflict 
model (Bobo 1983; 1988; Jackman 1991), the racial oppression model (Turner, 
Singleton, and Musick 1984), and neoclassical hegemony models (Gramsci 1976; 
Mosca 1939; Pareto 1943; Scott 1990) to postulate that:  
(a) to one degree or another, almost all human societies are viewed as 
group-based hierarchies in which at least one dominant group enjoys a 
disproportionate share of positive social value (e.g., wealth, health, 
leisure time, education), and at least one subordinate group endures a 
disproportionate share of negative social value (e.g., social restrictions, 
poor health, low-status occupations, prison sentences). (b) At its core, 
politics can be viewed as an exercise in intergroup competition over 
scarce material and symbolic resources (e.g., wealth, high relative social 
status). (c) In this intergroup competition, groups will use ideologica l 
instruments such as notions of natural rights, national superiority, 
national destiny (e.g., manifest destiny, racism, the Protestant work 
ethic), and political ideology in an effort to legitimize each group’s 
claims over these real and symbolic resources. (Sidanius, Pratto, and 
Bobo 1996, p. 477)  
 
 As such, the role of SDO in explaining the relationship between racial 
prejudice and individualistic values, as well as its role in predicting race-based policy 
opinions, is assumed by SDO theorists to emanate from perceived conflicts between 
groups and ideologies that are used deliberately to justify claims over contemporary 
real and symbolic resources. In other words, the roles of both group biases and 
ideological principles are thought to be conscious and intentional. Therefore, although 
the SDO framework identifies a more universal set of causes for race-based policy 
opposition than other work on the “principles or prejudice” question, it nonetheless 
pinpoints people’s conscious beliefs about how modern groups in society should be 
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organized as the cause of race-based policy opposition. The goals of this dissertation 
therefore include not only establishing that group-based principles such as SDO 
underlay race-targeted policy attitudes, but also broadening the range of factors 
thought to underlay group-based principles by examining how automatic and 
controlled processes interact to influence these attitudes.    
Evolution, Ingroup Bias, Conscious Control, and the Development of Group-
Based Principles 
 Although this dissertation builds largely on the theoretical foundations of 
existing work on “principles versus prejudice,” which primarily stem from sociology 
and social psychology, one of its central contributions is fitting existing work into an 
evolutionary psychology framework. The reason for this is that the primary 
distinction between the automatic and controlled processes examined in this 
dissertation emanates in evolutionary theory – specifically, when the neural regions 
underlying automatic versus controlled processes are thought to have evolved and for 
what functions. Further, I suggest that the psychological processes driving the factors 
mainly focused on within the NMSoT are best characterized as evolutionarily “older” 
than the psychological processes driving the factors focused on within the CCSoT, yet 
these processes continually interact with one another. As is most often the case with 
work building on evolutionary models, the overarching hypothesis that the processes 
studied in this dissertation have evolved through natural selection is not directly 
tested. Nonetheless, placing the empirical tests of this dissertation in the context of 
evolution is essential because it is from an evolutionary perspective that hypotheses 
are derived. Many of the hypotheses tested in this dissertation would be substantially 
different or non-existent if not informed by evolutionary theory, because many of the 
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hypotheses are based on theories of where automatic biases and “higher-order” 
thought come from and what their adaptive functions are.  
It is increasingly common among scholars studying political psychology for 
evolutionary theory to be used to derive hypotheses (e.g. Alford, Funk, and Hibbing 
2005; Fowler and Schreiber 2008; Haidt 2012; Hatemi and McDermott 2011; 
Hibbing, Smith, and Alford 2014; Marcus 2013; Petersen 2014; Petersen and Aarøe 
2012; Sidanius and Kurzban 2003). In the following section, I summarize 
evolutionary theory on the selection processes thought to underlay automatic versus 
controlled processes and their interaction. In doing so, I elaborate on the difference 
between automatic and controlled processes as well as clarify how both emanate from 
the process of natural selection.  
The “Lizard Brain” in Politics 
 All social primates, including humans, exhibit behaviors that might reasonably 
be called “politics” (Alperson-Afil et al. 2009; Brown 1991; Buss 2005; de Waal 
1996). In fact, group conflict, including within- and between-group conflict, has been 
around for millions of years and likely predates the appearance of Homo sapiens and 
tracks back to small-scale group living arrangements among human ancestors (e.g., 
Boehm 2000; Buss 2005; Wrangham and Peterson 1996; Petersen 2014; Petersen and 
Aarøe 2012). In other words, to a nontrivial degree, the political and group-based 
conflict we see today – clashes between national or subnational coalitions, disputes 
over resources, trade, rules enforcing hierarchy, punishments for rule breakers, and 
decisions about how resources are distributed between groups within countries – are 
hardwired consequences of being social animals.  
The “lizard brain,” or “reptilian brain,” as some have referred to it (e.g. 
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LeDoux 1998; Lieberman 2009; MacClean 1973), consists of the millennia-old, core 
psychological adaptations humans carry with them as they navigate the contemporary 
world, such as the “fight or flight” system of the autonomic nervous system (ANS) or 
motivations to eat food and fornicate. The reference to reptiles stems from the fact 
that a reptile brain consists only of the most evolutionarily old brain regions necessary 
for survival. As such, the use of the term to reflect social processes is somewhat 
misleading, as the social processes discussed here, although evolutionarily old and 
basic, are not shared by reptiles. Nonetheless, the phrase has been used often simply 
to delineate between primal, innate motivations and higher-order executive functions 
that are unique to humans. 
 A major difference between the group conflict that took place millennia ago 
and the group conflict of current-day politics is the size and scope of group 
interactions. Whereas the group conflict of the vast majority of human history took 
place within and between small groups, clans, and tribes of 25-200 people (Kelly 
1995), contemporary politics spans a much broader range of levels of analysis, 
including small groups just as before but also including national and international 
groups made up of millions (and often billions) of individuals who most often do not 
know each other. Importantly, mass-scale society has not been around until relatively 
recently in human history (within the last 500 years; Diamond 1998), and so the most 
powerful and ubiquitous adaptations humans have for interacting with one another in 
mass-scale society evolved in response to small-scale interactions (Petersen 2014; 
Petersen and Aarøe 2012;Tooby and Cosmides 1992). As such, the psychological 
tools humans bring to the table when interacting with today’s political world were not 
“designed” for mass-scale politics. This implies political attitudes and behaviors are 
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largely driven by the momentum of millions of years of evolutionary forces that we 
are not only unaware of but also blind to their purpose. Much NMSoT work is 
grounded in these principles of evolutionary theory. 
Political scientist Michael Bang Petersen and colleagues have done 
groundbreaking research exploring the political implications of the mismatch between 
mass-scale society and the (often “outdated”) psychological tools humans have to deal 
with it. By deriving hypotheses from evolutionary theory, Petersen and others have 
developed studies showing a range of empirical findings that might seem quite 
strange if not understood from the perspective that political conflict is based in the 
small-scale group conflict of human ancestors. For example, in one experiment, 
participants who consumed a sugary soft drink were less likely to support social 
welfare than participants who consumed a drink with artificial sweetener, which 
makes sense if in small-scale group living situations, humans were more likely to rely 
on sharing a key resource, food, to survive during periods of temporary hunger (Aarøe 
and Petersen 2013). In another study, it was shown that the flexed bicep 
circumference of a man’s dominant arm – a key morphological indicator of upper-
body strength – is associated with support for economic redistribution among low-
SES males and opposition to economic redistribution among high-SES males 
(Petersen et al. 2013). According to Petersen and colleagues, this is because 
historically, in small-scale group living situations, the physically formidable males 
were the ones most able to acquire and defend resources in line with their self-
interest, and so it should be expected that in contemporary society these individuals 
will be most likely to support a political system that benefits their own interests – i.e. 
high levels of economic redistribution among low-SES males and low levels of 
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economic redistribution among high-SES males. The overarching implication of the 
model developed by Petersen and colleagues is that most (if not all) of the group-
related political attitudes we like to think of as the product of conscious 
considerations, beliefs, values, and the weighing of costs and benefits (i.e. CCSoT 
factors) are actually driven by primitive, evolved psychological tools designed for 
small-scale group interactions (i.e. NMSoT factors).  
One of the most dominant adaptations evolved from small-scale group 
interactions that still influences political attitudes and behavior today is ingroup 
favoritism (e.g., Arceneaux 2012; Brewer 1999; Fiske 2000; Petersen 2012; 
Yamagishi and Mifune 2004). Indeed, for decades, psychologists have found the 
tendency for individuals to express bias in favor of members of their perceived 
ingroups to be a powerful and ubiquitous human phenomenon (e.g., Brewer 1986; 
Hogg and Abrams 2007; LeVine and Campbell 1972; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner 
et al. 1981). From an evolutionary perspective, ingroup favoritism has been adaptive 
because it allows individuals to rely on others without indiscriminately trusting 
everyone (Brewer 1997; 1999; Insko, Schopler, and Sedikides 1998; Tooby, 
Cosmides, and Price 2006). As Marilynn Brewer puts it:  
Social differentiation and clear group boundaries provide one 
mechanism for achieving the benefits of cooperative interdependence 
without the risk of excessive costs. Ingroup membership is a form of 
contingent altruism. By limiting aid to mutually acknowledged ingroup 
members, total costs and risks of nonreciprocation can be contained 
(1999, p. 433).  
Thus, as long as humans have been living socially, it has been strongly 
adaptive to demarcate individuals along group lines and favor ingroup members over 
outgroup members. Ingroup favoritism is therefore substantially hardwired into the 
human brain. Importantly, which individuals comprise ingroup members versus 
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outgroup members is decidedly not hardwired. Instead, the boundaries of group 
membership are fluid and context-dependent. Groups are perceived, and so the 
individuals people identify as members of their ingroup can depend highly on 
whatever demarcating characteristic of individuals is salient in the current 
environment (Efferson, Lalive, and Fehr 2008; Kurzban, Tooby, and Cosmides 2001; 
Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner et al. 1981). As such, the tendency to favor one’s 
ingroup is not bound to particular types of groups or periods of time; ingroup 
favoritism can manifest in any situation involving multiple individuals. If the 
previously stated premise is true – that humans engage in 21st century politics with 
prehistoric minds – we should expect most, if not all, of the political conflicts and 
disputes over resources that characterize contemporary politics to be driven primarily 
by sheer ingroup favoritism.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, ingroup favoritism and social identity motives have 
been shown to underlay a tremendous range of politically-relevant attitudes and 
behaviors (Fowler and Kam 2007; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2004; Greene 
2004; Huddy 2001; Huddy and Khatib 2007; Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Kinder 
and Kam 2009; Mutz and Kim 2016), including attitudes toward affirmative action 
(Lowery et. al. 2006). Further, it is evident that ingroup bias is automatic and occurs 
at a nonconscious level (Cunningham et al. 2004; Molenberghs et al. 2013; Van 
Bavel, Packer, and Cunningham 2008; Volz et al. 2009). The implication of these 
findings in conjunction with an evolutionary model of ingroup favoritism is that 
group biases are instantiated deep enough into the human psyche that they are 
triggered well before anything reasonably called a “conscious consideration” can take 
place.  
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Despite the predominance of group biases, there are also many instances in 
which ingroup favoritism does not manifest, or is even the exception rather than the 
rule. In various circumstances, many people embrace group equality, diversity, and 
globalism while rejecting hierarchy, racism, and nationalism. Further, ingroup 
favoritism is in many cases the antithesis of commonly held egalitarian values, and 
humans seem capable (at least sometimes) of adhering to such values; it is not 
uncommon for individuals to be somewhat self-aware regarding the pitfalls of ingroup 
favoritism. How is this possible? The picture painted by considering ingroup 
favoritism alone – a world where who’s team you are on is the defining characteristic 
of you as a person – seems partly accurate but does not leave any room for genuine 
principles such as egalitarianism, or individualism for that matter.  
Controlled Processing, Rules, and Higher-Order Thought 
To understand how primal motivations such as ingroup favoritism might be 
overridden, it is necessary to understand the development of the inhibition systems of 
the brain. Alongside motivations to form coalitions and delineate between ingroup 
and outgroup members automatically, humans have also evolved to be able to regulate 
and inhibit their primal motivations – or as Kahneman (2011) would put it, “think 
slowly.” Whereas automatic group biases evolved to allow individuals to quickly 
distinguish between trustworthy and untrustworthy individuals, “controlled” 
processes – also often called “executive function” – evolved so that individuals could 
interact with and respond to novel environments in a finer-grained, albeit slower 
fashion. Controlled processes allow individuals to refrain from applying blanket rules 
to every situation (e.g. “always favor ingroup members over outgroup members”), 
and instead to push an inhibitory lever that adjusts decision-making based on 
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circumstances (e.g. “sometimes favor ingroup members over outgroup members, but 
sometimes don’t”; see Tooby and Cosmides 1992). To put it simply, controlled 
processes let individuals adapt to complex environments by allowing nuance in the 
degree to which more primal “rules” for behavior are followed. 
Consistent with this understanding of the role of controlled processes, the 
development of controlled processes throughout the lifespan is thought to be central 
to how humans learn and abide by increasingly complex rules. Specifically, the 
development of regions of the brain associated with controlled processing – e.g. the 
prefrontal cortex, or PFC – is believed to correspond to increasing complexity in rule 
usage by humans such as going from using a single rule, to switching between rules, 
to switching between pairs of incompatible rules (Bunge and Zelazo 2006; Zelazo, 
Frye, and Rapus 1996; Zelazo, Muller, Frye, and Marcovitch 2003). It is through 
activity in the PFC, in particular, that humans are able to engage in higher degrees of 
self-reflection, or “levels of consciousness” (LOCs), and inhibit automatic reactions 
to environmental stimuli (Kerr and Zelazo 2004; Ortner, Kilner, and Zelazo 2007; 
Zelazo 2004). If we consider, for a moment, higher-order beliefs and principles to be 
complex sets of rules or guidelines for shaping behavior, it makes sense that whereas 
“lizard brain” processes might be more responsible for sheer ingroup favoritism in 
humans, lofty values such as individualism and egalitarianism may be driven more by 
executive function and controlled processes.  
Interactions between Controlled and Automatic Processes 
Up to this point, I have outlined the “older” evolutionary forces such as 
ingroup favoritism that are ubiquitous in human behavior today, as well as the 
“younger” evolutionary forces that allow humans to inhibit primal motivations and 
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abide by more complex rules and principles. However, it would be mislead ing to 
suggest that this means there are essentially two major forces working against one 
another and that one represents variables such as ingroup favoritism and the other 
represents variables such as individualism and egalitarianism. A central argument of 
this dissertation is instead that these forces continually interact with one another to 
drive the full range of attitudinal variables, including ingroup favoritism, ideological 
principles, and ultimately attitudes toward race-based government assistance. All of 
these variables exist on a spectrum from “more influenced by automatic processes” to 
“more influenced by controlled processes.” Where attitudes exist on this spectrum 
may be more difficult to decipher than some might imagine, as evidence exists 
suggesting automatic and controlled processes interact constantly. 
The most basic manifestations of controlled processing, such as directing 
attention, coordinating motor functions, and accessing memory, are not unique to 
humans and are not all that “young” evolutionarily. Rudimentary controlled processes 
are evident in monkeys (Fuster 1989) as well as rats (Kolb and Tees 1990), and the 
PFC is thought to have evolved at least 175 million years ago when the ancestors of 
all present-day mammals first appeared (Jerison 1997), which is “younger” than most 
brain regions associated with the “lizard brain” but still not recent by any means. In 
other words, if we are looking for the evolutionary basis of higher-order principles 
such as individualism or egalitarianism, it is unlikely to be found simply in the 
appearance of the PFC in human evolution. Further, contrary to much prior thinking 
(e.g. Deacon 1997; Holloway 1998), the human PFC is not proportionately larger than 
that of other mammals (Jerison 1997; Semendeferi, Damasio, Frank, and Van Hoesen 
1997; Uylings and Van Eden 1990), suggesting the uniqueness of controlled 
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processing in humans – the set of neural processes that underlay existential thought, 
ideals, and belief systems – is not due to the mere existence of certain brain regions 
absent in other species, but instead is most likely due to connectivity within and across 
areas of the brain (de Schotten, Dell’Acqua, Valabregue, and Catani 2011; DeFelipe, 
Alonso-Nanclares, and Arellano 2002; Fuster 2002; Holloway 2002; Ramnani et al. 
2006). That is, the unique executive functions of the human brain have likely evolved 
because “selectional pressures that bring about brain evolution do so by acting on 
interconnected systems rather than simply on individual brain areas” (Ramnani et al. 
2006, p. 817). Humans have evolved so that quick, automatic and nonconscious 
motivations are in constant communication with controlled, reflective thought. 
The Iterative-Reprocessing (IR) model of the neural bases of evaluation 
provides a roadmap for understanding how automatic and controlled processes 
continually interact with one another (Cunningham, Haas, and Jahn 2011; 
Cunningham and Zelazo 2007; Cunningham, Zelazo, Packer, and Van Bavel 2007). 
According to the IR model, environmental stimuli trigger an iterative evaluative 
process between automatic and controlled processes in the brain whereby the stimuli 
are interpreted repeatedly with regard to increasingly complex representations 
(Cunningham and Zelazo 2007). Critically, as Cunningham and Zelazo note, 
“Whereas evaluations that are based on few iterations of the evaluative cycle are 
relatively automatic, in that they are obligatory and might occur without conscious 
monitoring, evaluations based on additional iterations and computations are relatively 
reflective” (p. 97). Time is therefore a crucial element in this model because 
evaluations become more “complex” as controlled processes reinterpret, or reprocess, 
the stimuli.  
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Bringing it back to Race-Targeted Policies 
The implication of the IR model for understanding the variables of interest in 
this dissertation is therefore fairly straightforward. The range of factors thought to 
drive opinions toward race-targeted government assistance, from primal group biases 
to lofty ideals about individualism and the proper role of government, exists entirely 
on a spectrum from “more influenced by automatic processes” to “more influenced by 
controlled processes”, and no factor exists solely as a function of automatic or 
controlled processes alone. In line with the growing scholarship that acknowledges 
both NMSoT and CCSoT factors, I suggest the variables most influential in driving 
support for race-based government assistance are neither completely automatic nor 
entirely conscious. As such, the existing “principles or prejudice” literature, which is 
predominantly based in the CCSoT but has recently embraced some aspects of the 
NMSoT, is theoretically limited. Instead, I suggest race-targeted attitudes are driven 
primarily by the interaction between automatic and controlled processes. I propose 
that group-based principles directly reflect this interaction because they reflect the 
translation of innate group biases into broad guidelines for thinking about 
contemporary politics – i.e. principles. I suggest group-based principles will be the 
dominant predictor of these race-targeted policy attitudes because such policies 
exemplify the intersection between primal group-based motivations and ideological 
principles. Critically, I propose the mechanism of the dominant role of group-based 
principles is the iterative process that occurs when automatic reactions interact with 
controlled processes. As individuals have more time to evaluate race-based policies, 
their evaluations should transition from being based on automatic group biases to 
being based on broad principles.  
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Caveats 
 The distinction between automatic processes and controlled processes is 
crucial in this dissertation, and so it is worth elaborating. Basically, the distinction 
between automatic and controlled processes reflects the distinction between reflexive, 
often nonconscious neural processes that occur primarily in the limbic system and 
conscious, controlled processes that occur primarily in the frontal cortical regions of 
the brain. Whereas automatic processes are evolutionarily older and motivate 
individuals primarily toward basic survival, controlled processes are evolutionarily 
younger (although still quite old) and serve to allow individuals to interact with the 
complexities of the contemporary world. Automatic and controlled processes are both 
thought to underlay group biases and higher-order thought (i.e. ideological principles 
and values) to some degree, although group biases are theorized as emanating more 
from automatic processes whereas higher-order thought is theorized as emanating 
more from controlled processes. Below, I explain several important caveats regarding 
what the distinction between automatic and controlled processes, as conceptualized in 
this dissertation, does not represent.  
1. “Controlled” does not mean “superior.” One way some readers might 
interpret the distinction between automatic and controlled processes is as 
suggesting controlled processes are “better” than automatic processes because 
they are more deliberate and aimed at accuracy. However, this would not be 
an accurate characterization because as explained above, both are integral to 
human survival, and both underlay even the most “reasoned” and “logical” 
thoughts humans are capable of to some degree. Further, automatic processes 
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are essential for making quick decisions and motivating individuals toward 
goals (see e.g., Eagleman 2011; Kahneman 2011). 
2. Controlled processing does not mean “controlled” in the metaphysical sense. 
The use of the term “controlled” in this dissertation is not meant to reflect a 
role of “free will.” As explained above, controlled processes are 
conceptualized as products of natural selection just as automatic processes are, 
and so the term “controlled” is used simply to denote the more complex 
processes of the frontal cortical regions of the brain, which individuals can be 
consciously aware of. 
3. The distinction between automatic and controlled processes is not simply a 
distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes. Although much work has 
used implicit and explicit attitude measures to tap automatic versus controlled 
processes, and indeed such measures are used several times for this purpose in 
this dissertation, these measures are not pure indicators of automatic or 
controlled processes. In line with the IR model described earlier, automatic 
and controlled processes are both thought to influence implicit and explicit 
attitude measures; the difference is the degree to which each measure is 
influenced by each type of process.  
4. In line with the above caveat, the distinction between automatic and 
controlled processes is not simply a distinction between quick reactions and 
evaluations made over a longer period of time. Although it is theorized, in line 
with the IR model, that time is a critical factor in determining the degree to 
which controlled processes play a role in evaluation, even the quickest 
evaluations (including those made in less than a second) are believed to be 
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influenced somewhat by controlled processes (Cunningham, Haas, and Jahn 
2011). As such, although time plays a central role, the primary distinction is 
between regions in the brain rather than time. 
5. The distinction between automatic processes and higher-order thought is not a 
distinction between processes based in evolution and processes not based in 
evolution. As explained earlier, both automatic and controlled processes are 
thought to have evolved millions of years ago, and although the “higher-order 
thought” examined under the CCSoT (i.e. principles, ideological values, and 
existential thought) is human-specific, controlled processes are not because 
they can be found in all mammals to some degree. 
6. The distinction between automatic and controlled processes is not due to when 
humans began interacting in mass scale society. As explained earlier, mass-
scale society has only been around for approximately 500 years (Diamond 
1998) whereas both automatic and controlled processes have been around for 
millions of years. In that sense, this dissertation is not at odds with the work of 
Petersen and colleagues on the mismatch between contemporary politics and 
evolved human psychology. However, it is proposed in this dissertation that 
controlled processes are what allow humans to apply primal motivations to the 
complex political world of today. 
7. The focus of this dissertation is not simply an interaction term in a regression 
equation. The interaction between gut-level processes and higher- level 
thinking can be operationalized in many different ways and is not simply an 
interaction between two particular variables in a regression. The idea is to 
acknowledge the iterative process by which higher-level “principles” are built 
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from the iterative reprocessing that occurs between limbic and cortical regions 
of the brain. This might be an interaction between two variables aimed at 
gauging these processes, or it might be a single variable that captures the 
combination of these processes.  
Chapter Outline 
 In the remainder of this dissertation, I present empirical findings aimed at 
shedding light on different aspects of the model outlined in this chapter. First, in 
Chapter 2, I take a step back and examine the multitude of constructs that may 
embody the group-based and higher- level factors influencing attitudes toward race-
related political outcomes. I do so using only self-report measures to survey items. 
Specifically, I conduct a survey experiment through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to 
examine the degree to which race-targeted policy attitudes are related to group biases, 
individualistic values, or group-based principles. To examine the role of group biases, 
I use survey items tapping social identity motives – i.e. identification with ingroups. 
To gauge the role of ideological principles and values, I measure adherence to 
individualistic values such as work ethic and self-reliance. Finally, to gauge group-
based principles, I measure SDO. I find that race-targeted policy attitudes are 
explained mostly by preferences for group-based social hierarchy (the “Equality” 
subdimension of SDO). Further, manipulating the work ethic of Whites versus Blacks 
has no effect on policy attitudes. These findings suggest race-targeted policy 
opposition is not purely “principled” but also does not simply boil down to ingroup 
favoritism. Rather, group-based principles seem to be the primary predictor of race-
based policy attitudes. However, these results are constrained to policies assisting 
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Blacks only, and so it is impossible to know if the role of SDO-E is masking ingroup 
favoritism or attitudes specific to Blacks.  
Therefore, in Chapter 3, I address the concern that social desirability might 
account for the seemingly negligible role of ingroup favoritism by utilizing the 
Minimal Groups Paradigm (MGP), in which participants are divided into arbitrary, 
meaningless groups within a laboratory setting. This is crucial because the methods 
used up to this point have likely been influenced by the desire of respondents to 
provide socially acceptable answers that indicate racial tolerance or egalitarianism. To 
tap the role of ingroup favoritism more directly, I strip away the “priors” people have 
about specific racial groups by having them interact with meaningless groups for 
which societal pressures are minimal. In this way, the MGP allows me to look at the 
conditions under which race-specific attitudes and stereotypes are absent. I also 
employ an implicit attitude measure to tap automatic processes underlying evaluations 
of the minimal groups. However, I am still able to introduce opportunities for 
individuals to rely on broad individualistic principles. To do so, I manipulate the work 
ethic of the minimal groups so as to vary the degree to which participants are cued to 
evaluate the groups based on “merit” rather than ingroup/outgroup distinctions. By 
looking at the degree to which ingroup favoritism versus merit-based evaluation in the 
MGP predicts real-world race-targeted policy attitudes, I can gauge the degree to 
which the “principles” people use to judge race-based policies are indeed principled 
as well as the degree to which such judgments are based in ingroup favoritism. I find 
that the only significant predictor of real-world race-based policy attitudes is implicit 
ingroup favoritism in the MGP. I also find that group-based principles are 
significantly associated with both ingroup favoritism (implicit and, to some degree, 
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explicit) and merit-based evaluation. These results suggest that a) the role of 
individualistic principles in predicting race-based policy opinions is inherently tied to 
group-based evaluations, b) the role of ingroup favoritism in evaluations of race-
based policies is based primarily in automatic rather than controlled processes, and c) 
group-based principles embody some combination of automatic group biases and 
conscious, “principled” responses to environmental cues. 
  In the chapters thus far, I will have rigorously tested the degree to which race-
based policy opinions can be declared “principled” versus “group-based,” and 
concluded that the answer is both – i.e. group-based principles play the dominant role 
in predicting race-based policy opinions, principles that are not group-based seem to 
be negligible (except for the role they play in influencing group-based principles), and 
the role of ingroup favoritism seems to emanate from automatic processes. In Chapter 
4, I turn my attention to further drilling down on the role of automatic versus 
controlled processes. I demonstrate the utility of acknowledging the interaction 
between automatic preferences and controlled processes by examining the impact of 
implicit racial ambivalence – or discrepancies between implicit and explicit racial 
attitudes – on a variety of race-related political outcomes. Implicit racial ambivalence 
is not necessarily a direct operationalization of the interaction between automatic and 
controlled processes, but it nonetheless reflects the gap between individuals’ 
conscious considerations (“more controlled” factors) and implicit preferences (“more 
automatic” factors). Using the 2008 ANES data, I show that individual differences in 
implicit racial ambivalence regarding Whites and Blacks have a substantial impact on 
a range of race-related political outcomes, and that implicit racial ambivalence 
moderates the influence of higher-order principles such as egalitarianism and political 
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ideology on these outcomes. Therefore, the interaction between automatic and 
controlled processes seems not only to influence race-based policy attitudes directly, 
but also to moderate the role of higher-order principles. Returning briefly to the data 
used in Chapter 3, I demonstrate further that implicit ambivalence is negatively 
associated with ingroup favoritism. 
In Chapter 5, I directly examine the neural processes that have thus far been 
assumed to underlay the roles of automatic and controlled processes by using fMRI. 
By using fMRI, I am able to determine the degree to which brain regions associated 
with controlled processing such as the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC) relate to racial biases in support for government assistance as well as 
reliance on group-based principles. In the experiment, I introduce participants to 
hypothetical individuals applying for government assistance and ask whether they 
support or oppose assistance to that individual. I experimentally manipulate the race 
of the applicant as well as whether the applicant’s race is known consciously or only 
primed subliminally. This way, I can compare what happens when individuals are 
only implicitly made aware of the race of the target of government assistance versus 
when individuals are consciously aware of the target’s race. According to the model 
laid out in this dissertation, we should see greater activity in the cortical regions of the 
brain (the PFC and ACC, to be specific) when individuals are consciously aware of 
the applicant’s race compared to when they are only nonconsciously aware of the 
applicant’s race. Further, individuals’ evaluations should fall more in line with their 
broader ideological principles (specifically, SDO) when race is consciously known 
than when race is only subconsciously known because controlled processes can then 
exert greater influence. I find increased pro-Black biases in support for government 
42 
 
 
 
assistance in trials where race is consciously primed, and these increased pro-Black 
evaluations are associated with being low in SDO-D, but not SDO-E. More centrally 
for the purposes of this dissertation, I also find that brain activation patterns in the 
ACC and PFC largely behave as expected, although primarily with regard to the 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and SDO-E.  
Finally, in Chapter 6, I summarize the empirical findings of the previous 
chapters and assess the implications of these findings for the overarching framework 
outlined in this dissertation. Specifically, I summarize the results of my empirical 
investigations and discuss how the findings of the studies presented suggest the 
primal, gut-level factors studied under the NMSoT necessarily interact with controlled 
processes in order to yield higher-order principles and attitudes toward politics. The 
model developed in this dissertation holds substantial implications for how we 
understand a range of popular concepts, such as social desirability bias, symbolic 
racism, and system justification. With regard to race-based policy attitudes, 
specifically, these findings hold substantial implications for advancing and in some 
cases revising the “principles or prejudice” literature. Importantly, these findings also 
hold implications for predicting the utility of interventions designed to reduce the role 
of racial prejudice in contemporary politics.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Disentangling “Principles” and “Prejudice”: Ingroup Favoritism, 
Individualism, and Group-Based Principles  
“In the social scientific imagination, it is as if the advantaged are relentlessly looking 
to cash in on their dominance and the disadvantaged are proud revolutionaries-in-
waiting. Both types of groups are seen as primarily self-interested, and overt conflicts 
of interest are assumed to be endemic.” 
- John T. Jost, Mahzarin R. Banaji, and Brian A. Nosek2 
Disputes over the legitimacy of policies like affirmative action are often 
framed as emanating from principled disagreements over the proper role of 
government, with those opposing such policies arguing the government should not be 
selectively assisting any person, regardless of their group memberships. Others argue 
such justifications for opposing race-targeted policies are really just rationalizations 
for deep-seated racial prejudice or group biases. As outlined in the previous chapter, 
this conflict is reflected in the mixed empirical research on the topic, with evidence 
building in support of the roles of both prejudice (e.g. Henry and Sears 2002; Kinder 
and Sears 1981; Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996) and individualism (e.g. Sniderman 
and Tetlock 1986; Sniderman et al. 1996) depending on how individualism and 
prejudice are operationalized. I suggest these mixed findings are partly due to a 
critical source of confusion: we don’t fully understand how the multi- faceted 
constructs of individualism and group-based attitudes relate to one another, and how 
they interact to yield attitudes toward race-targeted policies. In other words, existing 
work in the “principles or prejudice” literature has yet to thoroughly define what the 
roles of “principles” or “prejudice” represent, let alone make a distinction between 
ingroup favouritism and group-based principles. 
                                                 
2 Jost, J. T., Banaji, M. R., & Nosek, B. A. (2004). A decade of system justification theory: 
Accumulated evidence of conscious and unconscious bolstering of the status quo. Political 
Psychology, 25(6), 881-919. 
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Existing work has predominantly evaluated whether individualism or 
prejudice underlay race-based policy attitudes by gauging the role of single attitudinal 
constructs or testing whether or not racial biases exist in support for government 
assistance policies. However, it remains unknown which sorts of individualistic 
values underlay the role of individualism, as well as whether the role of prejudice 
conveys ingroup favoritism or broad group-based ideologies. If the central thesis of 
this dissertation – that group-based principles rather than automatic group biases or 
individualistic principles alone drive opinions toward race-targeted government 
assistance – then the distinction between ingroup favoritism and group-based 
ideologies is a critical one. Further, how should we be thinking about “individualistic 
principles”? Are such principles most likely to manifest as a blanket opposition to 
government assistance to anyone, or do such principles allow for some to receive 
assistance so long as they are “deserving”? Shedding light on these questions is a 
critical first step in this dissertation, as it allows us to move beyond the question of 
whether principles or prejudice influence race-based policy attitudes and toward the 
question of how each influences such attitudes.  
There are two primary goals of this chapter. First and most critically, this 
chapter unravels the often unclear and overlapping conceptualizations of the 
dimensions making up individualism and group-based preferences that beset the 
existing literature on race-based policy attitudes. Three primary categories of factors 
are examined: individualistic values, social identity motives, and group-based 
ideologies. I refer to “social identity motives” instead of “ingroup favoritism” because 
in this chapter, I simply examine the role of beliefs and motivations related to 
people’s ingroups rather than constructing some measure of bias against other groups. 
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I do so in order to directly gauge individuals’ ingroup attachments rather than relying 
on a measure reflecting some manifestation of those attachments. The social identity 
literature has been key to understanding the functions of these attachments and 
motivations (e.g. Hogg and Abrams 2007; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner et al. 
1981).  
Each of these three primary dimensions are broken up further into several 
components. Individualism, in particular, is often assumed to be unidimensional. This 
study acknowledges distinct aspects of individualism such as self-reliance and work 
ethic. Regarding “prejudice,” research has yet to disentangle whether social identity 
motives or group-based ideologies best represent the role of prejudice in predicting 
race-based policy attitudes. Further, work has shown both Social Dominance 
Orientation (SDO; Pratto et al. 1994) and ingroup identification are multidimensional 
(Ho et al. 2012; Roccas et al. 2008). This study pits the roles of individualism, social 
identity, and social dominance – as well as the multiple dimensions comprising each – 
against one another to shed light on which ideological and group-based processes are 
most central to race-based policy attitudes. 
The second goal of this chapter is to test the proposition that group-based 
attitudes underlay the effects of individualism on race-targeted policy attitudes while 
acknowledging the multi-dimensional nature of both group-based attitudes and 
individualism. Prior work has shown the effects of SDO on race-targeted policies are 
often mediated by individualism-related constructs (Federico and Sidanius 2002; 
Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996), suggesting “principled” objections to policies like 
affirmative action are more “prejudiced” than they claim to be (also see, e.g. Reyna et 
al. 2005). This assertion has significant implications for the questions tackled in this 
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dissertation because if the role of individualism is entirely explained by group-based 
motivations, it is strong evidence in favor of the dominant role of NMSoT factors 
over CCSoT factors, and contrary to what I propose in this dissertation, we may not 
need to account for higher-order principles at all when predicting race-based policy 
attitudes. However, it remains unknown which aspects of group-based attitudes, 
whether a particular dimension of SDO or some aspect of group identity, explain 
which aspects of individualism (e.g. self-reliance, work ethic) and thus account for 
this mediation. Thus, if group-based factors do underlay the role of individualism, we 
still do not know whether this is because of innate motivations to favor ingroups or 
group-based principles, which entail some degree of higher-order thought. 
Competing Conceptualizations of Individualism 
The traditional conservative stance on government assistance is often summed 
up as a belief in “pulling yourself up by your bootstraps.” But what does it mean to 
pull oneself up by one’s bootstraps? Is the value being placed on the fact that people 
are doing it on their own—independently and without help? Or, does the intrinsic 
value of such an act hinge on the hard work that inevitably goes into overcoming an 
obstacle? Ambiguity surrounding the concept has plagued the existing literature, with 
measures of individualism ranging from questions roughly approximating the 
Protestant Work Ethic (Furnham 1990; e.g. Kinder and Mendelberg 2000) to sheer 
self-reported political conservatism (e.g. Sniderman et al. 1996). Despite some 
grappling with this conceptual problem (e.g. Sniderman, Crosby, and Howell 2000), 
we still lack an empirical investigation of how to best operationalize individualism as 
it pertains to race-targeted policy attitudes. In this chapter, I acknowledge the 
potentially distinct roles of two factors underlying individualism: work ethic and self-
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reliance. In both cases, these are consciously held values consistent with what is 
called higher-order thought in this dissertation, but there are important differences in 
the implications associated with each. If the role of individualism is explained by self-
reliance, higher-order thought manifests in the formation of race-based policy 
opinions as equal rejection of government assistance to individuals regardless of 
group membership. However, if the role of individualism is explained by work ethic, 
higher-order thought should be conceptualized as reliance on deservingness cues to 
determine who may receive government assistance.  
A common conceptualization of individualism is the Protestant Work Ethic, or 
the belief that hard work is the key to success. According to some, adherence to such a 
work ethic is thought to “fuse” with racial prejudice to form symbolic racism as 
explained in the previous chapter (Kinder and Sears 1981; Henry and Sears 2002; 
Rabinowitz, Sears, Sidanius, and Krosnick 2009; Sears and Henry 2003; Sears et al. 
1997). Work ethic is posited to be inherent to constructs like symbolic racism, in which 
Blacks are seen as not sufficiently hardworking to warrant assistance. Kinder and 
Mendelberg (2000) utilize a measure of individualism developed by Feldman (1988), 
which closely approximates the values related to work ethic, and find that symbolic 
racism outperforms sheer individualism in predicting race-based policy attitudes. 
 The lack of conceptual clarity regarding this brand of individualism has been 
identified by Sniderman, Crosby, and Howell (2000) in a critical analysis of symbolic 
racism. According to Sniderman et al., the items used in the symbolic racism scale 
“have nothing to do with individualism” (p. 243). Sniderman et al. defer to an 
Emersonian view of individualism as an ethic of self-reliance in one’s own life. As 
such, individualism is conceptualized as a high valuation of independence regardless 
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of how hardworking an individual is. They proceed to use political ideology as a more 
apt proxy for individualism as it represents preferences for limited government and thus 
the degree to which people prefer a society unassisted by government intervention. 
They find preferences for limited government to outperform racial attitudes in 
predicting policy attitudes.  
 Yet even if one agrees with the proposition that symbolic racism muddies the 
concept of individualism, is Emersonian self-reliance the “true” individualism that we 
should be concerned with, and is political ideology a sufficient proxy for such 
individualism? Further, there is still ambiguity regarding whether the key aspect of 
individualism underlying race-targeted policy attitudes is self-reliance or a high 
valuation of hard work. Kinder and Mendelberg (2000) explicitly discuss individualism 
in terms of both Tocqueville’s ideas about the American citizen being isolated from 
large-scale society (p. 45) and Weber’s ideas about work ethic (p. 46). However, no 
work to date explicitly sets out to disentangle the effects of these alternative notions of 
individualism.  
Perhaps most concerning is the fact that the measures of political ideology 
used in existing work constitute a wide range of factors beyond preferences for 
limited government, some of which are explicitly related to group-based attitudes 
(e.g. Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009; Jost et al. 2003). In other words, research that 
uses ideology measures as proxies for individualism are likely conflating 
individualism with a variety of other factors that may include the very group-based 
attitudes that the role of individualism is being compared to.  
Social Dominance, Group Identity, and the Multiple Facets of Each 
As with individualism, the role of “prejudice” in existing literature has also 
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been construed quite broadly. This is because the primary goal of existing research 
has been to determine whether people’s attitudes toward race-based policies are due 
to racial biases or nonracial principles. As such, this literature has gauged the relative 
influence of individualism versus prejudice by testing the explanatory power of scales 
measuring racial prejudice against scales measuring individualism (Bobo 1998; Henry 
and Sears 2002; Kinder and Mendelberg 2000; Sears and Henry 2003; Sniderman, 
Crosby, and Howell 2000) or by examining whether biases exist in support for 
government assistance to racial minority groups compared to nonracial groups 
(Kinder and Mendelberg 2000; Kuklinski et al. 1997; Reyna et al. 2005; Sears et al. 
1997; Sniderman et al. 1996; Sniderman, Crosby, and Howell 2000; Sniderman et al. 
1991). Although these efforts have made tremendous headway in advancing 
understandings of how racial attitudes compete with individualism in predicting race-
related political outcomes, in order to more precisely determine the specific 
mechanisms of these relationships, it is necessary to break down “prejudice” into its 
constituent parts. This study considers two distinct aspects of group-based attitudes 
that might reasonably comprise the role of “prejudice” yet have unique implications 
for understanding how, exactly, group-based preferences influence policy attitudes.  
One component of group-based attitudes examined in this study is the set of 
beliefs individuals have about how groups in society should be organized. Such 
beliefs, defined in the previous chapter as group-based principles, are distinct from 
social identity motives because they do not necessarily entail favoring the groups one 
belongs to. Instead, group-based principles are broad ideological beliefs about how 
groups should interact with one another irrespective of the groups one belongs to. 
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This chapter focuses on one particular form of group-based principles that has been at 
the center of research on race-based policy attitudes: Social Dominance Orientation.  
SDO researchers have made great strides in showing that broad preferences 
regarding how groups in society are organized significantly predict attitudes toward 
policies assisting minority groups (e.g. Federico and Sidanius 2002; Pratto, Sidanius, 
and Levin 2006; Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996). Critically, social dominance 
theory differs from psychology work centered on social identity because it strives to 
encompass the wide array of factors associated with the universal tendency for 
societies to organize hierarchically in groups beyond just individuals’ motivations to 
identify with and favor ingroups. These factors include cultural ideologies, 
institutions, “real” conflicts between groups over finite resources, personality 
differences between individuals, and evolutionary mechanisms, among others (Pratto, 
Sidanius, and Levin 2006). Accordingly, individual differences in SDO are thought to 
reflect differences in the legitimizing myths – or “consensually held values, attitudes, 
beliefs, stereotypes, and cultural ideologies” (Pratto, Sidanius, and Levin 2006, p. 
275) – that people rely upon to either enhance or attenuate group-based hierarchy in 
society. In contrast to social identity forces, which motivate individuals to favor their 
ingroup, both dominant and subordinate group members can latch onto the same 
legitimizing myths, and so it is often the case that subordinate group members 
subscribe to hierarchy-enhancing myths and dominant group members subscribe to 
hierarchy-attenuating myths (Pratto, Sidanius, and Levin 2006; see also Sidanius and 
Pratto 1999).  
SDO has been shown to consist of two distinct dimensions: SDO-Dominance 
(SDO-D), which represents individuals’ support for active dominance by superior 
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groups over inferior groups, and SDO-Equality (SDO-E), which represents 
individuals’ rejection of equality between groups via subtle, often indirect means (Ho 
et al. 2012). Thus, whereas SDO-D predicts variables such as old-fashioned racism, 
nationalism, and support for immigrant persecution, SDO-E predicts variables such as 
opposition to welfare, affirmative action, and other redistributive policies (Ho et al. 
2015; Jost and Thompson 2000; Kugler, Cooper, and Nosek 2010). Essentially, 
whereas manifestations of SDO-D tend to be overt and easily recognizable, 
manifestations of SDO-E tend to be covert and guised as unrelated to group 
preferences.  
Although studies have largely parsed out the differential effects of SDO-D and 
SDO-E on race-targeted policies, the explanatory power of the dimensions of SDO (or 
any group-based principle for that matter) relative to other group-based preferences 
remain unknown. Specifically, as suggested throughout this dissertation, people’s 
attitudes toward how groups in society should be arranged hierarchically are not 
necessarily the same as their attitudes toward the groups they belong to. Several 
studies find that of the two dimensions of SDO, it is SDO-D that seems to be most 
related to ethnocentrism and other social identity motives (Jost and Thompson 2000; 
Kugler, Cooper, and Nosek 2010). However, Ho et al. (2015) find that neither SDO-D 
nor SDO-E are related to ethnic identity among disadvantaged minority groups in a 
way that would be consistent with ingroup favoritism. Thus, despite the 
preponderance of research showing that SDO is a substantial predictor of race-based 
policy attitudes, it remains unknown how the explanatory power of SDO compares to 
social identity motives to favor ingroups.  
Indeed, as summarized in the prior chapter, seminal work in psychology has 
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shown the tendency to favor ingroups to be a fairly universal and powerful force in 
driving human attitudes and behavior (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner et al. 1987), yet 
there is substantial variation in the degree to which people identify with ingroups and 
derogate outgroups in general (Brewer 1999, 2001; Sumner 1906). Kinder and Kam 
(2009) have shown broad identification with groups, or ethnocentrism, varies quite a 
bit across individuals and predicts a wide array of political issue attitudes (see also 
Huddy 2001). Specifically with regard to attitude toward affirmative action, Lowery 
et al. (2006) showed ingroup favoritism to predict opposition to affirmative action 
independent of concerns regarding outgroups. This work is crucial because it suggests 
sheer ingroup favoritism, rather than broad preferences for group-based hierarchy, 
may be a driving factor behind race-based policy attitudes. However, existing work is 
still lacking because it has yet to directly pit these distinct forces against one another, 
and also because even social identity motives are not unidimensional. 
Roccas et al. (2008) test a multi-dimensional conceptualization of ingroup 
identification. According to this work, group identity can vary along four dimensions: 
Importance, or the degree to which individuals feel that the groups they belong to are 
important to who they are; Commitment, or the degree to which individuals aim to 
benefit and help the groups they belong to; Superiority, or the degree to which 
individuals view the groups they belong to as superior to other groups; and Deference, 
or the degree to which individuals believe it is important to honor and revere their 
groups’ norms, symbols, and leaders. They show that SDO (modeled as a single 
dimension) is most related to the Superiority dimension of group identification, 
suggesting even if SDO-D is related to social identity motives as suggested by other 
studies (Jost and Thompson 2000; Kugler, Cooper, and Nosek 2010), it nonetheless 
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only reflects a single dimension of identity concerns. In order to fully gauge the role 
of identification with ingroups relative to group-based principles in predicting race-
targeted policy attitudes, this study acknowledges the multidimensionality of group 
identity.  
Is Individualism Just an Excuse for Prejudice? 
A critical goal of this chapter is to shed light on a central finding of existing 
work on race-based policy attitudes: that “principled” individualistic arguments 
against race-targeted policies are often explained by group-based preferences. This 
suggests individualistic values are primarily used as an “excuse” for evaluating race-
based policies based on what group receives assistance from the policy. In this 
chapter, this is referred to as the “principled mediation” hypothesis, and its 
proponents generally suggest contemporary individualism often serves as a socially 
acceptable vehicle for expressing prejudice.  
Empirical work addressing this issue has generally concluded that although 
measures of individualism tend to largely predict race-based policy opposition, their 
roles are largely explained by group-based preferences. Correlational analyses have 
suggested SDO explains principled objections to affirmative action (Federico and 
Sidanius 2002; Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996), and experimental evidence suggests 
the link between conservatism and affirmative action attitudes is explained by 
stereotypes about Blacks (Reyna et al. 2005). However, a test of this proposition that 
acknowledges a distinction between group-based principles and social identity 
motives, and the multiple dimensions of each, has yet to be done. Do group-based 
preferences explain the role of work ethic or self-reliance? Is the relationship between 
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individualism and opposition to race-based policies explained by broad hierarchy-
enhancing ideologies or by ingroup favoritism?  
The distinction between the role of social identity motives and group-based 
principles is key because if the role of individualism is entirely explained by ingroup 
favoritism, it suggests higher-order thought has little, if anything, to do with race-
based policy evaluations. However, if the role of individualism is explained by group-
based principles, it suggests higher-order thought plays a role but we have simply 
been misunderstanding it. Then again, the principled mediation hypothesis has not 
been tested with the array of measures used in this study, and so it is also possible that 
with more direct measures of the distinct dimensions of “principles” and “prejudice,” 
the principled mediation finding of past research does not replicate.  
Work building on evolutionary theory actually supports the idea that 
individualistic principles may be deeply rooted and are not necessarily just vehicles 
for the expression of group biases. Petersen and colleagues have argued that reliance 
on deservingness heuristics to evaluate whether or not individuals should receive 
assistance is evolutionarily rooted in within-group interactions in small-scale group 
living among human ancestors. Specifically, it was adaptive for humans only to share 
resources with “hardworking” others because according to the “logic of social 
exchange,” these individuals were the most likely to be able to reciprocate with favors 
or resources. Conversely, “lazy” individuals or “cheaters” who exploited the good 
will of others were less likely to reciprocate (Petersen 2012; Petersen, Sznycer, 
Cosmides, and Tooby 2012; see also Cosmides and Tooby 1992; 2005; Price, 
Cosmides, and Tooby 2002). In the context of present-day politics, it is suggested 
these evolved psychological tools are applied to evaluations of social welfare 
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programs because, through aspects of the environments such as media or 
socialization, individuals learn to apply this deep-seated mechanism of determining 
one’s deservingness to mass-scale politics (Petersen 2012; Petersen et al. 2012). 
Accordingly, individualistic values – or at least work ethic because work ethic allows 
for the possibility of assisting others as long as they are deserving – may be expected 
to influence race-based policy attitudes net any effects from group-based attitudes. 
Overview and Hypotheses 
 The empirical tests of this chapter were done using data from an online 
survey, and include correlational analyses using Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) 
in conjunction with an experimental manipulation of the degree to which different 
groups are seen as hardworking. 
Self-Reliance versus Work Ethic 
Two conceptualizations of individualism are measured: 1) self-reliance, i.e. a 
belief that individuals should strive to be self-sufficient and avoid dependence on 
others, and 2) work ethic, i.e. a belief that hard work is a necessary and sufficient 
prerequisite for success. Most existing literature interprets the role of individualism as 
a combination of self-reliance and work ethic, and so there is no strong empirical 
basis for expecting one to play a role rather than the other. However, most work, 
including work based in evolutionary theory by Petersen and colleagues, makes the 
implicit assumption that there are instances in which most people will support 
assistance to certain individuals even if they are opposed to government assistance in 
general, which would favor the role of perceptions of deservingness and work ethic 
rather than blanket opposition to any government assistance in line with self-reliance. 
If deservingness heuristics are indeed, as Petersen and colleagues claim, evolved 
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mechanisms for detecting cheaters, people should be willing to assist individuals seen 
as hardworking. As such, the experimental manipulation targets the role of work ethic 
by varying the degree to which Blacks versus Whites are seen as hardworking. 
Nonetheless, the ideals associated with living on one’s own, isolated from broader 
society, are prominent in the United States. Tocqueville’s observations of American 
society are often reflected in libertarian rhetoric as well as popular media such as 
television shows about the charm of frontier living.  
Group-Based Principles, Social Identity Motives, and the Dimensions of Each 
 I disentangle “prejudice” by including separate measures of group-based 
principles (SDO-D and SDO-E) and social identity motives (ingroup importance, 
ingroup commitment, ingroup superiority, and ingroup deference). Most existing 
work on the role of “prejudice” in influencing race-based policy attitudes has focused 
on racial prejudice without aiming to distinguish between group-based principles and 
social identity let alone the subdimensions of each, and so remains agnostic as to 
which is the primary factor driving the role of prejudice. However, some research 
points decidedly at one versus the other. On the one hand, SDO research suggests 
opposition to race-targeted government assistance is driven by hierarchy-enhancing 
ideologies that can be embraced by both dominant- and subordinate-group members, 
and so sides with the role of group-based principles (Federico and Sidanius 2002; 
Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996; Ho et al. 2015; Jost and Thompson 2000). If enough 
controlled processing occurs when people evaluate race-targeted policies, we should 
expect deep-seated ingroup bias to be translated into higher-order principles that 
apply to how groups should be organized broadly. On the other hand, the role of sheer 
ingroup favoritism has been noted by several studies as well (e.g. Dovidio, Mann, and 
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Gaertner 1989; Lowery et al. 2006). Ingroup favoritism is fairly deep-seated in human 
attitudes and behavior and occurs automatically, and scholars have increasingly 
argued that quick, automatic preferences dominate people’s political evaluations (e.g. 
Lodge and Taber 2013). Given that I expect sufficient controlled processing to occur 
when people evaluate race-targeted policies, I nonetheless expect SDO to outperform 
ingroup favoritism.  
Explaining “Principled Mediation” 
 Mediational analyses using SEM are used to disentangle the dimensions of 
individualism and group-based attitudes that explain the “principled mediation” 
finding of past research. Most prior work seems to suggest individualism masks 
ingroup favoritism, because people use individualistic arguments to abide by social 
norms that frown upon the self-interest inherent in ingroup favoritism. However, it 
would be consistent with the proposed model of this dissertation if individualism were 
mediated by group-based principles – i.e. SDO – because it is hypothesized 
throughout this dissertation that group-based principles will be the dominant predictor 
of race-based attitudes. With regard to the dimensions of SDO, some research would 
suggest SDO-E is the main factor underlying the role of individualism because it 
reflects the subtle, hierarchy-enhancing ideologies often used to justify inequality and 
thus should be most related to how individualism is used as a rationale for opposing 
redistributive policies.  
There is little a priori theory for predicting which dimension of individualism 
group-based attitudes underlay. On the one hand, group-based attitudes may underlay 
self-reliance because a laissez-faire approach to government allows dominant groups 
to remain on top and subordinate groups to remain on the bottom. The caveat here is 
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that if social identity motives are the primary factor underlying self-reliance, we 
would expect this mediation to occur only among members of dominant groups. If 
group-based principles underlay self-reliance, this mediation should occur regardless 
of group membership. On the other hand, according to work suggesting stereotypes 
about Blacks being lazy are key to race-based policy opposition (Henry and Sears 
2002; Reyna et al. 2005), work ethic may be the dimension of individualism most 
driven by group-based attitudes because such values can be relied upon selectively as 
a means of assigning deservingness to groups.  
Data and Measures 
Eight hundred and twenty-four adults were recruited through Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) between January 7th and January 16th 2015 in exchange for 
$1 in compensation. Participants were required to have successfully completed at 
least 500 MTurk Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs), have been approved for at least 
95% of the HITs they completed, and had to reside in the United States. Due to 
incorrect responses on attention questions implemented throughout the survey, 199 
participants had to be dropped from the sample.3 Further, only White respondents 
were analyzed for the purposes of this study due to the large amounts of expected 
heterogeneity in support for race-targeted government assistance across races (see e.g. 
Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears and Henry 2003). The remaining sample of 513 adults 
was 40.9% male, and had a median age of 37 years old. Politically, the sample was 
53.2% liberal, 20.1% moderate, and 26.7% conservative as measured by a five-point 
                                                 
3 For the attention questions, participants were asked to mark a specific response option on a 5-point 
scale from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree” for each of 3 items dispersed throughout the 
survey. Participants who marked the wrong option for any of these 3 items were dropped from 
analyses. This fairly strict criterion may explain the somewhat high rate of failure on these questions. 
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self-report measure. MTurk has been shown to be reasonably representative of the 
U.S. population when compared to student samples but less representative – 
specifically, more educated and more liberal – than national surveys using random 
sampling (e.g., Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz, 2011; Buhrmester et al., 2011; Clifford, 
Jewell, and Waggoner, 2015). Thus this survey displayed similar biases to a typical 
MTurk sample (barring education, which was not measured).  
Individualism. The development of questions gauging self-reliance and work 
ethic was influenced by widely-used measures of Protestant Work Ethic (PWE; 
Furnham 1990), but were specifically adopted from prior work on the 
multidimensionality of PWE, which divides items into one of several dimensions 
including self-reliance and work ethic (Miller, Woehr, and Hudspeth 2001).  
Social identity motives. Broad identification with ingroups were measured via 
a modified version of a scale created by Roccas et al. (2008), which measures four 
dimensions of group identity as described earlier: Commitment, Importance, 
Deference, and Superiority.  
Social Dominance Orientation. Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) was 
measured via the original 16-item scale (Pratto et al. 1994) and consisted of two 
dimensions: SDO-Dominance (SDO-D) and SDO-Equality (SDO-E), which gauge 
preferences for the domination of some groups over others and rejection of equality 
between groups, respectively (see Ho et al. 2012).  
Race-targeted policy attitudes. Participants indicated on 7-point scales from 
“Strongly Oppose” to “Strongly Support” how they felt toward three redistributive 
race-targeted government assistance policies (affirmative action for Blacks in hiring 
for jobs, increased federal education spending in neighborhoods predominantly 
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populated by Blacks, and federally funded college scholarships for Blacks). These 
three items were used as indicators of a latent construct reflecting support for race-
based government assistance (α = 0.92). 
Work Ethic Manipulation. Participants were split randomly into one of five 
conditions: a Control condition, the Blacks High Merit condition, the Blacks Low Merit 
Condition, the Disabled High Merit condition, or the Disabled Low Merit condition. In 
every condition, participants were asked to read several pages of information that were 
collected in March 2014 as part of a scientific report aimed at looking at how various 
demographic groups are similar to or different from one another. This information was 
not shown to participants until all questions had been answered except the manipulat ion 
check items (described below) and items aimed specifically at group-based policy 
attitudes, which the manipulations were intended to influence.  
The information shown was all fabricated, which participants were told in a 
debriefing letter sent out after all data collection was complete. In all conditions, three 
sets of results from the fictitious study were presented to participants with short 
summaries of the result, why the topic was investigated, a graph displaying each result, 
and a few sentences explaining each graph. The content of these three results of the 
fictitious report was held constant across conditions and was related to the geographic 
distribution of Mormons in the United States, the age distribution of voters in the 2008 
Presidential Election, and gender differences in perceptions of who is the “head of the 
household” – a male or a female.  
In each of the four conditions besides the control condition, the three findings 
from the report described above were preceded by an additional finding related to the 
average amount of hours per week spent working across two demographic groups. In 
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the Blacks High Merit condition, participants were shown the (fictitious) finding that 
on average, Blacks work more hours per week (47 hours) than Whites (30). In the 
Blacks Low Merit condition, these numbers were simply reversed so that Whites were 
shown to work more hours on average per week. The Disabled High Merit and Disabled 
Low Merit conditions reflected these exact same conditions except that the groups 
being compared were disabled persons and non-disabled persons. The reason for 
including manipulations aimed at disabled persons, as well as the results regarding 
these manipulations, are explained in the next chapter. For this chapter, the 
manipulations of interest involve Blacks and Whites. As explained above, non-White 
participants were omitted from analyses so that Blacks are always the outgroup.  
Following the presentation of information from the fictitious report, 
participants were asked questions gauging their perceptions of a variety of traits 
among a variety of groups including Blacks and disabled persons. Perceptions of how 
“hardworking” each group was (on a 7-point scale from “not hardworking” to 
“hardworking”) were included in each battery as a manipulation check to ensure that 
the information they read did, on average, influence perceptions of the work ethic of 
the relevant groups. The survey concluded with participants answering a series of 
questions about their levels of support for or opposition to group-based policies as 
described above.  
Each model in the analyses controls for the effects of age, sex, religion 
(Christian or non-Christian), and political ideology (on a 7-point scale from “Strongly 
Liberal” to “Strongly Conservative”).4 The exact items used for each measure as well 
as the materials for the work ethic manipulation can be found in the Appendix.  
                                                 
4 The effects of control variables are not discussed in this chapter but are available upon request. 
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Results 
Confirmatory Factor Analyses 
Confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) using robust maximum likelihood 
(MLR) estimation were performed in order to disentangle the potentially distinct 
dimensions comprising both individualism and group-based attitudes. The MLR 
estimation procedure adjusts standard errors to take into account the degree to which 
the data are not normally distributed, and is recommended for data that involve 
Likert-scale items such as those used in this study (e.g. Rhemtulla, Brosseau-Liard, 
and Savalei 2012). A scaling correction factor is estimated through the use of MLR to 
reflect the degree to which the data are not normally distributed, with numbers farther 
from 1 indicating greater skewness. 
CFAs were first run separately for each individualism- and group-related 
construct to ensure the dimensions underlying each were measured adequately, and 
then jointly in a single model to assess relationships between dimensions and test 
whether each dimension was indeed distinct. Error covariances were added between 
individual factor items to account for large positive residual covariances (which 
indicate left over covariance between items not accounted for by the factor) and thus 
improve model fit. This resulted in three error covariances for the self-reliance factor 
of individualism and two error covariances for the work ethic factor of individualism. 
For group-based attitudes, one error covariance was estimated for the commitment 
dimension of group identity, one for SDO-D, and two for SDO-E. Error covariances 
between indicators were estimated only if they were theoretically appropriate (in all 
cases, they involved items from the same factor that had very similar wording) and 
significantly improved model fit. Items for which error covariances were estimated 
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are noted in the Appendix. The best-fitting model estimated each dimension 
separately, lending support to the idea that group-based principles, social identity 
motives, and individualism, as well as their subdimensions, are distinct. The 
correlations between each factor are shown in Table 2.1 and model fit for the joint 
CFA is shown in the caption. Full results from each CFA are available upon request. 
Table 2.1 shows the individualism factors were significantly related to one 
another as expected. However, it should be noted that although both of the 
individualism factors were significantly related, they were not redundant. When we 
turn to group-based attitudes, it is evident that just as with individualism, a 
unidimensional conceptualization of group-based preferences is not appropriate. 
Although there was a high degree of correlation within the sub-dimensions making up 
group identity and group-based principles, the correlations between factors 
representing group identity and factors representing SDO were quite low. Although 
many correlations were in the expected direction, many of the factors assumed to be 
related in past work were only modestly correlated if at all. In particular, the 
correlations between each of the four dimensions of group identity were only 
modestly correlated with SDO-D (except for Commitment, which was uncorrelated) 
and the only two correlations with SDO-E were quite weak. The largest correlation 
between SDO and the group identification constructs existed between the deference 
dimension of group identity and SDO-D, despite the fact that prior work has 
suggested that SDO should be most related to the superiority dimension. These results 
thus illustrate the multi-dimensionality of group-based attitudes and a distinction 
between SDO (i.e. group-based principles) and ingroup-related attitudes (i.e. social 
identity motives).   
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Table 2.1. Correlation Matrix for All Latent Factors of Individualism, Social Identity Motives, and Group-
Based Principles 
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Of particular interest for this chapter are the crossover relationships between 
individualism, social identity motives, and SDO. Both individualism factors were positively 
related to superiority and deference, although the correlations for work ethic were substantially 
stronger than the correlations for self-reliance. Importance and commitment were also positively 
related to work ethic, but unlike any of the other group-based attitude factors, they were 
unrelated to self-reliance. Finally, turning to group-based principles, SDO-D was weakly 
positively correlated with both individualism factors and SDO-E was positively associated with 
work ethic but unrelated to self-reliance.   
Structural Equation Models 
The primary analyses of this chapter involve using the multiple dimensions of 
individualism, social identity motives, and group-based principles to predict race-based policy 
attitudes as well as to explain the relationship between individualism and race-based policy 
attitudes. Analyses were first conducted to estimate the simultaneous effects of all individualism 
and group-related constructs on race-based policy attitudes. Then, based on these full model 
results, subsequent models tested the degree to which the relationship between individualism and 
race-based policy attitudes was explained by either social identity motives or group-based 
principles. SEMs were run with the same estimation procedures as with the CFAs. Due to high 
collinearity between the commitment and importance dimensions of group identity, these factors 
were combined in this and all subsequent models.5  
Figure 1 illustrates the results of an SEM predicting support for race-based government 
assistance with all factors comprising individualism, social identity motives, and group-based 
                                                 
5 The results did not change substantially when using these factors individually instead. 
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principles. It should be noted that even with just these variables in the model, nearly half of the 
variation in support for race-based government assistance was explained. This amount of 
explained variance was approximately the same when control variables were excluded from the 
model (R2 = .506 without control variables).6  
 
Figure 2.1: SEM Predicting Race-Based Policy Attitudes with Individualism, Social 
Identity Motives, and Group-Based Principles 
SDO-E was the most predictive factor out of all categories of constructs, followed by 
importance of/commitment to ingroups, which is positively associated with support for race-
based government assistance, and finally self-reliance. Work ethic was only marginally related to 
support for government assistance. SDO-D, superiority, and deference all showed no significant 
                                                 
6 This slight increase in the amount of variance explained when control variables are excluded is likely due to the 
fact that the unique variance explained by each primary independent variable increases when the collinearity 
between those variables and the control variables is excluded from the model.  
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relationship with race-based policy attitudes when the effects of the other constructs were 
simultaneously estimated.  The results of this model are notable for several reasons. First, group-
based principles – specifically, SDO-E – were dominant in predicting race-targeted policy 
support.7 However, SDO-E was not the only dimension that mattered. Social identity motives 
were influential, but in the opposite direction than expected. The importance and commitment 
factors were actually positively related to support for race-targeted policies assisting Blacks.8 It 
thus seems that the effects of group identity on policy attitudes are far from unidimens ional. 
Although other social identity motives such as believing one’s ingroups are superior to other 
groups or believing ingroup norms and leaders should be obeyed are unrelated to race-based 
policy support, merely valuing membership in ingroups is associated with greater support for 
government assistance to Blacks. Finally, contrary to the “principled mediation” hypothesis, 
there was evidence of significant independent effects of individualism alongside the effects of 
SDO and group identity, although only self-reliance was significant at the p < .05 level.  
The full model results therefore provide evidence suggesting the different dimensions of 
individualism and group-based attitudes have distinct effects on race-targeted policy attitudes but 
the dominant portion of explanatory power comes from SDO-E. Nonetheless, with independent 
effects from individualism even in the face of group-based attitudes, it seems there is still some 
chance the individuals are able to evaluate government assistance programs based on the 
perceived deservingness of the target group rather than whether the target group is an ingroup or 
outgroup, or where the target group stands hierarchically in society. 
                                                 
7 It should be noted that the lack of effects from SDO-D is likely due to collinearity with SDO-E, as SDO-D 
negatively predicts policy attitudes as expected when SDO-E is removed from the model. 
8 When importance and commitment are included as separate constructs in the model, it is evident that importance is 
predominantly driving this relationship but commitment has a consistent relationship in the same direction.  
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Putting Merit to the Test: Effects of Work Ethic Manipulations 
 Table 2.2 shows the results of OLS regressions illustrating the manipulation checks 
testing whether the information presented in each condition influenced participants’ perceptions 
of how “hardworking” the target groups of the manipulations were. The Black High Merit 
condition led to a significant increase in how hardworking participants saw Blacks but had no 
effect on how hardworking participants saw Whites. Conversely, the Black Low Merit condition 
led to a significant increase in how hardworking participants saw Whites but had no effect on 
their perceptions of Blacks. As such, it can be said that although the manipulations did not make 
the group depicted as working less hours per week seem less hardworking, they did make the 
group depicted as working more hours per week seem more hardworking. Thus, the 
manipulations did have an effect on evaluations of how hardworking Blacks and Whites are 
relative to one another.  
Table 2.2: Manipulation Check – Perceptions of “Hardworking” by Condition 
 
 Yet turning to Table 2.3, it is evident that despite the effects of the conditions on 
perceptions of how hardworking Blacks and Whites are, there was no discernible effect of the 
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conditions on policy attitudes. These results call into question the independent effects of work 
ethic seen earlier, but corroborate the overall finding that the effects of individualism are limited 
nonetheless. 
Table 2.3: Effects of Work Ethic Manipulations on Race-Based Policy Attitudes 
 
Testing the “Principled Mediation” Hypothesis 
A critical question remains: is the relationship between individualism and support for 
race-based government support explained by group-based preferences? In other words, is there 
support for the “principled mediation” hypothesis and can we identify the dimensions of 
individualism and group-based attitudes responsible for it? The full model results shown in 
Figure 2.1 suggest individualism maintains an independent relationship with policy attitudes 
despite the roles of group-based principles and social identity motives, but the lack of effects of 
 
 
 
 
70 
the work ethic manipulation calls into question what the work ethic survey items really 
measured. Further, it is still possible that a significant portion of what would otherwise be 
interpreted as individualism is actually explained by group-based attitudes.  
Table 2.4 compares the results of the full model with the results of a model in which 
SDO-E is removed from being a predictor of race-based policy attitudes. SDO-E is removed 
because the full model results suggest it is the only group-based attitude variable predicting race-
based policy attitudes in the expected direction, and so is the only factor that can reasonably 
explain the role of individualism. The only individualism coefficient that changes notably when 
SDO-E is removed from the full model is the coefficient for work ethic. The relationship 
between work ethic and race-based policy support goes from being only marginally significant to 
being significant at the p < .05 level. This suggests that of the two individualism factors, work 
ethic shows the most evidence of potentially being mediated by group-based attitudes. Indeed, as 
shown in Table 2.1, SDO-E is unrelated to self-reliance but significantly positively related to 
work ethic.  
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Table 2.4: Predicting Race-Based Policy Attitudes With and Without SDO-E 
 
The change in the coefficient for work ethic when SDO-E is removed from the full model 
suggests SDO-E may at least partially mediate the relationship between work ethic and race-
based policy support (the term “partially” is used because even in the full model the coefficient 
for work ethic is marginally significant). However, to properly test the degree to which the effect 
of work ethic is explained by SDO-E, a model was tested that replicates the full model but also 
makes SDO-E endogenous by regressing it on work ethic, self-reliance, and the control variables 
that are already predicting race-based policy attitudes. Further, indirect and direct effects were 
calculated for work ethic through SDO-E to quantify the degree to which the relationship 
 
 
 
 
72 
between work ethic and race-based policy support is explained by SDO-E (see Sobel 1988). The 
direct relationship between work ethic and support for race-based government assistance as well 
as work ethic’s indirect effect through SDO-E are illustrated in Figure 2.2.   
  
Figure 2.2: Testing “Principled Mediation” of Work Ethic by SDO-E 
As shown in Figure 2.2, the direct relationship between work ethic and race-based policy 
support is again significant, and with the control variables in the model predicting SDO-E, work 
ethic no longer exhibits a significant relationship with SDO-E. In conjunction with the lack of an 
indirect effect of work ethic through SDO-E, these results suggest the effects of work ethic on 
support for race-based government assistance were not mediated by SDO-E. Work ethic exhibits 
a fairly weak but independent relationship with race-based policy support that is not explained by 
group-based attitudes.  
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Taking Stock of What “Really” Matters 
The findings presented in this chapter provide a much needed clarification to 
understanding what factors are “really” at play when people evaluate race-targeted policies. The 
existing literature is beset by conflicting empirical findings regarding the roles of “principles” 
versus “prejudice.” I have suggested this is largely due to conceptual ambiguity. This study not 
only clarifies the roles of various constructs in predicting race-based policy attitudes but also 
allows for a second look at previous findings on the topic. At a broad level, it is evident that both 
individualism and group-based attitudes are complex, multi-dimensional constructs and the 
dimensions of each have distinct relationships with race-based policy attitudes that are at times 
contrary to what would be expected given unidimensional understandings of the role of each.  
Is There Room for Non-Group-Based Principles? 
The values commonly thought of as underlying the role of individualism such as work 
ethic and self-reliance have been largely assumed in research grappling with the philosophical 
theories of Tocqueville, Emerson, and Weber. The findings in this chapter suggest the effects of 
individualistic values seem best encapsulated by self-reliance rather than work ethic, although 
both constructs showed evidence of consistent, independent (albeit fragile in the case of work 
ethic) relationships with policy attitudes in the expected direction. However, the null effects of 
the work ethic manipulation call into question what measures of these values – work ethic in 
particular – are really gauging. Do independent effects of self-reliance and work ethic suggest 
there is room, after all, for reliance on higher-order principles that are not fused with group-
based attitudes? Or, perhaps when people report a strong adherence to the virtues of working 
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hard, they are really exposing some more deep-seated group-based preference not measured in 
these data. 
The Dominant Role of Group-Based Principles 
With regard to group-based attitudes, the distinction between group-based principles and 
social identity motives seems key. SDO-E is the most dominant predictor of race-based policy 
opinions above and beyond group identity and individualistic values. This finding should not be 
taken lightly, as much of the existing research on race-based policy attitudes makes the implicit 
assumption that ingroup favoritism is a major driver of opposition to government assistance. The 
results presented here suggest that on the contrary, broad ideological beliefs about how groups 
should be organized in society are more central to people’s attitudes about government assistance 
to racial minority groups. Yet the results also show SDO is not the only game in town, and the 
relationships between people’s attitudes toward groups they belong to and how they think groups 
should be organized broadly is more complex than suggested by prior research. Group identity 
variables seem more correlated with SDO-D than SDO-E, as expected (Jost and Thompson 2000; 
Kugler, Cooper, and Nosek 2010), but these correlations are rather weak and inconsistent. 
Further, although SDO-E is the most dominant predictor of race-based policy attitudes, group 
identity variables exhibit unique relationships with policy attitudes alongside and independently 
from SDO-E.  
Crucially, importance of and commitment to ingroups is positively associated with 
support for race-based policies. This finding is unexpected given the decades of work in 
psychology and political science on the relationship between group identity and ingroup 
favouritism (see e.g. Hogg and Abrams 2007), as well as research specifically suggesting 
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ingroup favoritism leads to opposition to race-based policies (Lowery et al. 2006). It seems given 
the findings of this chapter that positive attitudes toward ingroups in the form of deference to 
ingroup norms and leaders or beliefs that one’s ingroups are superior to all other groups are fairly 
irrelevant, but those who simply value their group memberships and seek to help members of 
their ingroups are often actually more likely to support race-based government assistance. How 
could this be? One possibility is that by controlling for the “negative” aspects of group identity 
such as the superiority and deference dimensions, the effects of the importance and commitment 
dimensions of group identity reflect broader communitarianism rather than positive feelings 
aimed only at ingroups. However, this possibility is not testable in the current data, nor is it a 
primary focus of this dissertation, and so I leave further exploration of this unexpected finding to 
further research. 
Individualism: Not Just an Excuse for Prejudice  
“Principled mediation” was not evident in the data. Although the relationship between 
work ethic and race-based policy support was slightly influenced by whether or not SDO-E was 
included as a covariate, further analysis suggested the effects of work ethic were not significantly 
explained by SDO-E. Work ethic maintained an independent relationship with race-based policy 
opinions, and so the proposition that principled objections to race-targeted policies are a facade 
for prejudice was not supported. This calls into question existing work suggesting SDO explains 
the role of individualism in predicting race-based policy attitudes (e.g. Federico and Sidanius 
2002; Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996). There are multiple differences between this study and 
the existing work on the topic that may explain this discrepancy in results, but the primary 
distinction this study focused on was the operationalization of individualism. Whereas prior 
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research showing evidence of “principled mediation” has operationalized individualism as 
political conservatism or examined how SDO mediates the role of individualistic arguments 
against race-based policies, this study used direct measures of the individualistic values that the 
“principles or prejudice” literature has centered on. Thus, it is possible that some other form of 
individualism is at the core of “principled mediation.” Or, it is also possible that when measured 
directly, the doctrines associated with “pulling yourself up by your bootstraps” play a genuine 
role, albeit one that pales in comparison to the role of group-based principles and is not reflective 
of work ethic as generally conceived (according to the null effect of the manipulation).  
But Have We Really Ruled Out Ingroup Favoritism? 
All of the analyses presented in this chapter have predicted attitudes toward government 
assistance to Blacks, but given the broad nature of what I am trying to address in this dissertation 
– that is, the interplay between evolutionarily rooted group biases and broad higher-order 
principles – shouldn’t these findings hold up for a broad array of target groups besides Blacks? 
Most of the “principled or prejudice” literature examines attitudes toward specific racial groups 
(mainly Blacks) without considering how people view group-based resource distribution broadly. 
This is sufficient when the question is simply whether “principles” or “prejudice” underlay 
policy attitudes, but it does not say much about the mechanisms of these relationships. By 
limiting investigations to policies aimed at a particular racial group, it does not properly allow 
for disentangling ingroup favoritism from group-based principles because it remains possible 
that the role of, for example, SDO is explained by the fact that Whites are answering the SDO 
questions with Blacks in mind. If this is the case, it would suggest it is still about ingroups and 
outgroups. This concern is addressed in Chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Ingroup Bias  in the  Raw: The  Minimal Groups  Paradigm 
“There is no doubt that under some conditions all men can and do display hostility towards 
groups other than their own, be they social, national, racial, religious or any other. There is also 
no doubt, however, that under other conditions this hostility either does not appear or can be 
modified.” 
- Henri Tajfel9 
 
 In 1954, Muzafer Sherif gathered 22 White, middle-class, twelve-year-old boys from 
Protestant backgrounds on a 200-acre Boy Scouts of America camp in the Robbers Cave State 
Park in Oklahoma. He split the boys into two groups, which the boys named the “Eagles” and the 
“Rattlers.” Over the course of three weeks, he had the boys engage in group activities to 
reinforce their group membership and then compete in various tasks against the other group such 
as baseball, swimming, and tug-of-war. He found that the “Eagles” and the “Rattlers” each 
developed their own hierarchical structures and that competition between the groups bred 
ingroup pride and negative attitudes and hostile behaviors across group lines (Sherif 1954; 1958; 
Sherif et al. 1961). Sherif’s somewhat unsurprising findings and simple research design – flawed 
in many ways relative to contemporary research standards – demonstrated what decades of 
research in social psychology would identify as a universal human tendency: ingroup favoritism. 
It is not surprising, then, that a prominent explanation for why people disagree on policies that 
dictate how societal resources should be distributed across groups – policies such as affirmative 
action and race-based education spending – is that people simply prefer whatever policy favors 
the groups they belong to (e.g. Dovidio and Gaertner 1996; Dovidio, Mann, and Gaertner 1989; 
Lowery et al. 2006).   
                                                 
9 Tajfel, H. (1981). Human groups and social categories. New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press. 
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Yet the idea that people evaluate government assistance policies solely on the basis of 
whether or not their group benefits from the policy runs directly counter to arguments that such 
evaluations are not racial or group-based, but are instead based on individualistic values. 
According to this viewpoint, people who oppose race-targeted government assistance do so 
because they believe everyone is capable of “pulling themselves up by their bootstraps” if they 
so desired, and so group-based assistance unfairly favors some individuals over others. Despite 
much evidence to the contrary (Henry and Sears, 2002; Kinder and Mendelberg 2000; Kinder 
and Sears, 1981), the perspective that individualism rather than prejudice drives race-based 
policy attitudes is to some degree backed up with empirical evidence (e.g., Sniderman and 
Carmines, 1997; Sniderman et al., 2000). However, so far in this dissertation, I have found 
evidence in favor of neither the role of individualism nor the role of ingroup favoritism. 
 In the previous chapter, I found group-based principles – specifically, SDO-E – rather 
than ingroup bias or individualism, to be the foremost predictor of attitudes toward race-targeted 
government assistance. Although this dissertation is far from the first study to show the dominant 
role that SDO plays in race-based policy attitudes (e.g. Federico and Sidanius 2002; Ho et al. 
2015; Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996), it is the first study to pit its effects against the effects of 
ingroup favoritism and individualism simultaneously. The fact that SDO outperforms social 
identity motives and individualism suggests race-based policy attitudes are not driven simply by 
whether or not one’s own group is perceived as benefiting, but they are also not driven solely by 
lofty principles about work ethic and self-reliance. Instead, race-based policy opinions seem 
group-based yet principled at the same time. People favor certain groups over others, but in a 
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manner that reflects broader rules regarding group hierarchy that should be applied regardless of 
which groups one actually belongs to.  
 These findings may be surprising given the ubiquitous nature of ingroup favoritism, 
which scholars since Sherif have demonstrated in a wide variety of settings using a wide range of 
methods (Hogg and Abrams 2007; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner et al. 1981). Yet the central 
argument of this dissertation is that group-based principles rather than ingroup favoritism or 
individualistic values alone drive race-based policy opinions because evolutionarily speaking, 
humans have developed controlled neural processes that allow for higher-order thought to 
interact with innate, automatic group biases. In other words, the simple set of behavioral 
guidelines that automatic ingroup favoritism provides – a simple rule set that was developed 
primarily for small-scale group interactions – can be modified in such a way that addresses the 
broad specter of mass-scale society. Group-based principles allow individuals to translate innate 
group biases into generalized belief systems applicable to society as a whole.  
I argue that although ingroup favoritism is a dominant force in many aspects of human 
behavior, it takes a back seat to group-based principles when people evaluate race-based policies 
because race-based policy opinions occur at a high enough level of consciousness (“LOC” in 
terms of social neuroscience research; Zelazo 2004) that there is ample time for automatic group 
biases to interact with controlled processes and higher-order thought. Therefore, I suggest the 
dominant role of group-based principles is due to controlled processes that interact with 
automatic group biases when people evaluate race-based policies.  
Despite this theoretical framework, and the findings presented in Chapter 2, it is possible 
I have not adequately ruled out the roles of sheer ingroup favoritism and individualistic values. 
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Prior studies, including my analyses in Chapter 2, have been specific to particular races (almost 
entirely, Blacks – but see Akrami, Ekehammar, and Araya, 2000; Bahr and Chadwick, 1974; and 
Hurwitz and Peffley, 1992 for examples with other races). But this is problematic because 
examinations of “real-world” groups and policies come with the limitation that history and 
context inherently influence perceptions of such groups and policies. Thus, a stereotype such as 
that Blacks are lazy, for example, makes it difficult if not impossible to distinguish whether the 
role of group-based principles is due to where groups broadly are perceived as “belonging” in the 
social hierarchy or perceptions that Blacks, in particular, have violated individualistic principles 
and thus deserve lower standing in the social hierarchy. Both mechanisms would result in racial 
biases in support for government assistance and significant effects of group-based principles but 
they have substantially different implications. The former mechanism reflects group-based 
principles as conceptualized in this dissertation, but the latter reflects an application of 
individualistic values. Indeed, these sorts of conceptual problems have been at the core of 
disagreement in much of the “principles or prejudice” literature (see e.g., Sniderman, Crosby, 
and Howell 2000).  
 In addition, by only examining the attitudes of Whites toward Blacks, it is possible that 
group-based principles still act as a proxy for ingroup-outgroup dynamics. The items comprising 
the SDO survey battery refer to “group” in a general sense. However, if the participants are all 
White and the primary group they have in mind when answering the SDO questions is Blacks, it 
is possible the SDO measures are picking up on ingroup favoritism and social identity motives 
rather than broad principles about how groups should be organized regardless of one’s ingroup.  
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 In this chapter, I use the Minimal Groups Paradigm (MGP) to examine the degree to 
which ingroup favoritism in a Minimal Groups (MG) setting, in which group distinctions are 
entirely arbitrary and have no history or context attached to them, is predicted by opposition to 
race-based government assistance. In doing so, I isolate ingroup favoritism in its purest form to 
determine the degree to which it is associated with race-based policy attitudes while avoiding 
confounds related to specific racial groups. Further, to isolate the role of individualistic values, 
the perceived merit of each minimal group is experimentally manipulated.  As such, I artificially 
apply deservingness stereotypes to otherwise meaningless groups, and examine the degree to 
which individuals adjust their attitudes and behavior in accordance with the relative merit of the 
groups, as well as the degree to which sensitivity to merit manipulations is predicted by 
opposition to race-based policies.  
 I also utilize both implicit and explicit attitude measures within the context of the MGP in 
order to gauge automatic versus controlled processes as related to ingroup favoritism in the MGP 
as well as race-based policy attitudes. A major argument I make in this dissertation, which has 
thus far been untested, is that group-based principles are a dominant predictor of race-based 
policy opinions because they represent the interaction between automatic group biases and 
higher-order ideological values. Two components of this argument are tested in this chapter: 1) 
the relationship between ingroup favoritism and race-based policy attitudes is due to automatic 
processes, and 2) group-based principles are associated with automatic/implicit group biases as 
well as controlled/explicit higher-order principles (in this experiment, sensitivity to the relative 
merit between groups).  
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Ingroup Bias: A Versatile Tool 
The details of how and why ingroup favoritism manifests have been augmented 
substantially since the Sherif experiments that showed how prejudice could evolve from 
competition between groups. Importantly for the purposes of this dissertation, it has been shown 
that “real” competition between groups over resources is not necessary for perceived group 
distinctions and ingroup favoritism to develop (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner et al. 1981). 
Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) and Self-Categorization Theory (Turner et al., 
1987) have been the most dominant models of intergroup attitudes and behavior for decades, and 
suggests that in an effort to cultivate structure in the social world and build self-esteem, 
individuals will construct group distinctions by utilizing available cues from the environment 
(e.g. Hogg and Abrams 2007; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner et al. 1981). In other words, the 
human motivation to identify as members of a group is universal, but the precise group 
distinctions at play in any given situation depend on what traits and characteristics are salient. 
Therefore, group distinctions are fluid, and individuals can find traits to use to delineate between 
ingroups and outgroups in any social context. Indeed, using the MGP, research has shown that 
people will favor ingroups and express bias against outgroups even when group membership is 
arbitrary (e.g. Tajfel and Turner 1979).  
Recent research in social neuroscience has corroborated the innate tendency to favor 
ingroups by identifying neural components associated with group categorization beyond mere 
racial categorizations (Van Bavel, Packer, and Cunningham 2008; 2011; Ratner, Kaul, and Van 
Bavel 2013). The central implication of this research is that people tend to categorize themselves 
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into ingroups and outgroups at an automatic level and so prejudice can manifest spontaneously 
across a variety of groups beyond just those laden with historically imbued negative stereotypes.  
By constraining the role of prejudice in the “principles or prejudice” literature to being 
aimed at Blacks, it also makes it impossible to parse out the role of ingroup favoritism from the 
role of consciously held beliefs and stereotypes about groups. For instance, if we constrain the 
role of prejudice to attitudes toward Blacks, prior work showing that people oppose assistance to 
other groups besides Blacks (e.g. Sniderman and Carmines, 1997; Sniderman et al., 1991; 
Sniderman et al., 1996) may seem like evidence of individualism when in reality it could be 
evidence of broad ingroup favoritism. In order to fully determine whether learned stereotypes are 
a necessary condition for opposing government assistance to a group, it would be ideal to 
experimentally manipulate whether stereotypes are attached to the group. 
Overview and Hypotheses 
 In this chapter, I use the Minimal Groups Paradigm (MGP) to examine the degree to 
which attitudes and behavior in a MG setting predict “real-world” policy attitudes – namely, 
attitudes toward race-based government assistance. By manipulating perceptions of merit 
between two minimal groups – one of which is the participant’s ingroup and the other of which 
is the participant’s outgroup – it will be possible to examine the degree to which the perceived 
merit of groups influences attitudes and behaviors toward those groups, as well as if these 
attitudes and behaviors in a MG setting differentiate supporters of race-based policies from those 
who oppose such policies. Further, I utilize both implicit and explicit measures of attitudes 
toward each of the minimal groups in order to account for the distinction between automatic and 
controlled processes. I conduct my analyses in three main stages.  
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First, I use the same survey measures that were used in Chapter 2 to see if my results 
from Chapter 2 replicate in the smaller laboratory sample. The only difference between the 
measures used in Chapter 2 and those used in this chapter is that the ingroup identification 
measures – i.e. the measures of social identity motives – are all directed specifically at the 
minimal ingroup in this experiment as opposed to ingroups in general. I expect that as in Chapter 
2, group-based principles will predict race-based policy attitudes more strongly than 
individualism or social identity motives.  
 Second, I estimate the degree to which participants favored their ingroup and were 
influenced by the merit manipulation across three MG bias variables: an implicit MG bias 
variable, an explicit MG bias variable, and a behavioral MG bias variable determined by 
decisions in a point distribution task. I interpret greater ingroup favoritism when the ingroup is 
high in merit (relative to the outgroup) and less ingroup favoritism when the ingroup is low in 
merit (relative to the outgroup) as evidence of an influence of individualism. However, ingroup 
favoritism and effects of the merit manipulation in the context of the MGP alone are not the 
primary concern of this stage of analyses. Instead, I go on to determine whether ingroup 
favoritism and sensitivity to the merit manipulation (in the expected direction) is predicted by 
opposition to race-based policies. My hypotheses for this stage of analyses depend on the 
measure of MG bias. I expect that only implicit MG bias (rather than explicit or behavioral MG 
bias) will be associated with opposition to race-based policies because the role of ingroup 
favoritism should, according to my theoretical model, be limited to automatic processes. On the 
other hand, I expect that only explicit and behavioral MG bias will be influenced by the merit 
manipulations, as merit-based considerations and the role of individualism more broadly should 
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be mainly constrained to controlled processes. Thus, sensitivity to the merit manipulations 
should only be predicted by race-based policy opposition with regard to the explicit and 
behavioral MG bias variables.  
 In the third and final stage of analyses, I examine the relationships that SDO – my 
measure of group-based principles – has with ingroup favoritism and sensitivity to the merit 
manipulations. I have argued that the reason group-based principles will be the dominant 
predictor of race-based policy attitudes is because they represent the interaction between 
automatic group biases and higher-order thought. Accordingly, I expect implicit (but not explicit 
or behavioral) MG bias to be associated with greater levels of SDO, but the impact of explicit 
and behavioral (but not implicit) MG bias on SDO to be moderated by the merit manipulations. 
In other words, at the implicit level, I expect ingroup bias to have a direct relationship with 
group-based principles, but at the explicit level, I expect group-based principles to predict 
sensitivity to merit manipulations. 
Data and Methods 
 Ninety undergraduate students from a mid-sized Midwestern university enrolled in 
various Political Science courses participated in the study for course credit. Data collection took 
place over the course of 3 semesters between April 2015 and March 2016. The sample was 
53.3% male, 86.7% White, 4.4% Latino, and 66.7% Christian. Forty-four percent of the sample 
identified as Democrats or leaning Democrat, 40% identified as Republicans or leaning 
Republican, 12.2% identified as Independent, and 3.3% identified as something else. The sample 
was 45.6% liberal, 16.7% moderate, and 37.8% conservative. All survey questions and 
experimental procedures took place in a computer lab where no more than 5 participants were 
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run through at a time. Partitions separated each participant to ensure maximum isolation during 
the experiment. The experiment consisted of four components: a survey component (see 
Appendix for exact items), minimal groups assignment via the Numerical Estimation Style Test 
(NEST), a resource distribution task (the Tajfel matrices), and measurement of implicit attitudes 
via the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne et al. 2005). 
 Race-based policy attitudes. Students reported attitudes toward the same three race-
targeted government assistance policies as in Chapter 2, which were averaged together to form a 
composite variable (α = 0.82). 
 Social Dominance Orientation. The same 16 SDO items as in Chapter 2 were used to 
construct variables indicating SDO-E (α = 0.85) and SDO-D (α = 0.88).  
 Social identity motives. Variables for the same four dimensions of ingroup identification 
as in Chapter 2 were used to construct measures of ingroup importance (α = 0.83), commitment 
(α = 0.85), deference (α = 0.79), and superiority (α = 0.87). Importantly, instead of referring to 
groups broadly, these items referred specifically to the minimal ingroup in the experiment.  
 Individualism. Measures of work ethic (α = 0.91) and self-reliance (α = 0.89) were 
constructed using the same items as in Chapter 2.  
 Explicit MG bias. Measures of explicit attitudes toward each of the minimal groups 
consisted of feeling thermometers ranging from 0-100 with labels above the 0 (“Very Cold”), 50 
(“Neutral”), and 100 (“Very Warm”) marks. A value of “2” was used as a starting point for all 
participants to be better able to distinguish between those who intended to mark a “0” on the 
scale and missing data. A measure of explicit Minimal Groups (MG) bias was constructed by 
subtracting each participants’ feeling thermometer score for the outgroup from their feeling 
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thermometer score for the ingroup. Thus, higher scores on this variable indicate greater ingroup 
bias. 
Minimal Groups Assignment and NEST 
 After completing the survey component of the study, participants completed the 
Numerical Estimation Style Test (NEST; Tajfel et al. 1971), which is a commonly used method 
for randomly assigning participants to groups in the MGP. Specifically, participants were shown 
a series of white screens with various numbers of black dots on each screen for 5 second each, 
and asked to estimate the number of dots on each screen. Traditionally, participants are told a 
bogus story about how dot-counting tendencies are significant personality traits and that people 
tend to either be “Overestimators,” individuals who tend to overestimate the number of dots on 
each screen, or “Underestimators,” individuals who tend to underestimate the number of dots on 
each screen. They are told that these tendencies are randomly distributed in the population. In 
this study, however, participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: the MGP 
condition, High Merit Ingroup condition, and Low Merit Ingroup condition.  
 In the MGP condition, participants were simply divided into Overestimators and 
Underestimators based on the same procedures as in the traditional NEST. In the High Merit 
Ingroup and Low Merit Ingroup conditions, the NEST was still used but instead of dividing 
participants into Overestimators and Underestimators, participants were divided into Accurate 
Estimators and Inaccurate Estimators. As feedback, participants were randomly assigned to be 
told that they were either relatively accurate or relatively inaccurate in their estimates compared 
to others who completed the same task, and thus were categorized for the duration of the 
experiment as Accurate Estimators or Inaccurate Estimators. Essentially, in these conditions, 
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rather than representing a “true” minimal groups paradigm in which group membership is 
meaningless, group membership indicated the degree of merit (accuracy) associated with group 
members (see Appendix for Instructions for NEST and group assignments). Upon being 
introduced to the minimal groups, participants were shown two abstract, colorful symbols and 
told that one is the logo for their ingroup and the other is the logo for the other group (see 
Appendix for logos). The logos were randomized between participants so that the ingroup logo 
for half of the participants was the outgroup logo for the other half.  
Resource Distribution Task 
 After being assigned to their groups, participants completed the resource distribution 
task, which took the form of the “Tajfel matrices” originally developed by Henri Tajfel and 
colleagues to measure ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination as behavior resulting from 
minimal group assignments in the Minimal Groups Paradigm (e.g., Tajfel and Turner, 1979; 
Bourhis, Sachdev, and Gagnon, 1994). This task involved participants choosing among options 
in which points are distributed between their own group and the outgroup. Importantly, 
participants were explicitly told that the points were not going to them personally, but rather to 
the group as a whole. Participants completed 6 versions of this task in order to yield three 
dependent variables: one that measures ingroup favoritism, or the degree to which a participant 
distributed more points to the ingroup instead of choosing to maximize points for both groups, 
one that measures maximum differentiation, or the degree to which a participant favored the 
greatest difference in points between groups in favor of the ingroup rather than maximizing 
profit for either the ingroup or both groups, and one that measures parity, or the degree to which 
a participant preferred equal distribution of points between groups rather than favoring the 
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ingroup (see Appendix for exact instructions and task). During each resource distribution trial, 
participants were shown the minimal groups logos at the bottom of the screen with labels above 
each to serve as a reminder of which represented which group. 
Implicit MG Bias 
 Measures of implicit attitudes toward each of the two minimal groups were obtained via 
the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, and Stewart 2005), in which 
participants were shown abstract, meaningless symbols preceded by a quickly shown prime and 
asked to rate whether the abstract symbol was “pleasant” or “unpleasant.” Participants completed 
96 trials of the AMP. For each trial, a fixation cross was shown for 306 ms, followed by the 
prime for 20 ms, then a black and white noise mask for 94 ms, the abstract symbol for 106 ms, 
and finally another black and white noise mask until the participant registered a response. In 
total, aside from the time taken for the participant to respond, the stimulus presentation occurred 
over 526 ms. The inter-stimulus interval (ISI) between the participants’ responses and onset of 
the next trial was 1 s. Although the original AMP employs primes that are shown for around 75 
ms and without a first noise mask following the prime, more recent work has experimented with 
various modifications to the protocol and suggested that a shorter stimulus presentation time with 
a mask immediately following the prime yields effects that isolate affect misattribution processes 
more appropriately (Rohr, Degner, and Wentura 2015).  
The procedure is a measure of implicit biases that individuals have toward the primes, as 
the affect attributed to the prime has been shown to pour over into evaluations of the target 
symbols. This procedure has been used in a variety of research to measure implicit bias and 
prejudice (Hofmann and Baumert 2010; Imhoff, Schmidt, Bernhardt, Dierksmeier, and Banse 
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2011; Payne et al. 2005; Payne et al. 2010; Rohr, Degner, and Wentura 2015). The primes were 
the group logos associated with the minimal ingroup and outgroup that the participants were 
assigned to. Prime images were set in a random order across trials with the constraint that no 
three primes of the same type (Ingroup or Outgroup) occurred consecutively. 
Results 
Replicating Chapter 2 Results 
 The results of an OLS regression mostly replicated the results discussed in Chapter 2. 
Specifically, the dominant predictor of race-based policy opposition was SDO-E (SDO-D was 
significant when SDO-E was removed from the model, just as in Chapter 2). Unlike the results of 
Chapter 2, however, neither individualism factor predicted race-based policy attitudes. Further, 
In Chapter 2, I unexpectedly found positive relationships between ingroup identification and 
support for race-based policies. However, these unexpected relationships were not evident in 
these data. As would normally be expected, the importance dimension of ingroup identification 
was related to opposition to race-based policies. This suggests the unexpected positive 
relationship between ingroup importance/commitment and race-based policy support found in 
Chapter 2 may have indeed been spurious or due to the measures being aimed at groups in 
general rather than particular, relevant ingroups. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 
3.1.  
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Table 3.1: Predicting Race-Based Policy Opinions with Group-Based Principles, Social 
Identity Motives, and Individualism 
 
Preliminary MGP Results 
 Analyses were first conducted to examine baseline levels of ingroup favoritism versus 
merit-based evaluations across these outcome measures. The difference between feeling 
thermometer scores for the ingroup (M = 68.30, SD = 19.16) and feeling thermometer scores for 
the outgroup (M = 55.88, SD = 17.12) was positive and significant (t = 5.32, df = 82, p < .001), 
suggesting explicit ingroup bias in the aggregate. Similarly, there was evidence of significant 
implicit ingroup bias in the aggregate as well, as a greater proportion of symbols following 
ingroup primes were rated as pleasant (M = 0.31, SD = 0.23) than symbols following outgroup 
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primes (M = 0.26, SD = 0.22; t = 2.74, df = 81, p < .01). Finally, there was mixed evidence of 
ingroup favoritism in the aggregate with regard to resource distribution in the Tajfel matrices. 
One-sample t-tests showed that participants were significantly more likely than chance to express 
ingroup favoritism over maximum joint profit (M = 2.51, SD = 4.91; t = 4.78, df = 86, p < .001) 
and maximum differentiation over maximum ingroup/joint profit (M = 1.82, SD = 4.81; t = 3.52, 
df = 86, p < .001). However, participants were also significantly more likely than chance to 
express parity over ingroup favoritism (M = 8.12, SD = 5.39; t = 14.05, df = 86, p < .001). These 
somewhat contradictory descriptive statistics for the three resource allocation variables is not 
surprising given prior work on how much variation exists in the strategies people use for these 
types of tasks across contexts (e.g. Bornstein et al. 1983a; 1983b; Forgas and Fiedler, 1996). 
Given that in this chapter the interest is in variation in resource allocation decisions rather than 
descriptive levels of these variables in the aggregate, this concern is of little consequence for 
tests of my hypotheses.  
 A series of OLS regressions were run to estimate the main effects of condition on explicit 
MG bias and resource allocation decisions. All models controlled for the effect of ideology (5-
point scale from “very liberal” to “very conservative”) and included dummy control variables for 
being male, nonwhite, Latino, non-Christian, being born outside the US, and not speaking 
English as one’s first language. There was a marginal effect of condition on explicit MG bias 
such that there was marginally less explicit ingroup bias in the Low Merit condition than in the 
High Merit condition (b = -11.088, SE = 5.635, t = -1.970, df = 72, p = .053), suggesting weak 
evidence for merit-based evaluation in the expected direction. However, neither the Low Merit 
condition nor the High Merit condition showed a significant difference from the MGP condition.  
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 With regard to resource distribution via the Tajfel matrices, the merit conditions had 
weak effects, if any, and in ways that only slightly resemble merit-based evaluation as 
hypothesized. There were no effects of condition on ingroup favoritism or maximum 
differentiation. There was marginally more evidence of parity in the Low Merit condition than in 
the MGP condition (b = 3.018, SE = 1.532, t = 1.970, df = 76, p = .053), as would be expected 
for merit-based evaluation, but there were no other significant differences between conditions.  
 To analyze implicit MG bias, multilevel logit models were run with each AMP trial as a 
separate case and allowing intercepts to vary at the participant- level. Thus, these models estimate 
the probability of any given symbol being rated as “Pleasant” (rather than “Unpleasant”) as a 
function of which group logo (ingroup or outgroup) preceded the symbol, experimental 
condition, and the control variables (which were the same as in the regression models above). An 
empty linear multilevel model grouping by participant yielded an ICC that suggested 16% of the 
variation across trials can be explained by participant. In the multilevel logit model, condition 
had a significant main effect on the probability of rating symbols as pleasant. Participants were 
significantly more likely to rate symbols as pleasant in the Low Merit condition than in the MGP 
condition (b = 0.823, SE = 0.327, z = 2.519, p < .05) or the High Merit condition (b = 0.662, SE 
= 0.320, z = 2.069, p < .05). However, there was no significant interaction between condition and 
group, and so implicit ingroup bias did not differ as a function of merit condition.  
Minimal Ingroup Bias and Race-Based Policy Attitudes 
 There was evidence of ingroup favoritism and a lack of merit-based evaluation in the MG 
setting, but the hypotheses of this study have to do with the relationship between attitudes and 
behavior in the MG setting and “real-world” race-based policy attitudes. In these analyses, I 
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model attitudes and behavior in the MG setting as my outcome variables and individual 
differences in support for race-targeted policies as a predictor (along with the same control 
variables as before). To restate my hypotheses, I expect implicit, but not explicit or behavioral 
MG bias to be predicted by race-based policy opposition.  
 Table 3.2 shows the coefficients for explicit MG bias as well as each of the three 
behavioral MG bias variables regressed on race-based policy support. Also shown are the 
coefficients for interactions between race-based policy support and experimental condition, 
which were calculated in separate regression models. All models controlled for the same 
variables as in prior models. Race-based policy support showed no significant relationship with 
any of the explicit or behavioral MG bias variables. Further, there were no significant 
interactions between policy support and condition.   
Table 3.2: Race-Based Policy Attitudes, Merit, Explicit MG Bias, and Behavioral MG Bias 
 
 Table 3.3 shows the results of analyses testing the same hypothesis as above except with 
regard to implicit attitudes. Multilevel models allowing intercepts to vary by participant were 
again run with interaction terms between the dummy variable for outgroup primes and the race-
based policy attitude variable. These interactions indicate the extent to which the negative 
relationship between outgroup prime and the probability of being marked “Pleasant” (which is 
significant in the aggregate) changes across levels of support for race-targeted policies. Separate 
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models were also run to calculate three-way interactions between the outgroup prime variable, 
race-based policy attitudes, and condition. However, due to model convergence failure, the three-
way interaction models are simple logit models.  
Table 3.3: Race-Based Policy Attitudes and Implicit MG Bias 
 
The interaction between the outgroup prime variable and race-based policy support was 
significant and positive, indicating that at greater levels of support for race-targeted policies, the 
gap between ingroup primes and outgroup primes was less negative than at lower levels of 
support for each policy. Put simply, support for race-targeted policies was associated with lower 
levels of implicit MG bias. Figure 1 illustrates how the effect of the outgroup prime variable (i.e. 
implicit MG bias) varies across race-based policy support, from one standard deviation below the 
mean to one standard deviation above the mean.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
96 
 
Figure 3.1: Implicit MG Bias across Levels of Support for Race-Based Policies 
 Table 3.3 also shows that there were no significant three-way interactions with condition, 
suggesting sensitivity to the merit manipulations in terms of predicting implicit MG bias did not 
vary as a function of race-based policy support. Those who oppose race-targeted policies were 
no more or less likely to exhibit merit-based evaluations than those who support race-targeted 
policies. 
Ingroup Bias, Merit, and SDO 
 The final set of analyses in this chapter concerned the relationships between attitudes and 
behavior in the MGP and group-based principles. Table 3.4 shows the results of OLS regression 
models regressing explicit MG bias and each of the behavioral MG bias variables on SDO-E and 
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SDO-D as well as their interactions with the conditions. SDO-E and SDO-D are always included 
in separate models to avoid collinearity problems. Further, the interaction terms shown in Table 
3.4 are estimated in separate models from those used to estimate the main effects of SDO. I 
hypothesized that at the explicit level (i.e. for the explicit and behavioral MG bias variables), 
sensitivity to the merit manipulations rather than ingroup favoritism alone would be associated 
with SDO. The findings shown in Table 3.4 offer mixed support for this hypothesis.  
Table 3.4: SDO, Merit, Explicit MG Bias, Explicit MG Bias, and Behavioral MG Bias  
 
 As expected, the effects of the merit manipulations depended significantly on 
participants’ levels of both SDO-E and SDO-D. Although there were no cases in which the Low 
Merit condition led to decreased ingroup favoritism compared to the MGP condition, the High 
Merit condition led to increased ingroup favoritism, as was hypothesized, but only significantly 
among those high in SDO. This interaction is illustrated in Figure 3.2 with SDO-D. From 
observing Figure 3.2, it can be seen that as SDO-D increases, the effects of the merit 
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manipulations begin to look increasingly as they are expected to if individualism is at play. This 
same pattern is evident for the interaction with SDO-E (not shown).  
 
Figure 3.2: Effects of Merit Manipulations across Levels of SDO-D 
 Yet when it comes to behavioral MG bias, the effects of the merit manipulations do not 
vary across levels of SDO except in one case, where as expected individuals are less likely to 
exhibit parity (i.e. equal distribution between groups) in their point distribution patterns in the 
High Merit condition at high levels of SDO-E. But for the other behavioral MG bias measures 
and in all cases with regard to SDO-D, the relationship between behavioral MG bias and SDO 
seems direct. That is, contrary to expectations, explicit ingroup bias is associated with group-
based principles when it comes to participants actually dividing up points between their group 
and the other group.  
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 With regard to implicit attitudes in the MGP, it was expected that implicit MG bias would 
have a straightforward relationship with group-based principles without any dependence on the 
merit manipulations. Said differently, sensitivity to the merit manipulations in such a way that 
reflects the effects of individualism on implicit MG bias should not be dependent on SDO. As 
shown in Table 3.5, this hypothesis was mostly supported. The analyses used here used the same 
exact MLM strategy as was the case when looking at the relationship between implicit MG bias 
and race-based policy support. However, due to model convergence issues, all results showing 
the three-way interactions and all SDO-E results shown in Table 3.5 are from ordinary logit 
models.10 All interactions between SDO and each merit condition were significant, but not in a 
way that suggested greater reliance on individualism was associated with SDO. For both SDO 
variables, the interaction terms for both the High Merit condition and the Low Merit condition 
were in the same direction. Decomposing these interactions showed that implicit MG bias 
increased across levels of SDO primarily in the MGP condition but in both merit conditions, this 
relationship was dampened significantly. Put simply, the effects of the merit manipulations 
contained in the interactions shown in Table 3.5 do not seem to reflect individualistic behavior.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 For the model estimating the two-way interaction between Outgroup Prime and SDO-E, the MLM allowing for 
random intercepts by participant converged normally with an un-centered but not a centered SDO-E variable, and so 
although the simple logit results are shown for this model so that the main effects are not misleading, the MLM 
results did not differ substantially.  
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Table 3.5: SDO and Implicit MG Bias 
 
 If we turn to the two-way interactions between Outgroup Prime and SDO, it is evident 
that in the case of SDO-D, the degree to which symbols following outgroup primes were rated as 
less pleasant than symbols following ingroup primes (i.e. implicit MG bias) was significantly 
moderated by SDO-D. Specifically, the negative effect of Outgroup Prime, and thus implicit MG 
bias, was significantly stronger at higher levels of SDO-D. This result is illustrated in Figure 3.3, 
and supports the hypothesis that automatic ingroup bias will be associated with group-based 
principles. This interaction was in the same direction but not significant with regard to SDO-E. 
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Figure 3.3: Implicit MG Bias across Levels of SDO-D 
The Subtle Role of Ingroup Bias, and theNot-So-Subtle Role of Group-Based Principles 
 Before discussing results related to the MGP in this experiment, it is worth noting that 
correlational analyses basically replicated the results of Chapter 2. Group-based principles – 
SDO-E, in particular – predicted race-based policy attitudes better than individualistic values or 
social identity motives. Ingroup importance showed weak evidence of an independent negative 
effect, which suggests the unexpected positive association this construct (as well as ingroup 
commitment) had with race-based policy attitudes in Chapter 2 may have been spurious or due to 
the fact that the items did not target specific, relevant groups. Nonetheless, group-based 
principles were the foremost predictor of race-based policy opinions.  
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Turning to the results pertaining to the MGP, ingroup bias was fairly ubiquitous across 
explicit, implicit, and behavioral measures. Further, the ingroup bias that occurred in the MGP 
predicted opposition to race-targeted policies, but as hypothesized, only with regard to implicit 
attitudes. This suggests that in line with the theoretical foundations of this dissertation, there is a 
role for ingroup favoritism in evaluations of race-targeted policies, but it is a subtle role that 
results primarily from automatic rather than controlled processes. Across self-report measures, in 
which individuals have the time to deliberate and engage in controlled processing, the role of 
factors related to ingroup identification pales in comparison to factors related to group-based 
principles. However, ingroup bias in its purest form – that is, at the implicit level in a setting 
where groups have no context or prior beliefs associated with them – is significantly predicted by 
opposition to race-based government assistance.  
Evidence of “Pure” Individualism? Not Really… 
Some research using the MGP has found that manipulating the status or merit of groups 
has very limited effects on how the groups were treated (e.g. Bettencourt, Charlton, Dorr, and 
Hume, 2001; Commins and Lockwood 1979; Ellemers, Wilke, and Van Knippenberg, 1993; 
Tajfel and Turner, 1979). In the aggregate, the effects of the merit manipulations in this study 
corroborate these past findings. There were no substantial effects of the merit manipulations on 
implicit, explicit, or behavioral MG bias. There was also no evidence of sensitivity to the merit 
manipulations being predicted by race-based policy attitudes in the aggregate. Although 
participants in the Low Merit condition were less likely to mark symbols as pleasant in general, 
this effect was not moderated by whether the symbol was preceded by an ingroup or outgroup 
prime, and so implicit MG bias did not differ across conditions.  
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The Group-Based and “Principled” Foundations of Group-Based Principles  
 A key contribution of this chapter to the dissertation more broadly was the ability to 
examine whether automatic group biases and higher-order principles come together to form 
group-based principles as hypothesized. I have argued that evolutionarily speaking, group-based 
principles rather than ingroup bias or ideological values alone should predict attitudes toward 
race-targeted government assistance because they represent the confluence between quick, deep-
seated motivations to favor ingroups and slower, controlled processes that allow individuals to 
adjust the “simple” guidelines provided by sheer ingroup favoritism and translate them into 
principles applicable to mass-scale society.  The results presented in this chapter “mostly” align 
with this theoretical framework.  
As expected, implict ingroup bias was directly associated with SDO without being 
moderated by the role of merit in a way that indicated individualism, and explicit attitudes 
toward the minimal groups were associated with SDO in a way that indicated merit-based 
evaluation, or individualism. However, when it came to behavioral MG bias variables, there was 
weak evidence of a relationship between SDO and merit-based evaluation, as would be expected, 
but for the most part the relationship between behavioral ingroup bias and SDO was direct. This 
suggests that in certain instances – specifically, with regard to behavioral measures, which 
“should” be influenced heavily by controlled processes – group-based principles can represent 
ingroup bias that occurs at a fairly high level of consciousness. Therefore, this suggests the role 
of ingroup favoritism is not entirely constrained to automatic processing.  
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Implications for How We Think About Race and Politics 
The findings presented in this chapter suggest three overarching conclusions. First, the 
role of ingroup favoritism in predicting race-based policy opinions seems mainly automatic. 
Second, reliance on individualism as evidenced by merit-based evaluations and use of 
deservingness cues seems extremely limited in the aggregate. Finally, group-based principles 
seem to comprise some combination of implicit and explicit group biases as well as sensitivity to 
deservingness cues, i.e. individualism. These findings are mostly in line with the theory I have 
presented in this dissertation, and suggest that people’s attitudes toward hot-button race-related 
political issues such as affirmative action and race-targeted education spending are 
predominantly influenced by the interaction between people’s deep-seated, primal motivations to 
favor the groups they belong to and higher-order principles that people consciously strive to 
abide by. But it is still reasonable to be somewhat puzzled by the fact that explicit and behavioral 
MG bias did not predict race-based policy attitudes. What is going on psychologically when 
people explicitly divvy up resources between groups in the MGP that is different from when they 
explicitly divvy up resources between groups in the “real-world”? The MGP is, after all, a few 
steps removed from “real-world” politics. In the next chapter, I go back to examining attitudes 
toward Whites and Blacks and explore the implications of gaps between people’s implicit and 
explicit racial attitudes. I suggest it is the translation process between automatic and controlled 
processes that lead evaluations of “real-world” groups to differ from what goes on between 
meaningless groups in the laboratory. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
105 
CHAPTER 4 
When Automatic and Controlled Collide  
“His mind slid away into the labyrinthine world of doublethink. To know and not to know, to be 
conscious of complete truthfulness while telling carefully constructed lies, to hold simultaneously 
two opinions which cancelled out…to forget, whatever it was necessary to forget, then to draw it 
back into memory again at the moment when it was needed, and then promptly to forget it 
again…that was the ultimate subtlety; consciously to induce unconsciousness, and then, once 
again, to become unconscious of the act of hypnosis you had just performed.” 
- George Orwell11 
 
In his seminal novel, Nineteen Eighty-Four, George Orwell introduced readers to a 
psychological phenomenon he referred to as “doublethink,” or “the power of holding two 
contradictory beliefs in one’s mind simultaneously, and accepting both of them” (214). Research 
has shown that what might be called doublethink does indeed exist across a variety of beliefs and 
attitudes, albeit in a less nefarious fashion than the government-induced doublethink Orwell 
spoke of. Individuals often harbor both positive and negative beliefs and attitudes toward an 
object concurrently – a phenomenon called ambivalence (Kaplan 1972), which has been studied 
extensively for its relevance to understanding political attitudes (Alvarez and Brehm 1997; 
Feldman and Zaller 1992; Lavine 2001; Rudolph and Popp 2007). Recent work in social 
psychology has shown that individuals need not be consciously aware of their ambivalence for it 
to exist and substantially influence how they think and process information (Petty, Tormala, 
Briñol, and Jarvis 2006). With regard to race, for example, individuals can think one way about a 
racial group at a conscious, or explicit, level and yet feel differently in their gut.  
Work in political science and psychology has attempted to weigh the utility of implicit 
versus explicit measures of attitudes when predicting political outcomes, but this work remains 
                                                 
11 Orwell, George. Nineteen Eighty-Four. London: Secker and Warburg, 1949. 
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largely focused on simply comparing the main effects of implicit and explicit attitude measures 
as predictors of political phenomena, thus neglecting the implications of individuals 
simultaneously holding contradictory implicit and explicit preferences. It is precisely this 
distinction between the implicit and explicit levels of evaluation that I am interested in. As 
discussed throughout this dissertation, automatic and controlled neural processes interact with 
one another over time, and it is this interaction that I suggest is key to understanding how people 
evaluate race-targeted government assistance policies.  
In the previous chapter, I showed that whereas the role of ingroup bias in race-based 
policy attitudes seems primarily automatic, principles seem to enter the picture at a more 
controlled level. Yet in a minimal groups setting, people are perfectly willing to explicitly favor 
the ingroup, so what is different about how people process information in the MGP versus in the 
“real-world”? I suggest the difference lays in the translation process between automatic group 
biases and controlled thought that occurs when people evaluate “real-world” groups and policies 
relevant to mass-scale politics. As such, instead of evaluating the utility of implicit versus 
explicit attitude measures, I examine individual differences in the correspondence between 
implicit and explicit attitudes that exists within individuals and use these individual differences 
as a predictor of race-related political outcomes. Although the distinction between automatic and 
controlled processes is not perfectly reflected by the difference between implicit and explicit 
attitude measures, the difference between scores on these measures should indicate the gap 
between “more automatic” and “more controlled” evaluations.  
 I also address the potential concern that given the dominant role of group-based 
principles and the fact that group-based principles, along with other self-report measures, seem 
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to subsume the role of automatic group biases, measures of automatic processes might be 
unnecessary for understanding race-based policy attitudes. On the contrary, I suggest measures 
of automatic group biases are critical because the gap that exists between one’s implicit and 
explicit attitudes can tell us the degree to which we should expect them to think ideologically 
rather than in terms of sheer ingroup favoritism in the first place. The observed relationship 
between SDO and race-based policy opinions in this dissertation and in other work, though 
substantial, has never been 1-to-1, and I have argued that group-based principles tend to predict 
race-based policy opinions because they reflect some combination of automatic group biases and 
higher-order principles. Therefore, in this chapter, I explore the idea that discordance between 
evaluations made implicitly and evaluations made explicitly can, in itself, provide useful 
information about the degree to which people are influenced by the “group-based” or 
“principled” components of group-based principles.  
By examining conflict between implicit and explicit attitudes, I address several questions 
long overdue to be answered in the literature on race-related implicit cognition. What are the 
political implications when someone reports unbiased racial attitudes in a survey yet exhibits 
prejudiced implicit associations? Conversely, what about those who express prejudice explicitly 
but show no evidence of racial biases implicitly? The answers to these questions has substantial 
implications for understanding the preferences, biases, and motivations people bring to the table 
when evaluating political phenomena, and in particular policies that have to do with socially 
sensitive topics such as race-targeted government assistance.    
In this chapter, I take advantage of the unique opportunity afforded by the the 2008 
American National Election Study (ANES) Time Series data, which included participants’ 
 
 
 
 
108 
responses to a race-centered version of the same implicit attitude measure used in the previous 
chapter, to examine implicit racial ambivalence, or the ambivalence created by the gap between 
implicit and explicit racial attitudes, as it exists in the United States. Further, I look at the effects 
of implicit ambivalence on several race-related political attitudes (including but not limited to 
support for race-based government assistance) and, crucially, its moderating effect on the role of 
ideology in predicting race-related political attitudes and behaviors. Therefore, in this chapter, I 
take a step back from looking at the role of group-based principles and instead focus on what I 
argue to be the mechanism underlying the dominant role of group-based principles –the 
interaction between automatic group biases, conscious racial attitudes, and ideological values.   
Do We Really Need Implicit Attitude Measures? 
 Implicit and explicit racial biases can be observed in children as young as 6 years old, 
yet explicit bias decreases as children reach adulthood, suggesting that self-reported racial 
attitudes shift toward being less prejudiced as people become entrenched in the egalitarian norms 
of society (Baron and Banaji 2006). This finding highlights a critical aspect of attitudes that is 
increasingly recognized in psychology and political science and has been noted repeatedly 
throughout this dissertation: attitudes are comprised of a combination of both automatic and 
controlled as well as conscious and nonconscious processes, and as such, self-report measures 
are limited in their ability to encapsulate people’s preferences (e.g. Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, and 
Williams 1995). When individuals have a motivation to obfuscate or edit their self-reported 
responses to survey items, or when people are simply unaware of their biases, explicit measures 
of racial attitudes can be especially problematic.  
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Contemporary work on implicit racial biases uses a wide array of “indirect” measures to 
gauge racial attitudes in ways that subvert more controlled processes that would otherwise lead 
individuals to tailor self-reports. A relatively straightforward and feasible way to tap implicit 
racial biases in large sample survey data is to measure people’s implicit associations. These 
methods, described in Chapter 1,primarily involve measuring individuals’ quick, automatic 
associations between visual stimuli and positive or negative words or images to assess deep-
seated and reflexive biases, and have been extremely useful in assessing racial attitudes. These 
measures tap evaluations that are presumably less controlled and more automatic, and thus less 
susceptible to the influence of social desirability (Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 1998; 
Olson and Fazio 2009).  
A nontrivial amount of research has been done examining the relationship between 
implicit racial attitudes and political preferences. As referenced earlier in this dissertation, 
research has used the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 1998) 
to predict attitudes toward President Barack Obama, the Affordable Care Act, and immigration 
policy (Greenwald, Smith, Sriram, Bar-Anan, and Nosek 2009; Knowles, Lowery, and 
Schaumberg 2010; Pérez 2010; Pérez 2016). The same measure of implicit biases used 
throughout this dissertation, the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, 
and Stewart 2005), along with the same data used here (as it is rare to find nationally 
representative data with implicit measures), have been used in several articles examining how 
scores on the AMP relate to vote choice in the 2008 presidential election, support for affirmative 
action, attitudes toward Barack Obama, and other racial attitudes (Ditonto, Lau, and Sears 2013; 
Finn and Glaser 2010; Greenwald et al. 2009; Pasek et al. 2009; Payne, Krosnick, Pasek, and 
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Lelkes 2010; Segura and Valenzuela 2010). However, although most of this research finds 
implicit racial attitudes can indeed be used to predict political outcomes, all of these studies also 
find either that explicit attitude measures predict political outcomes just as well as implicit 
attitude measures, or that explicit attitudes mediate the effects of implicit attitudes. As such, the 
utility of measuring implicit attitudes has been far from self-evident with regard to predicting 
political outcomes.   
Explicit measures may be more predictive of political outcomes than implicit measures 
because implicit measures often gauge learned associations and culturally embued stereotypes 
rather than the racial preferences that ultimately drive political attitudes and behavior (Arkes and 
Tetlock 2004). Indeed, implicit measures have been shown to predict a range of behaviors 
indicative of racial discrimination no better than explicit measures (Blanton et al. 2009; Oswald, 
Mitchell, Blanton, Jaccard, and Tetlock 2013). This may be because political attitudes and 
behaviors are often influenced by the controlled processes that implicit measures are specifically 
designed to ignore, such as social desirability, which has been shown to influence attitudes such 
as those toward affirmative action (e.g. Wilson, Moore, McKay, and Avery 2008). Whereas 
implicit attitude measures are often best at predicting quick, automatic behaviors such as whether 
or not to shoot a potentially armed target (e.g. Correll, Urland, and Ito 2006; 2006; Petty, Fazio, 
and Briñol 2009), the political attitudes and behaviors often studied by political psychologits 
mostly take place over a period of time that allows for higher-level thinking, hesitation, 
inhibition, deliberation, and sometimes rationalization. Payne, Burkley, and Stokes (2008) 
showed that the correlation between implicit and explicit attitude measures depends heavily on 
the “structural fit” between measures, or the similarity between measures in task demands. For 
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example, the correlation between AMP scores and explicit evaluations of Black and White faces 
was significantly higher than the correlation between AMP scores and survey batteries such as 
the Modern Racism Scale (MRS; McConahay 1983). In other words, implicit attitudes tend to be 
most strongly related to outcome measures that involve similar levels of conscious processing, 
and political attitudes and behaviors tend to involve processing that is more deliberate than what 
goes on during measurement of implicit attitudes (see also Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, 
Le, and Schmitt 2005). 
So does this mean we should abandon implicit measures as a means of understanding 
race and politics, or even political attitudes more broadly? I have argued that although race-
related political attitudes are largely steeped in automatic processes, by the time they are reported 
in a survey or relied upon to cast a vote, they have interacted substantially with controlled 
processes and higher-order thought. So why do we need to actually measure automatic 
processes? I suggest that implicit attitude measures are actually central to understanding race-
related political attitudes and shed much needed light on the mechanisms of political cognition 
broadly. I propose that focusing research around whether implicit or explicit attitudes better 
predict political outcomes is problematic because such research ignores the unique value of the 
interplay between implicit and explicit attitudes. By neglecting the spectrum upon which 
attitudes exist from automatic (early processes) to controlled (later processes), we may be 
missing a significant part of the picture and potentially building misleading models of when and 
how things like racial prejudice influence political attitudes.  
More broadly, neglecting the interplay between implicit and explicit preferences means 
neglecting the full rage of motivations and attitudinal forces that shape public opinion. Racial 
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attitudes, in particular, have been shown to be central to American public opinion, but they 
compete with other values and considerations in driving political attitudes and behavior. The 
results presented in this chapter suggest the degree to which race, rather than factors like political 
ideology, is a driving force in evaluations of political phenomena depends largely on how much 
individuals have used controlled processing to “resolve” their implicit and explicit racial 
preferences.  
Implicit Ambivalence: The Implicit-Explicit Gap 
Multiple studies have examined the correlations that exist between implicit and explicit 
attitude measures, and the findings of these studies indicate implicit attitude measures tend to 
significantly predict explicit attitudes, with average correlations ranging between about .25 and 
.35, suggesting they are correlated but far from redundant (Cunningham, Preacher, and Banaji 
2001; Hofmann et al. 2005; Nosek 2006; 2007). Individual- level variation in the “gap” between 
automatic and controlled processes therefore reflects individual- level variation in the mental 
processes that mediate the relationship between implicit and explicit attitudes.  
There is some disagreement as to what the moderate correlations between implicit and 
explicit measures mean – i.e. why implicit and explicit measures tend to covary yet remain 
distinct. Some scholars suggest a single attitude construct exists and low correspondence 
between implicit and explicit measures occurs only to the degree that explicit measures are 
altered by effortful, conscious processing (Fazio et al. 1995; Fazio and Olson 2003). Others 
suggest implicit and explicit measures tap structurally separable constructs represented by 
distinct mental processes, and that there are fundamental differences between the automatic, 
unintentional processes picked up by implicit measures and the more controlled, deliberate 
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processes picked up by explicit measures (Devine 1989; Dovidio et al. 1997; Greenwald and 
Banaji 1995; Hofmann et al. 2005; Nosek 2006; 2007; see also Cunningham et al. 2004 and 
Stanley, Phelps, and Banaji 2008 for neuroscientific evidence). However, regardless of whether 
implicit and explicit measures tap a single mental representation or distinct constructs, there is a 
near consensus regarding why scores on implicit and explicit measures often differ. People have 
quick, automatic reactions to attitude objects, which are mostly gauged by implicit measures, and 
controlled processes translate these automatic reactions into conscious evaluations reported in 
explicit measures. With regard to race, individuals have automatic reactions to racial outgroups 
and, over time, may inhibit, alter, or even rationalize their automatic racial biases to abide by 
learned values, norms, and principles.  
The fact that effortful mental processes intervene between automatic reactions to an 
object and controlled evaluations of that object explains how people can feel positively toward 
an object explicitly yet negatively at an implicit level, or vice versa. Implicit ambivalence refers 
to ambivalence that manifests as a discrepancy between one’s implicitly and explicitly held 
attitudes (Petty et al. 2006), and is to be expected with regard to attitudes that individauls are 
motivated to change, such as racial attitudes (Petty et al. 2006; Plant and Devine 1998). Some 
work has examined the ramifications of implicit ambivalence regarding race, specifically (Petty, 
Briñol, and Johnson 2012). As noted by Alvarez and Brehm, “racial policy wears all the signs of 
a policy debate that yields internal conflict, or ambivalence over policy choices” (1997, p. 345; 
also see Dovidio, Mann and Gaertner 1989).  
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Expectations for Implicit Ambivalence 
Psychology work on implicit ambivalence suggests it leads to effortful thinking and 
deliberation related to the target of ambivalence. With regard to race, individuals whose implicit 
and explicit attitudes conflict – i.e. those high in implicit ambivalence – should deliberate more 
about race than unambivalent individuals. This is because implicit ambivalence leads individuals 
to dedicate cognitive resources to addressing the disparity between implicit and explicit 
evaluations. Indeed some work has shown that priming implicit racial ambivalence led to greater 
scrutiny of messages about hiring African American faculty at a university (Petty, Briñol, and 
Johnson 2012). Therefore, I expect race to be a more central factor in the evaluation of political 
targets among individuals whose racial attitudes are unresolved (i.e. high in implicit 
ambivalence) compared to those whose attitudes are resolved (i.e. low in implicit ambivalence). 
Greater controlled processing centered around race is therefore assumed to be the mechanism 
underlying the role of implicit ambivalence. 
Need for Cognition, Education, and Resolving Conflicting Attitudes 
Given that implicit ambivalence is thought to yield increased controlled processing and 
scrutiny over the target of ambivalence, it should be expected that individual differences in 
implicit ambivalence are associated with various measures of sophistication such as education 
and Need for Cognition (NFC; Cacioppo and Petty 1982), or the trait-like tendency to enjoy 
effortful thinking. However, the expected direction of these relationships is uncertain. On the one 
hand, it might be expected that because priming implicit ambivalence is associated with 
deliberation and effortful thought, measures of sophistication like education and NFC will be 
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positively associated with implicit racial ambivalence. Indeed, although more highly educated 
individuals are generally less likely to express overt racial prejudice (e.g. Bobo and Licari 1989; 
McClosky and Zaller 1984; Sniderman and Piazza 1993), implicit biases tend to be fairly 
impervious to conscious attempts at controlling prejudiced expressions (e.g. Baron and Banaji 
2006; Greenwald et al. 2009; but see e.g. Fazio and Olson 2003 on the malleability of implicit 
attitudes). Thus, those higher in NFC and education may tailor their self-reports, causing their 
explicitly reported racial attitudes to diverge from implicit measures. Further, it has been shown 
that explicit ambivalence toward political parties and candidates is positively associated with 
NFC, largely because such individuals are more likely to interact with heterogeneous 
information networks (though this is mainly the case with weak partisans; Rudolph 2011; 
Rudolph and Popp 2007).  
On the other hand, it may be the case that NFC and education are negatively related to 
implicit racial ambivalence because individuals who think more effortfully in general and are 
highly educated may be better equipped to resolve discrepancies between their implicit and 
explicit preferences. In other words, because implicit ambivalence is measured as an individual 
differences variable (as opposed to being primed through an experimenta l manipulation), it may 
be expected that low levels of implicit ambivalence indicate individuals who have, over time, 
dedicated greater controlled processing to resolving their ambivalence. This hypothesis is 
supported by an array of prior research findings. Explicit attitudinal ambivalence has 
predominantly been shown to be negatively related to NFC because individuals who are 
generally more cognitively sophisticated are better able to reconcile opposing beliefs and 
preferences (Jonas, Diehl, and Brömer 1997; Thompson and Zanna 1995; Thompson, Zanna, and 
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Griffin 1995). Work on motivated reasoning that suggests it is individuals with greater cognitive 
sophistication who are best equipped to manipulate information in order to justify preexisting 
biases (Lodge and Tabe 2013; Taber and Lodge 2006). Further, the role of implicit attitudes in 
predicting policy preferences has been shown to be strongest among the highly educated (Pérez 
2016). As such, individuals high in measures of sophistication may be the most adept at shifting 
explicit attitudes to line up with and reinforce implicit preferences. Importantly, unlike with 
explicit ambivalence, individuals are not necessarily aware of their implicit ambivalence, and so 
this hypothesis suggests either that individuals high in NFC and education are more likely to be 
aware of their implicit biases, or that NFC and education influence nonconscious processes that 
resolve ambivalence.  
Implicit Racial Ambivalence and Race-Related Political Outcomes 
The relationships between implicit ambivalence and measures of sophistication described 
above are critical with regard to the primary goal of this chapter – that is, understanding how the 
interaction between automatic and controlled racial evaluations might influence attitudes toward 
race-related political outcomes. Given psychology research on the mechanisms underlying 
implicit ambivalence, individuals high in implicit ambivalence – i.e. those whose implicit and 
explicit attitudes differ a great deal – should evaluate race-related political outcomes along a 
racial dimension to a greater degree than individuals low in implicit ambivalence. Said 
differently, race should play a weaker role, relative to other considerations, in the evaluation of 
political targets among individuals with the cognitive capacity to have resolved their 
ambivalence.  
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I do not hypothesize a main effect of implicit racial ambivalence, but I do expect it will 
moderate the influence of ideological values on political attitudes. As explained throughout this 
dissertation, racial attitudes are not the only dimension along which individuals evaluate race-
related political targets, and the “principles or prejudice” literature in political science has 
revolved around whether they are even a key dimension in light of competing values such as 
individualism and preferences for limited government (e.g. Federico and Sidanius 2002; Kinder 
and Mendelberg 2000; Kinder and Sears 1981; Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996; Sniderman et al. 
1996). I have also argued that whereas the influence of group biases tends to be automatic, the 
influence of higher-order principles such as individualism and egalitarianism is primarily driven 
by controlled processes. Therefore, I expect that individuals who have utilized controlled 
processing to resolve disparities between their implicit and explicit racial attitudes will rely more 
on ideological values and higher-order principles when evaluating race-related political objects 
than individuals who have not utilized controlled processing to resolve their implicit 
ambivalence. Conversely, as implicit ambivalence causes race to become the central dimension 
along which political targets are evaluated, other factors – ideological values and higher-order 
principles like ideology and egalitarianism – will be relied upon less for evaluating these targets. 
In sum, as implicit ambivalence increases, the relationship between ideological values and race-
related political attitudes should be diminished.  
Data and Measures 
 The analyses for this chapter were tested using data from the post-election interviews 
conducted as part of the American National Election Study (ANES) 2008 Time Series Study. 
These data provided a unique opportunity for testing the hypotheses of this study because at the 
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end of the post-election interview, respondents were given the Affect Misattribution Procedure 
(AMP), which has been shown to be a valid measure of implicit prejudice (Payne, Cheng, 
Govorun, and Stewart 2005) and was the same measure used to tap automatic group biases in 
Chapter 3. The ANES 2008 Time Series Study took place between November 5 and December 
21, 2008, and was conducted via face-to-face interviews using computer-assisted personal 
interviewing (CAPI). Complex sampling procedures were used to ensure adequate 
generalizability to the adult U.S. population. This entailed a five-stage address-based sampling 
frame split by county, census tract, census block group, and then household. The data were 
weighted in all analyses to account for this complex sampling strategy. Black and Latino 
respondents were oversampled, but due to the racial nature of this study, only non-Hispanic 
Whites were included in the sample for analyses. The exclusion of Hispanics and non-Whites 
was done to control for the heterogeneity that would otherwise be expected in the effects of 
racial attitudes. This is common practice across studies focused on racial prejudice (see e.g. 
Kinder and Sears 1981; Pèrez 2010; Sears and Henry 2003). Respondents received monetary 
compensation for participation. The final sample used for analyses consisted of 1158 respondents 
(44% male; median age = 49; 41% with a college degree or higher). 
Prior research examining implicit ambivalence informed its measurement in this study, 
and so was measured as the difference between implicit and explicit racial attitudes (Petty et al. 
2006).  
Explicit racial bias. Explicit racial attitudes were gauged via feeling thermometers for 
Blacks and Whites (coded so that higher values indicate more positive feelings; Blacks: M = 
66.28, SD = 19.46, n = 1037; Whites: M = 73.03, SD = 19.32, n = 1038). An explicit racial bias 
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score was calculated by subtracting individuals’ feeling thermometer score for Whites from their 
feeling thermometer score for Blacks, and dividing this score by 100 to yield a score between 0 
and 1. Thus, higher values on these variables reflected greater pro-White/anti-Black explicit 
racial bias (M = 0.07, SD = 0.19, n = 1033). 
Implicit racial bias. Implicit racial attitudes were gauged via the AMP, which consisted 
of 48 computerized trials in which a White or Black male face was shown for 75 milliseconds 
(ms) after brief exposure to a fixation cross, followed by a Chinese ideograph shown for 250 ms 
(although a technical error caused the first face image for each race not to appear for some 
participants).12 Following the Chinese ideograph, a black and white noise mask (a screen with 
random black and white pixels) was shown until respondents indicated the ideograph to be either 
“pleasant” or “unpleasant.” Respondents were explicitly instructed to avoid influence from the 
prior photos. The aggregate of binary responses to the ideographs following faces of each race 
has been used as a valid measure of individuals’ implicit evaluations of racial groups, with lower 
scores (i.e. lower proportions of “pleasant” to “unpleasant” responses) for ideographs preceded 
by a particular racial group indicating greater prejudice toward that racial group (Payne et al. 
2008). Due to the technical error mentioned above, the items corresponding to each of the first 
face images for each race were omitted from all analyses, yielding 23 indicators for each AMP 
construct (AMP-Blacks: M = 0.51, SD = 0.30, n = 1025, α = 0.92; AMP-Whites: M = 0.66, SD = 
0.26, n = 1025, α = 0.90). An implicit racial bias score was calculated by subtracting individuals’ 
                                                 
12 The differences between this AMP and the AMP used in Chapter 3 are therefore that the primes were shown for 
longer (and thus more consciously perceived), the primes involved Black and White faces rather than minimal group 
logos, and the symbols were Chinese ideographs rather than randomly generated symbols. 
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AMP score for Whites from their AMP score for Blacks. Thus, higher values on these variables 
reflected greater pro-White/anti-Black implicit racial bias (M = 0.16, SD = 0.30, n = 933).  
Implicit racial ambivalence. Implicit racial ambivalence was operationalized as the 
absolute value of the difference between individuals’ standardized (z-scored) score on the 
implicit bias variable and their standardized (z-scored) score on the explicit bias variable. 
Standardized bias scores are used to account for the fact that levels of bias on the feeling 
thermometer variables are not necessarily equivalent to levels of bias on the AMP variables, and 
so implicit ambivalence is measured as the absolute value of the difference between individuals’ 
relative points on the distributions of implicit and explicit bias (M = 0.83, SD = 0.78, n = 1000). 
Due to a substantial skewness value of 1.52, this variable was subjected to a square root 
transformation when included as a predictor in statistical models.  
The direction of ambivalence is not expected to matter, but was taken into account in 
analyses to test for dependence on whether ones explicit attitudes were more biased than their 
implicit attitudes or vice versa. Separate strategies were used for bivariate versus multivariate 
analyses. For bivariate analyses, the implicit ambivalence variable prior to the absolute value 
transformation was used (M = 0.01, SD = 1.14). For multivariate analyses, a dummy variable for 
direction of ambivalence were created using the implicit ambivilance variable prior to the 
absolute value transformation such that individuals with greater levels of explicit prejudice than 
implicit prejudice were coded as 0 and those with greater implicit prejudice than explicit 
prejudice were coded as 1. Ambivalence was fairly evenly split in terms of direction, with 53.7% 
of respondents having more anti-Black explicit than implicit attitudes relative to the respective 
means of each measure.  
 
 
 
 
121 
Need for Cognition. NFC was gauged via two items from the NFC scale (Cacioppo and 
Petty 1982). Respondents were asked about the degree to which they like having responsibility 
for handling situations that require a lot of thinking and whether they prefer simple or complex 
problems, which were summarized into a single variable ranging from 0 to 1, with higher values 
indicating greater NFC (M = 0.56, SD = 0.35, n = 1059).  
Education. Education was gauged via the education summary variable provided in the 
ANES data, which ranges from 0 (no high school diploma) to 7 (advanced degree).  
Political Interest. In multivariate models, political interest was included to control for 
variation explained by NFC and education that is due to knowledge about politics, specifically. 
Political interest was measured via items asking about how often and/or closely the respondent 
follows government and politics (M = 2.45, SD = 1.02, n = 1059). 
Race-Related Political Attitudes. Race-related political attitudes were denoted by seven 
variables. Symbolic racism was gauged via a composite variable created by averaging the four 
items used in the standard symbolic racism scale (Kinder and Sears 1981; M = 3.59, SD = 0.93, 
n = 1059).  
Attitudes toward the influence of Blacks in politics were measured via a single item 
asking whether respondents thought Blacks have 1 “too much influence” (n = 112), 3 “just about 
the right amount of influence” (n = 546), or 5 “too little influence” (n = 300) in U.S. politics.  
Attitudes toward Black elected officials were measured via a set of items ultimately 
formed into a composite scale ranging from 1 “White candidates are a great deal better suited to 
be an elected official than Black candidates” to 7 “Black candidates are a great deal better suited 
to be an elected official than White candidates” (M = 3.89, SD = 0.50, n = 1039). A second 
 
 
 
 
122 
variable was formed from items asking the same question except “in terms of intelligence” (M = 
3.87, SD = 0.55, n = 1043).  
Support for preferential hiring and promotion of Blacks was gauged via a composite 
variable made up of an initial item asking if respondents were for or against preferential hiring 
and promotion of Blacks, and a second item measuring strength of their position. The resulting 
measure contained the categories: 1 “strongly against” (n = 681), 2 “not strongly against” (n = 
198), 3 “not strongly for” (n = 52), and 4 “strongly for” (n = 47).  
Support for the federal government’s role in ensuring the fair treatment of Black people 
in jobs was gauged via a similar composite variable comprised of an initial item regarding the 
respondent’s position and a second item measuring opinion strength. A preceding variable, 
however, asked respondents if they had an interest in the topic, and so only respondents who 
indicated an interest in the topic were asked about their position. Thus, the number of 
respondents with scores for this variable is substantially lower than that of the first measure and 
support is fairly higher. Higher scores indicate greater support for the federal government 
ensuring fair treatment of Black people in jobs (“strongly against”, n = 247; “not strongly 
against”, n = 60; “not strongly for”, n = 49; “strongly for”, n = 194).  
Finally, a variable measuring Obama vote was measured with a question asking 
respondents if they voted for Barack Obama in the general election (361 voted for Obama, 455 
did not).   
Higher-Order Principles. Higher-order principles were measured in two ways. Political 
ideology was estimated via a traditional 7-point self identification scale ranging from “extremely 
liberal” to “extremely conservative,” as well as a follow-up question asking those who intially 
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chose “moderate; middle of the road,” “don’t know,” or “haven’t thought much about it” if they 
would choose “liberal,” “conservative,” or “moderate” if they “had to choose.” These 
respondents were then coded as “slightly liberal,” “slightly conservative,” and “moderate,” 
respectively (M = 4.41, SD = 1.47, n = 1038).  
Egalitarianism was estimated via the mean of 6 items asking about equality in society, 
each using 5-point scales from “Disagree Strongly” to “Agree Strongly.” The resulting 
composite variable was coded so that higher scores reflect greater levels of egalitarianism (M = 
3.39, SD = 0.77, n = 1059, α = 0.70). The wording for all questions is shown in the Appendix. 
Results 
 It is first worth taking advantage of the unique opportunity offered by a nationally 
representative sample to note the degree to which implicit racial ambivalence exists in the United 
States. Figure 4.1 shows two histograms illustrating implicit racial ambivalence as it existed in 
2008 based on these data. The top panel shows implicit ambivalence scores before the absolute 
value transformation, and so includes direction of ambivalence, whereas the bottom panel shows 
the variable after the absolute value transformation but still before the square root 
transformation. The implicit and explicit bias variables were both standardized, and so values on 
the x-axis indicate the difference in z-scores between one’s implicit and explicit attitudes.  
The average implicit ambivalence score is less than a standard deviation difference 
between one’s implicit and explicit attitudes scores, which makes sense given the two types of 
measures are often correlated but non-redundant. Yet there is variation, and the sample is 
roughly evenly split between people whose implicit bias score exhibits a relatively more anti-
Black bias than their explicit bias score and people whose scores exhibit the opposite pattern.  
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Figure 4.1: Implicit Racial Ambivalence in the United States (2008) 
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Moving on to the relationships implicit ambivalence has with other variables of interest, 
Table 4.1 shows the correlations between each of the racial bias variables (absolute value 
implicit ambivalence, directional implicit ambivalence, implicit bias, and explicit bias) and the 
constructs for which there were theoretical expectations. The implicit and explicit bias variables 
are included to compare the effects of implicit racial ambivalence to those of implicit and 
explicit bias when modeled separately. 
Table 4.1: Correlations Between Racial Attitude Measures and Covariates of Interest 
 
 Looking first at the non-racial variables, it is evident that implicit and explicit bias were 
both negatively correlated with NFC and education, as expected, and implicit racial ambivalence 
was also negatively associated with NFC and education (although only marginally with NFC), 
supporting the hypothesis that cognitive sophistication and education are associated with an 
increased ability of individuals to resolve discrepancies between implicit and explicit 
preferences. It should also be noted that the direction of ambivalence did not seem to matter for 
any of these variables, and so it seems to be the case that the relationship between implicit 
ambivalence and these variables holds whether one’s implicit attitudes are more biased relative 
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to the mean of implicit bias than their explicit attitudes are relative to the mean of explicit bias, 
or vice versa.  
 Turning to race-related political attitudes, it is first evident that implicit and explicit 
prejudice were consistently and unsurprisingly related to anti-Black positions on race-related 
political outcomes. More importantly for the purposes of this paper, and unexpectedly, implicit 
racial ambivalence also exhibited direct relationships with these political outcomes in a 
consistent manner. Individuals high in implicit racial ambivalence were consistently more likely 
to believe that Blacks have too much influence in U.S. politics (although only marginally), that 
Whites are better suited than Blacks to serve as elected officials, and that the federal government 
should not play a role in ensuring fair treatment of Blacks in jobs. Those high in implicit racial 
ambivalence were also less likely to report having voted for Barack Obama in the 2008 general 
election. The only exception was support for affirmative action, which implicit ambivalence did 
not predict. Direction of ambivalence only mattered for attitudes toward Black elected officials, 
such that individuals who exhibited more baised explicit than implicit attitudes (relative to the 
means of each measure) were less likely to believe Blacks are equally or better suited to serve as 
elected officials than individuals who expressed greater implicit than explicit bias (relative to the 
mean of each measure). 
 With regard to higher-order principles, both implicit and explicit bias were significantly 
related to ideological conservatism and anti-egalitarianism, but neither implicit ambivalence 
variable exhibited a relationship with these two variables. However, the hypothesized 
relationship of implicit racial ambivalence with higher-order principles is that implicit 
ambivalence will moderate the influence of principles on race-related political attitudes such that 
 
 
 
 
127 
the influence of principles is diminished at greater levels of implicit ambivalence. Table 4.2 
summarizes the results of regression models examining this moderation hypothesis. 
 
Table 4.2: Implicit Racial Ambivalence, Principles, and Race-Related Political Outcomes 
 
 The results shown in Table 4.2 are the coefficients of interest from separate regression 
models. Each column represents a different dependent variable. The rows labeled “Implicit 
Ambivalence (abs)” indicate models examining the main effects of implicit racial ambivalence 
controlling for direction of ambivalence, ideology, egalitarianism, NFC, education, political 
interest, age, and sex. The “Implicit Amb*Direction” rows represent models interacting implicit 
ambivalence with the direction of ambivalence dummy variable to determine if direction of 
ambivalence matters. The other rows reflect the moderating effects of implicit ambivalence on 
ideology and egalitarianism, respectively. Three-way interactions between implicit ambivalence, 
ideology/egalitarianism, and direction of ambivalence were first tested to determine whether 
moderation of ideology or egalitarianism was dependent upon direction of ambivale nce. If the 
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three-way interactions were insignificant (which is what I expect), two-way interactions were 
tested between implicit ambivalence and ideology/egalitarianism so that no higher-order 
interactions were included unnecessarily. Linear regressions were used to predict symbolic 
racism and attitudes toward Black elected officials. Ordered logistic regressions were used to 
predict perceptions of Black influence in U.S. politics, support for affirmative action, and 
support for the federal government ensuring fair job treatment for Blacks. Finally, a binomial 
logistic regression was used to predict the probability of reporting having voted for Obama. 
 Importantly, the intention of the implicit ambivalence variables is to estimate levels of 
discrepancy between implicit and explicit evaluations rather than focusing simply on one or the 
other. Thus, a significant influence of implicit ambivalence should indicate that even among 
individuals with equal levels of explicit prejudice, their political attitudes can be predicted by the 
distance between their implicit and explicit attitudes. However, a concern might be that the 
effects of implicit ambivalence are due simply to variation in one of the racial attitude variables 
(implicit or explicit). The considerable degree of variation on both implicit and explicit attitude 
measures alleviates this concern to some degree because it indicates that variation on the implicit 
ambivalence variable reflects variation across both implicit and explicit measures.13  
  Corroborating the bivariate results described above, implicit racial ambivalence showed 
a direct relationship with six out of the seven dependent variables. In all cases except attitudes 
toward affirmative action, the discrepancy between individuals’ implicit and explicit racial 
preferences played a statistically significant role in predicting race-related political outcomes. In 
                                                 
13 Nonetheless, models were run controlling for implicit and explicit racial attitudes (one at a time) to ensure that the 
effects of implicit ambivalence did not disappear when controlling for one racial attitude variable or the other (which 
could indicate that the effect of implicit ambivalence was driven mainly by variation in only one of the variables). 
The inclusion of these controls did not change results substantially and are available upon request.  
 
 
 
 
129 
two of these instances – symbolic racism and whether the respondent reported voting for Obama 
– the direction of ambivalence did not matter. However, in contrast to the bivariate analyses, 
direction mattered for four of the political outcomes examined. In all cases where direction 
mattered, implicit racial ambivalence was associated with anti-Black political attitudes among 
individuals whose explicit attitudes were more (relatively) baised than their implicit attitudes, but 
was unrelated to political attitudes among those whose implicit attitudes were more (relatively) 
baised than their explicit attitudes. For example, among those with more (relatively) biased 
explicit than implicit attitudes, implicit ambivalence was significantly associated with more 
negative attitudes toward Black relative to White elected officials (b = -0.535, SE = 0.055, p < 
.001); yet among those with more (relatively) biased implicit attitudes, there was no relationship 
between implicit ambivalence and attitudes toward Black elected officials (b = -0.044, SE = 
0.055, p = .421). The same interaction pattern is evident for perceptions of the influence of 
Blacks in U.S. politics, attitudes toward Black elected officials “in terms of intelligence,” and 
marginally regarding support for the federal government ensuring fair job treatment for Blacks.  
 As hypothesized, implicit racial ambivalence showed evidence of moderating the roles of 
principles in predicting all political outcomes. However, there was substantial variation in how 
implicit ambivalence moderated principles across dependent variables. There were five instances 
of implicit ambivalence moderating the role of principles in the expected direction – that is, 
principles were less predictive of political outcomes at high levels of implicit racial ambivalence. 
For example, as shown in Figure 4.2, ideology exhibited a negative relationship with support for 
affirmative action at mean levels of implicit ambivalence (OR = 0.739, CI = 0.674-0.810, p < 
.001), but this relationship was significantly stronger at low levels of implicit ambivalence (OR = 
 
 
 
 
130 
0.648, CI = 0.568-0.736, p < .001) and significantly weaker at high levels of implicit 
ambivalence (OR = 0.843, CI = 0.748-0.950, p < .01).  
 
Figure 4.2: Implicit Racial Ambivalence x Ideology Predicting Support for Affirmative 
Action 
This same pattern was evident predicting the probability of voting for Obama, symbolic 
racism, perceptions of the influence of Blacks in U.S. politics, and attitudes toward Black elected 
officials “in terms of intelligence”, but moderation of ideology was dependent on the direction of 
ambivalence for all of these outcomes except for the probability of voting for Obama. Regarding 
symbolic racism and attitudes toward Black elected officials “in terms of intelligence,” ideology 
was only moderated by implicit ambivalence among those whose explicit attitudes were more 
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(relatively) biased than their implicit attitudes. Regarding perceptions of the influence of Blacks 
in U.S. politics, ideology was only moderated by implicit ambivalence among those whose 
implicit attitudes were more (relatively) biased than their explicit attitudes. This variation in the 
importance of direction of ambivalence is somewhat erratic, but all of these analyses nonetheless 
provide evidence for the hypothesis that the influence of politica l ideology on political outcomes 
is dependent on the degree to which individuals’ implicit and explicit preferences conflict with 
one another.  
Critically, however, the effects of egalitarianism were never moderated by implicit 
ambivalence in the expected direction. In fact, there are four instances of the effects of 
egalitarianism being amplified at high levels of implicit racial ambivalence, and one instance of 
political ideology being amplified at high levels of implicit racial ambivalence. Figure 4.3 
depicts the amplification of egalitarianism by implicit ambivalence when predicting the 
probability of having voted for Obama in 2008. 
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Figure 4.3: Implicit Racial Ambivalence x Egalitarianism Predicting the Probability of 
Voting for Obama in 2008 
 At mean levels of implicit ambivalence, egalitarianism was significantly associated with 
a higher likelihood of reporting having voted for Obama (b = 1.005, SE = 0.130, p < .001). Yet at 
low levels of implicit ambivalence, this relationship was significantly weaker (b = 0.632, SE = 
0.167, p < .001), and at high levels of implicit ambivalence, this relationship was significantly 
stronger (b = 1.379, SE = 0.200, p < .001). This same pattern of amplification of the effects of 
egalitarianism was evident with regard to symbolic racism, attitudes toward Black elected 
officials, and support for the federal government ensuring fair job treatment for Blacks, although 
this amplification effect was marginal and dependent on direction of ambivalence for symbolic 
racism and support for fair job treatment for Blacks. In both cases where direction of 
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ambivalence seemed to matter, it was mainly among individuals whose implicit attitudes were 
more (relatively) biased than their explicit attitudes that effects of egalitarianism were amplified.  
What about Ingroup Favoritism? 
 The results presented thus far shed light on the construct of implicit racial ambivalence, 
its covariates, and its ability to moderate the role of higher-order principles in predicting race-
related political outcomes. However, a key component of the theoretical framework of this 
dissertation that I have not been able to examine with these data is how the role of ingroup 
favoritism might depend on levels of implicit ambivalence. I have argued that the controlled 
processing that comes along with resolving implicit-explicit discrepancies in racial attitudes 
yields deference to principles when evaluating race-targeted policies, but I have also suggested in 
previous chapters that controlled processing diminishes the influence of sheer ingroup 
favoritism. Accordingly, it should be expected that individuals who have resolved discrepancies 
between their implicit and explicit attitudes should be the least likely to support or oppose a race-
targeted policy simply because of ingroup favoritism.  
In these data, I do not have a measure of ingroup favoritism, and the racial attitude 
variables I have are used in my measures of implicit ambivalence. However, by briefly turning 
back to the data used in Chapter 3, I can construct a measure of implicit ambivalence using the 
implicit and explicit minimal groups attitude measures from that study and see how it relates to 
ingroup favoritism in terms of resource allocation – i.e. the behavioral task. Therefore, before 
discussing the main findings of this chapter, I do exactly that.  
 An implicit ambivalence variable was constructed the same exact way as the implicit 
racial ambivalence variable that was created using the ANES data. The only difference was that 
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the groups were the minimal ingroup and outgroup from the MGP rather than Blacks and Whites 
(M = 1.03, SD = 1.02). In these data, roughly 61% of the sample had more (relatively) biased 
implicit than explicit attitudes. Given high skewness, this variable was also subjected to a square 
root transformation before being included in statistical models. Across behavioral MG bias 
measures, ingroup favoritism was, as expected, significantly positively related to implicit 
ambivalence (ingroup favoritism: b = 4.397, SE = 1.392, p < .01; maximum differentiation: b = 
4.353, SE = 1.378, p < .01; parity: b = -1.944, SE = 0.741, p < .01).14 In other words, individuals 
with more resolved attitudes – even in the minimal groups setting – were less likely to favor their 
ingroup. The relationship between implicit ambivalence and the behavioral variable representing 
ingroup favoritism over maximum joint profit is illustrated in Figure 4.4. 
 
Figure 4.4: Implicit MGP Ambivalence and Ingroup Favoritism 
                                                 
14 Due to substantial skewness in the parity variable, a new variable dichotomizing parity into whether or not 
individuals chose one of the top three most equitable parity options was used as the dependent variable. All models 
controlled for direction of ambivalence and the control variables used in the models  in Chapter 3. There were no 
cases in which the effect of implicit ambivalence was dependent on direction of ambivalence. 
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Translating from Automatic to Controlled 
 The theoretical foundations of this dissertation emanate largely from work in psychology 
showing that attitudes exist on a spectrum from automatic, gut-level and implicit to conscious, 
deliberate, and explicit. This work has shown that implicit attitudes are useful for understanding 
a variety of political attitudes and behaviors (e.g. Greenwald et al. 2009; Pasek et al. 2009; Pèrez 
2010; Pèrez 2016) but are also often mediated by explicit self-reports (e.g. Ditonto, Lau, and 
Sears 2013; Payne et al. 2010). I have argued that what is missing from this literature is work 
that goes beyond simply estimating main effects of implicit and explicit attitude measures and 
acknowledges the interactions between the automatic and controlled processes that underlay 
these measures. Therefore, part of recognizing the spectrum of attitudes from implicit to explicit 
involves looking at within-person discrepancies between implicitly and explicitly held 
preferences. This is not only relevant to race-targeted policy attitudes, but also is an extension 
beyond how we understand the range of attitudes and considerations people bring to the table 
when evaluating political phenomena. In this chapter I have proposed that instead of comparing 
the utility of implicit and explicit measures to find the “best” measures for predicting political 
outcomes, it is more fruitful to embrace individual differences in the correspondence between 
implicit and explicit attitudes as a useful and meaningful tool for understanding race and politics 
as well as public opinion more broadly.  
That is not to say measures of implicit ambivalence should in any way replace separate 
measures of implicit and explicit preferences; indeed, the effect sizes of the implicit and explicit 
attitude variables were often larger than that of the ambivalence variables. Instead, I suggest 
implicit ambivalence should be acknowledged alongside the direct roles of implicit and explicit 
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prejudice as a critical factor in determining how much “room” there is for other considerations 
when people evaluate political targets. Implicit ambivalence helps us to understand the 
translation process from automatic to controlled processes, which I have suggested is key to 
understanding how people evaluate race-targeted policies.  
 The results presented in this chapter largely support my proposed overarching 
framework, albeit in somewhat mixed fashion. First, it is worth emphasizing that according the 
the 2008 ANES data, Americans are roughly split in terms of wear they fall on implicit and 
explicit racial attitude measures relative to the mean of each variable. A common argument built 
on research showing the tremendous breadth of implicit racial biases is that for most people, 
implicit attitudes are more prejudiced and people tailor their explicit self-reports to appear 
unprejudiced. However, the simple descriptive statistics on implicit racial ambivalence in these 
data suggest potentially that controlled processes can pull people’s explicit self-reports in either 
direction. It is worth reiterating that because the implicit and explicit attitude variables in the 
implicit ambivalence measure are both standardized, positive/negative implicit ambivalence 
scores cannot be said to directly indicate that one’s implicit/explicit racial attitudes are more 
“prejudiced” than their explicit/implicit racial attitudes. However, the relative differences 
between implicit and explicit scores are nonetheless telling, and it is perhaps possible to imagine 
individuals who are less biased at an automatic level but experience social pressure to exhibit 
prejudiced racial attitudes. This suggests controlled processes may not be universally used to 
inhibit prejudice. Instead, for some people, controlled processes may be more complex. 
Implicit ambivalence was found to be associated with a broad swatch of politically 
relevant constructs, consistently results in more prejudiced race-related political attitudes and 
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behaviors in the aggregate, and, critically, often moderates the roles of competing considerations 
that political evaluations might be based on such as ideology and egalitar ianism. In other words, 
holding explicit racial attitudes constant, the degree to which one’s implicit attitudes differ from 
one’s explicit attitudes holds substantial implications for how people evaluate race-related 
political outcomes, including levels of symbolic racism, attitudes to the role of Blacks in politics, 
race-targeted government assistance, and the probability of voting for Black candidates.  
I did not expect implicit ambivalence to have a straightforward main effect on race-
related political attitudes and behavior. Specifically, greater implicit racial ambivalence was 
associated with more prejudiced race-related political attitudes. This may be because as implicit 
racial ambivalence increases, the fact that the issue deals with a racial outgroup becomes more of 
a factor in people’s evaluations of the target. This may seem somewhat counter-intuitive. If an 
individual is high in implicit racial ambivalence, it means that some aspect of their racial 
attitudes are substantially prejudiced, and so it makes intuitive sense that their political 
evaluations will be more prejudiced than those of someone who holds nonprejudiced explicit and 
implicit attitudes. However, this would also suggest that individuals high in implicit racial 
ambivalence exhibited more prejudiced political opinions than individuals with prejudiced 
implicit and explicit attitudes, which is unexpected.  
Yet we may be able to explain this effect by drawing from work on cognitive dissonance. 
According to the action-based model of dissonance, conflicting thoughts and cognitions yield 
negative feelings, which individuals strive to resolve by adjusting their cognition in a way that 
involves the least resistance (Harmon-Jones 2008; Harmon-Jones, Amodio, and Harmon-Jones 
2009). Critically, this cognitive adjustment aimed at resolving dissonance can lead individuals to 
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“double down” on the cognition that is less easily manipulated. Given that the suppression of 
prejudice has been shown to entail substantial cognitive effort and resources (e.g. Cunningham et 
al. 2004; Devine 1989; Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones, and Vance 2002; Plant and 
Devine 1998; Stanley, Phelps, and Banaji 2008), the “easier” cognition on which to double down 
might be the prejudiced one. Yet that would also suggest the automatic preference is not 
necessarily the “easier” one, which would not fit with any existing theory. 
 The moderation of the role of principles by implicit ambivalence in this chapter is crucial 
because it speaks to the “principles or prejudice” literature as well as whether “principles” versus 
“prejudice” are primarily responsible for constructs such as symbolic racism. The results 
presented in this chapter suggest the degree to which individuals are conflicted or ambivalent 
over their racial preferences consistently influences the degree to which “principles” or 
“prejudice” are relevant in the first place.  
 There are several caveats and unanswered questions pertaining to the findings of this 
chapter. First, the direction of ambivalence was sometimes found to matter and sometimes found 
not to matter, and no clear pattern emerged regarding why direction mattered in some cases and 
not others. It was sometimes the case that when explicit attitudes differed from implicit attitudes, 
explicit attitudes tended to “win out,” which fits in line with work showing explicit attitudes can 
mediate implicit attitudes (e.g. Ditonto, Lau, and Sears 2013). However, the more implicit 
attitudes deviated from explicit attitudes, the more they “won out.” Given prior research, implicit 
ambivalence should yield greater scrutiny and deliberation aimed at the target of ambivalence – 
in this case, race – regardless of direction (Petty et al. 2006), but the sporadic influence of 
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direction in this study suggests the ramifications of increased racial scrutiny via implicit 
ambivalence vary depending on the target being evaluated.   
 Second, implicit racial ambivalence had a mostly consistent tempering effect on the role 
of political ideology in predicting race-related political outcomes, as expected. However, implicit 
ambivalence actually seemed mostly to amplify the effects of egalitarianism (and in one instance 
the effects of political ideology) on several political outcomes, suggesting in some cases, values 
may be deferred to in the face of racial scrutiny. Such an effect would be consistent with some 
work suggesting anti-egalitarian values can be utilized as a socially acceptable tool for 
expressing prejudiced attitudes (e.g. Federico and Sidanius 2002; Kinder and Mendelberg 2000). 
This could also indicate that egalitarianism is more directly related to group-based attitudes than 
political ideology, which arguably encompasses a wide range of “principles” beyond how people 
feel about equality in society. Anti-egalitarianism may thus offer a closer structural fit for 
expressing prejudice than political ideology.  
 Ultimately, the nuances in this chapter’s findings leave several questions unanswered. 
However, the purpose of this chapter was to examine the implications of conflict between 
automatic and controlled processes. As expected, individuals who were more resolved in their 
racial preferences, which presumably came with effortful processing over time, were more likely 
to rely on ideology as a guideline for evaluating race-related political objects. More work is 
needed to obtain a more fine-grained understanding of the implications of when individuals’ 
implicit and explicit preferences diverge, but the translation process between automatic and 
controlled processes seems to, as expected, largely determine the relative role of higher-order 
principles.  
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CHAPTER 5 
Inhibition or Ideology? The Neural Mechanisms of Principles 
and Prejudice 
Bigotry is the disease of ignorance, of morbid minds; enthusiasm of the free and buoyant. 
Education and free discussion are the antidotes of both.  
- Thomas Jefferson15 
 
 Despite having owned slaves, Thomas Jefferson has been quoted as condemning bigotry 
as the product of foolishness. But is racial prejudice due to ignorance, or does it reflect genuine 
moral conviction? A predominant view, with deep roots in eighteenth-century enlightenment 
thinking, is that bigotry and prejudice stem from deficiencies. Whether the deficiencies involve 
education, reason, awareness, or even cognitive ability, the common assumption is that prejudice 
is due to a lack of complex, enlightened thought. Accordingly, this view suggests prejudice 
reflects a default, simplistic way of thinking and can be overcome through effortful thought and 
learning about the logical fallacies of prejudiced beliefs. Although this viewpoint is primarily 
evident in lay rhetoric, it is corroborated by work suggesting that people are most able to inhibit 
racial biases when they engage in controlled processing – i.e. when they “think about” race (e.g. 
Cunningham et al. 2004; Mendelberg 2001; Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002). However, 
although it may be the case that controlled processing is associated with lower levels of racial 
bias, this does not necessarily mean that inhibition of prejudice is the universal outcome of 
controlled processing.  It could be the case that for some, controlled processing allows for 
prejudice inhibition, but for others, controlled processing actually exacerbates racial biases.  
                                                 
15 Jefferson, Thomas, 1735-1826. (1971). The Adams-Jefferson Letters: The complete correspondence between 
Thomas Jefferson and Abigail and John Adams. L. J. Cappon (Ed.). New York: Simon & Schuster. 
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I have argued that the function of controlled processing is not simply to diminish racial 
biases, nor is it to produce more reasoned thought in general for that matter. Instead, in line with 
work in social neuroscience (e.g. Bunge and Zelazo 2006; Cunningham and Zelazo 2007), my 
model suggests controlled processing is part of an iterative routine whereby simple evaluations 
become increasingly complex, and basic behavioral rules are transformed into broad principles 
that can be applied to mass-scale society. It follows that controlled processing will not always 
produce egalitarianism and inhibition of prejudice, and may often yield anti-egalitarian beliefs or 
exacerbation of prejudice as long as individuals are then able to apply these attitudes to mass-
scale society broadly. Put simply, I propose that controlled processing yields deference to 
ideological principles rather than universal inhibition of prejudice.  
 The results presented throughout this dissertation thus far have largely supported my 
proposed model, but without direct measures of the neural mechanisms assumed to be at work, it 
remains difficult to understand the role controlled processing plays. In this chapter, I utilize 
functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) to directly observe the neural processes 
occurring when people evaluate race in the context of politics, as well as what happens when 
automatic evaluations are translated into higher-level principles.  
 The contributions of this chapter are twofold. First of all, this chapter provides a 
significant methodological advancement to not only this dissertation but also existing literature 
by allowing me to directly observe the neural mechanisms assumed to underlay race-related 
evaluations. Some work in social neuroscience has examined the neural correlates of automatic 
racial biases as well as inhibitory processes that diminish racial biases (e.g. Cunningham et al. 
2004; Shkurko 2012), but for the most part (and especially in political science), these neural 
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processes are assumed, ignored, or measured indirectly (e.g. Huber and Lapinski 2006; Hurwitz 
and Peffley 2005; Mendelberg 2001; Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002). This is in no small 
part due to the tremendous cost of using direct measures such as fMRI, but it is also due to the 
relative youth of fMRI technology and research necessary to formulate hypotheses about specific 
neural processes. In this chapter, I build on the surfeit of social neuroscience research on race-
related evaluations that has accumulated over the past two decades to develop specific 
hypotheses about which neural processes should underlay controlled versus automatic processing 
of race-related political stimuli.  
 The second contribution of this chapter is to test the predictions of my model regarding 
the role of controlled processing. Specifically, as mentioned above, whereas existing work 
largely suggests controlled processing is used to inhibit racial biases, I suggest controlled 
processing allows people to defer to broad ideological principles, which may diminish or 
exacerbate racial biases depending on one’s ideological preferences. Without direct measures of 
automatic versus controlled processes, it is impossible to know, for example, whether 
conservatives tend to exhibit more anti-Black political views because of a lack of controlled 
processing, or because the consequences of controlled processing are different for conservatives 
than they are for liberals. Even in Chapter 4, the finding that ideology played a stronger role in 
predicting race-related political attitudes at low levels of implicit ambivalence could be due to 
controlled processing leading to different outcomes for liberals and conservatives, or it could be 
due to liberals simply utilizing controlled processing to a greater degree than conservatives when 
resolving conflicts in their racial preferences. Put differently, without directly observing 
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controlled processes, we cannot determine whether encouraging people to “think about race” 
leads to greater racial tolerance across the board or ideological polarization.  
 To be clear, the hypotheses derived from my model are not necessarily incompatible with 
findings from existing literature (that controlled processing is associated with greater racial 
tolerance). It may very well be the case that individuals who express lower levels of racial bias 
exhibit greater levels of controlled processing than individuals who express high levels of racial 
bias. However, the central test of my model is not whether controlled processing is greater 
among racially tolerant individuals than among racially intolerant individuals. The central test is 
whether controlled processing results in greater racial tolerance for everyone, or in greater racial 
tolerance for those embracing liberal, hierarchy-attenuating ideologies and greater racial 
intolerance for those embracing conservative, hierarchy-enhancing ideologies.  
The Consequences of “Thinking about Race”  
 The idea that encouraging effortful thought can reduce prejudice emanates largely from 
work on when racial cues in political messages are most likely to trigger racial attitudes. This 
work focuses on political attitudes broadly rather than race-targeted policy attitudes. Mendelberg 
(2001) developed a framework describing the conflict that most White Americans face when 
they evaluate a racialized political message. According to this framework, the racial appeals 
most likely to be influential are those that only implicitly prime race because when race is 
primed explicitly, people are cued to reject prejudiced instincts and abide by egalitarian norms 
encouraged by society. However, when race is primed implicitly, the argument is that prejudiced 
instincts can influence political attitudes uninhibited. This model is supported by an array of 
empirical evidence showing that a wide range of implicit racial cues can trigger race-based 
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evaluations of political messages, and that the mechanism implicit cues operate through is by 
making race cognitively accessible (Mendelberg 2001; Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002). 
The assumptions of this model are therefore that implicit racial cues trigger uncontrollable racial 
biases, that explicit racial cues trigger higher-level cognitive processes, and that higher- level 
cognitive processes triggered by explicit racial cues necessarily yield inhibition of prejudice. The 
implication is that when race is explicit (as it always is with race-targeted policies), prejudice 
influences race-targeted policies because some individuals simply do not engage in controlled 
inhibition. As explained by Valentino, Hutchings, and White, “For most people, the argument 
goes, negative racial attitudes affect political thinking automatically or not at all” (2002, 77).  
Despite evidence supporting this framework, some findings call its assumptions into 
question. The effects of implicit racial cues are diminished when the cue presents a racial group 
in a counter-stereotypic way (Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002) – a finding explained as 
due to greater controlled processing of counter-stereotypic information (Brewer, Dull, and Lui 
1981; Hastie 1981). Also, the greater ability of implicit racial cues rather than explicit racial cues 
to trigger racial attitudes when evaluating a political message seems concentrated only among 
the highly educated (Huber and Lapinski 2006). These findings suggest that although the 
framework constructed by Mendelberg (2001) may be somewhat robust, there are significant 
limits to its generalizability. It seems that implicit cues do not necessarily lead to uncontrollable 
racial biases. Further, the finding that the model holds mainly among the highly educated 
suggests that the effects of making race explicit depend on the person: among highly educated 
individuals it seems likely that controlled processing will reduce the effects of prejudice, but less 
educated individuals may hold egalitarian values a bit more loosely, and so controlled processing 
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may often yield an equal or greater role for prejudice. Indeed, work on “motivation to respond  
without prejudice” suggests that individuals vary a great deal in the degree to which they are 
internally or externally motivated to use controlled processes to inhibit prejudice, even when race 
is explicit (e.g. Plant and Devine 1998). Not everyone holds the egalitarian views assumed to 
yield controlled inhibition when racial appeals are explicit. Nonetheless, this assumption remains 
largely accepted: that higher- level, controlled processing universally yields prejudice inhibition. 
The best way to reduce the role of prejudice then is to make race explicit and encourage greater 
controlled processing.  
In this study, I explore the possibility that equal levels of controlled processing can 
nonetheless yield variation in the degree to which prejudice influences policy opinions. For 
some, according to this hypothesis, controlled processing leads to inhibition of prejudice because 
of higher- level principles that call for hierarchy attenuation. For others, controlled processing 
simply reinforces and even exacerbates the role of prejudice because of higher- level motivations 
to enhance hierarchy and reject egalitarian norms.  
A Neural Framework of the Automatic and Controlled Components of Prejudice  
 A variety of methodologies have been used to estimate the influence of racial prejudice 
on political attitudes, but these methods rely heavily on assumptions regarding the mechanisms 
by which prejudice influences policy attitudes. To understand how prejudice influences such 
attitudes and thus how its role can be diminished, the most promising avenue of research is to 
directly examine the hypothesized mechanisms at work in the brain. Advances in medical 
technology have made it possible to obtain quantitative measurements of brain activity by 
tracking the increases in oxygenated blood that accompany increases in activity in particular 
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parts of the brain. Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) uses a magnetic field in 
conjunction with pulses of radio frequencies to track the iron that comes with movement in 
oxygenated blood (Friston 2009).  
There is one simple, overarching finding of research using fMRI methodology – the 
human brain is extremely complex, and to suggest that any attitude or behavior can be traced 
solely to a single region of the brain, or conversely that any single region of the brain has just 
one behaviorally relevant function, would be tremendously misguided. Nonetheless, research has 
advanced our understanding of neural activity substantially, and we can look at trends in brain 
activity in response to specific stimuli to infer which parts of the brain are generally active in 
particular contexts, including contexts related to politics (see Schreiber 2011). Through 
replication and convergence, we can develop frameworks of specific neural processes so brain 
activity can be used to predict “real-world,” ecologically valid outcomes (Berkman and Falk 
2013). Neuroscience research on prejudice has provided an excellent starting point for 
understanding the mechanisms by which prejudice might influence policy attitudes. Findings 
from this work have essentially left us with a roadmap for how the brain functions when 
prejudice occurs automatically versus when controlled processes inhibit racial biases. 
  Group-based categorization seems hardwired into the brain’s processing of social 
information. Some work has shown that even when group membership is meaningless (i.e. 
created within the confines of an experimental task), the brain reacts to fellow ingroup members 
by activating certain regions associated with awareness of self (Volz et al. 2009; Shkurko, 2012; 
Molenberghs et al. 2013; Van Bavel, Packer, and Cunningham 2008). With regard to reactions to 
outgroups, the most commonly activated brain regions include the amygdala and insula, 
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suggesting that people immediately categorize outgroup members as emotionally significant (e.g. 
Cunningham et al. 2004; but also see Wheeler and Fiske 2005) and associate them with 
uncertainty or danger, which must be avoided (Rilling et al. 2008; Risheson et al. 2003; see 
Shkurko 2012 for meta-analysis). This reaction – that is, the activation of these brain regions – 
occurs automatically and even when race is only primed implicitly (Cunningham et al. 2004; 
Cunningham et al. 2007).  
Something interesting happens, however, when race is consciously recognized and there 
is a conflict between people’s implicit adverse reactions to outgroups and their explicit goals of 
being or appearing unprejudiced (e.g. “I feel threatened by the Black man walking toward me but 
know I should not”): the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) detects the goal conflict, the amygdala 
response is suppressed, and certain parts of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) kick in that are associated 
with higher- level cognitive functioning (see Stanley, Phelps, and Banaji 2008). Controlled 
processes are thus triggered when race makes the jump from covert to overt, and these processes 
can allow people to inhibit prejudiced reactions. This basically means the precise mechanisms 
assumed to be occurring under the framework of this dissertation are detectable when observing 
brain data. Overall, we are left with relatively distinct patterns of neural activity when someone 
reacts adversely to a racial outgroup member, detects a conflict between this adverse reaction 
and one’s conscious goals regarding race, and subsequently attempts to supersede adverse 
reactions through controlled processing. Note that conflict detection and controlled processing to 
inhibit adverse reactions should only be evident when race is explicit enough so as to be 
consciously recognized; otherwise, automatic reactions should occur uninhibited (Cunningham et 
al. 2004). 
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 Critically, the research on the aforementioned neural processes does not suggest that 
controlled processing in the PFC will necessarily yield inhibition of prejudiced reactions – just 
that it is necessary for such inhibition to be possible. An alternative possibility, which has not 
been explored thoroughly in the neuroscience literature let alone in political science, is that 
controlled processes ultimately lead individuals to reinforce their pre-existing biases as a form of 
rationalization. In terms of the brain, PFC activation may be necessary for inhibition to occur, 
but in some situations, it may act as a catalyst for “doubling down” on prejudiced instincts. The 
implication for reducing the role of prejudice is glaring: encouraging people to think more about 
the racial component of race-targeted policies will not diminish the influence of prejudice and 
may even bolster its influence because people will turn to ideological principles that may either 
enhance or attenuate group hierarchy.  
Expectations for the Role of Controlled Processing 
 The central test of this chapter has to do with the expected role of controlled processing 
in people’s race-related political evaluations. I expect that broadly, controlled processing will be 
associated with greater deference to ideological principles that either enhance or attenuate 
hierarchy, and so individuals who hold most strongly to hierarchy-enhancing or hierarchy-
attenuating ideologies should experience the greatest amount of controlled processing when 
evaluating race-related political stimuli. I test this broad hypothesis using data from an fMRI 
experiment during which participants make decisions about whether or not individuals should 
receive monetary aid from the government. The race of the individuals applying for aid varies 
between Black and White, and race is primed either implicitly or explicitly. By priming race 
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either implicitly or explicitly, I am able to simulate the conditions under which we should expect 
automatic versus controlled processing related to race.  
In line with the research described earlier in this chapter, it should be expected that when 
race is primed implicitly, individuals will exhibit greater automatic processing when evaluating 
Black applicants for government assistance compared to White applicants. When race is primed 
explicitly, individuals should exhibit greater controlled processing when evaluating Black 
applicants compared to White applicants. This has been established in prior research (e.g. 
Cunningham et al. 2004; Shkurko 2012). The critical test in relation to this dissertation has to do 
with the correlates of controlled processing when race is explicit. When race is explicit, I expect 
anti-Black racial biases in support for government assistance to be diminished among those who 
endorse hierarchy-attenuating ideologies and exacerbated among those who endorse hierarchy-
enhancing ideologies. Further, because my model proposes that these effects of priming race 
explicitly are due to controlled processing among both “hierarchy-attenuators” and “hierarchy-
enhancers,” controlled processing when race is explicit should be greater for those at the tail-
ends of the ideological spectrum (i.e. those who are more ideologically extreme) compared to 
those who are more ideologically moderate. The critical tests of this study in terms of relevance 
to this dissertation are therefore constrained to involving activation in the cortical regions of the 
brain such as the ACC and PFC (i.e. the brain regions associated with controlled processing), and 
so only results pertaining to these brain regions are reported.16  
                                                 
16 Nonetheless, results regarding brain regions associated with automatic processing (e.g. amygdala and insula) are 
available upon request.  
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Data and Methods 
  Twenty-Three White adults were recruited to participate in the study through flyers 
placed around the community surrounding a large Midwestern university, as well as a volunteer 
participant registry created by the facility housing the MRI. Participants were each compensated 
$25. All participants were right-handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
Participants were safety screened to ensure eligibility for MRI and provided informed consent in 
accord with study approval by the Institutional Review Board. The sample was 60.9% female, 
65.2% Christian, and 100% U.S.-born with English as a first language. The median age was 22 
years old (range: 19 to 57) and 39.1% of the sample had a 4-year college degree or higher. Some 
screening was also done during recruitment to ensure the sample was adequately diverse in terms 
of political ideology and partisan affiliation. Nonetheless, the sample exhibited a 
liberal/Democratic skew (16 participants identified as liberal or strongly liberal, 1 identified as 
moderate, and 6 identified as conservative or strongly conservative; 13 participants identified as 
Democrats, 1 identified as Independent, 7 identified as Republican, and 2 identified as 
“something else”).  
Experimental Design 
The experimental task used a 2 (race of applicant: White vs. Black) x 2 (conscious 
awareness: non-conscious/implicit vs. conscious/explicit) rapid event-related within-subjects 
design consisting of 4 blocks. Race of applicant varied at the trial-level (i.e. within blocks) and 
conscious awareness varied at the block-level (i.e. between blocks). There were 40 trials within 
each block for a total of 160 trials. Each block lasted approximately 7 minutes. Experimental 
stimuli were presented in the scanner using PsychoPy2 v1.83.01 (Peirce, 2007; 2009). Both trial 
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order and interstimulus interval (ISI) duration were predetermined using Optseq2 
(https://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/optseq), a software package that maximizes efficiency in 
modeling the hemodynamic response in rapid event-related designs (see Burock, Buckner, 
Woldorff, Rosen, & Dale, 1998; Dale, Greve, & Burock, 1999).  
Each trial presented participants with a random piece of information about the applicant and 
asked them to decide whether they strongly oppose, oppose, support, or strongly support 
monetary aid to that individual using response pads (one response pad for each hand, with 
buttons under each of participants’ pointer and middle fingers). Response options were shown at 
the top of the screen throughout the task, and their positions on the screen remained constant 
across trials. Descriptions were constructed in such a way that they would not explicitly indicate 
any sort of deservingness or merit on the part of the applicant (e.g. “has an outie belly button” or 
“hums when eating”; see Appendix for complete list of statements). All applicants were males in 
order to avoid any effects of applicant sex. The phrase “A man that:” was shown on the screen 
just below the response options at all times. 
Prior the description of each individual, a Black or White face was presented for an amount 
of time that either allowed for conscious recognition of the face (Explicit blocks) or not (Implicit 
blocks). The order of Conscious and Nonconscious blocks was randomized for each participant. 
All faces were taken from the Chicago Face Database (Ma, Correll, and Wittenbrink, 2015), a 
database of high-resolution standardized photographs of 158 Black and White individuals 
between the ages of 18-40. Each image has been coded for 41 physical characteristics (e.g. nose 
width, face width to height ratio, eye closeness) and rated along 22 perceptual dimensions (e.g. 
threatening, attractive, masculine) by an independent sample of raters, and was matched as 
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closely as possible across these characteristics and dimensions. Only 80 images were used (40 
Black faces and 40 White faces), and so each image was shown twice (once during an Explicit 
block and once during an Implicit block). Images were randomly paired with applicant 
descriptions for each participant.  
Each trial began with a fixation cross shown for 500 milliseconds (ms). In Explicit blocks, 
this was followed by an image of a Black or White face for 1 second, and then an applicant 
description for 3.5 seconds. In Implicit blocks, the fixation cross was followed by a noise mask 
(a picture of random black and white pixels) for 934 ms, a Black or White face for 30 ms, a 
second noise mask for 36 ms, and then an applicant description for 3.5 seconds. As such, Explicit 
and Implicit trials were identical except that whereas Explicit trials showed a Black or White face 
for a full second before each applicant description, Implicit trials showed noise masks during that 
second with a Black or White face shown rapidly in between masks. Thus, participants were 
expected not to be consciously aware of the influence of the Black or White face in the Implicit 
trials. Prior research has explored similar protocols and shown that a short stimulus presentation 
time such as the one being used here for the implicit face primes is sufficient to yield only 
nonconscious recognition of a stimulus (see Rohr, Degner, and Wentura 2015). The exact 
timings used for this experiment were pre-tested on a small sample of undergraduate students as 
well as during pilot runs in the fMRI scanner.  
Survey Measures 
Participants were in the scanner for approximately 45 minutes to 1 hour. Before being 
removed from the scanner, participants were asked a series of questions about whether they were 
able to see faces during the Implicit blocks (8 participants reported being able to see faces, and 
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11 said they were able to make out the race of faces seen between noise masks). Afterward, they 
completed a 15-minute long survey, which included, among other things, the 3 race-based policy 
support items used in chapters 2 and 3 (α = 0.89; M = 5.36, SD = 1.44), SDO (SDO-D: α = 0.82, 
M = 2.19, SD = 0.98; SDO-E: α = 0.90, M = 2.27, SD = 1.11), and demographic items. SDO-D 
and SDO-E are used as the primary measures of hierarchy-attenuating/hierarchy-enhancing 
ideological principles. Both SDO scales were folded at their midpoint so that higher values 
indicate greater ideological extremity in either direction (SDO-D: M = 1.14, SD = 0.54; SDO-E: 
M = 1.21, SD = 0.51). 
MRI Data Acquisition 
 A Siemens Skyra 3.0 Tesla MRI with a 32-channel head coil was used to collect brain 
activation data. Prior to functional imaging, a high-resolution T1-weighted 3D anatomical image 
(MPRAGE; field of view (FoV) read = 256 millimeters, slice thickness = 1.0 x 1.0 x 1.0 mm, 
repetition time (TR) = 2400 ms, echo time (TE) = 3.37 ms, inversion time (TI) = 991 ms, prescan 
normalize on, PAT mode GRAPPA) was obtained for spatial normalization. Functional MRI data 
was acquired with acquisition parallel to the AC-PC line to maximize whole-brain coverage (42 
slices, FoV read = 220 mm, slice thickness = 3.0 x 3.0 x 3.0 mm, TR = 2500 ms, TE = 30 ms, flip 
angle = 80 degrees, prescan normalize off). The first 12.5 seconds of each block showed a blank 
grey screen so that the first five volumes of each block could be discarded to avoid variability 
due to pre-steady state functional data.  
MRI Data Preprocessing and Analysis 
MRI data were preprocessed using fMRI Expert Analysis Tool (FEAT) in FMRIB 
Software Library (FSL; Jenkinson, Beckmann, Behrens, Woolrich, & Smith, 2012; Smith et al., 
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2004) on Mac OS X. The MPRAGE image was skull stripped using FSL’s Brain Extraction 
Function (BET; Smith, 2002). Functional data were subjected to normalization, registration to 
both MPRAGE and standard space (MNI152), spatial smoothing at FWHM of 5mm, slice timing 
correction (to correct for interleaved data acquisition), and motion correction using MCFLIRT 
(Jenkinson, Bannister, Brady, & Smith, 2002). 
General linear models (GLMs) were used as implemented in FSL. Time-series data was 
modeled at the first level (the trial level) using FMRIB’s Improved Linear Model (FILM), and 
then higher-level analysis (across blocks first, and then across participants) was done using 
FMRIB’s Local Analysis of Mixed Effects (FLAME; see Smith et al., 2004). The blood oxygen 
level-dependent (BOLD) signal was first modeled at the trial level for each run as a function of 
race (Black/White). At the block-level, BOLD signal differences for Black compared to White 
trials were modeled as a function of conscious awareness (Explicit/Implicit). The subject-level 
analyses were then combined into group-level region of interest (ROI) analyses using FSL 
FLAME1. ROI analyses on left amygdala, right amygdala, bilateral insula, anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC), and frontal orbital cortex (OFC) were masked prior to analysis (using anatomical 
masks from the Harvard-Oxford Cortical/Subcortical Atlases provided with FSL). Due to the 
small sample size, these analyses remained uncorrected for multiple comparisons.17 Analyses of 
the race*conscious awareness contrasts (before taking into account between-subject variables) 
were used to examine whether controlled processing was, as expected, more likely for Black 
compared to White trials in Explicit compared to Implicit blocks. To examine how brain 
activation mapped onto individual differences in SDO extremity, BOLD signal differences for 
                                                 
17 As such, the results presented in this chapter are preliminary and should not be cited without consulting the 
author. 
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the race*conscious awareness contrasts were modeled as a function of each of the SDO 
extremity variables (analyses for SDO-D and SDO-E were carried out separately).   
Results 
Behavioral Task Results 
 Before turning to the fMRI results, analyses of participants’ responses to the task were 
done to determine whether support for government assistance was influenced by race, conscious 
awareness, and SDO in the expected directions. Multilevel models were run with trial as the unit 
of analysis nested within blocks, nested within participant. An empty model was run estimating 
random effects for participant, block, trial number, and face image (because each image was 
shown twice). Only the random effects for participant explained a substantial amount of variation 
in support for government assistance (approximately 10% of the variance), and so all subsequent 
models include only random effects for participant. All models also controlled for fixed effects 
of participant’s sex, education, religion (Christian or non-Christian), and whether participants 
reported being able to decipher the race of faces shown in between noise masks in the Explicit 
blocks.  
 First, I examined the relationship between racial biases in support for government 
assistance during the task and support for race-based policies as measured during the post-scan 
survey in order to determine the degree to which the task reflected evaluations of “real-world” 
policies. Support for government assistance during the task was regressed on a dummy variable 
for conscious awareness condition (0 = Explicit, 1 = Implicit), a dummy variable for race of the 
applicant (0 = Black, 1 = White), race-based policy support (mean-centered), and the interaction 
between race of applicant and race-based policy support. Indeed, there was a significant 
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interaction between race of applicant and race-based policy support (b = -0.052, SE = 0.022, p < 
.05). Once decomposed, it was evident that at low levels of support for race-based policies (-1 
SD from the mean), there were no significant racial biases in support for government assistance 
during the task (b = 0.011, SE = 0.048, p = .811), but at high levels of support for race-based 
policies (+1 SD from the mean), there was a significant pro-Black bias (b = -0.135, SE = 0.044, p 
< .01). This suggests that although opposition to “real-world” race-based policies was not 
associated with anti-Black bias during the task, support for race-based policies was indeed 
associated with pro-Black bias during the task.  
 The primary behavioral analyses concern the interaction between race of applicant and 
conscious awareness. A main effects model indicated no significant main effect of conscious 
awareness, but there was a significant main effect of applicant race such that on average, 
participants were less likely to support White applicants than Black applicants (b = -0.069, SE = 
0.033, p < .05). Next, an interaction was calculated between applicant race and conscious 
awareness. The interaction was marginally significant (b = 0.106, SE = 0.057, p = .062), and 
showed that although a pro-White racial bias existed in Explicit blocks (b = -0.122, SE = 0.044, p 
< .01), no significant racial bias existed in Implicit blocks (b = -0.017, SE = 0.043, p = 0.696). 
Thus, although the lack of racial bias in Implicit blocks was unexpected, more racially tolerant 
evaluations were observed in Explicit blocks as hypothesized.  
 The final, critical, behavioral analysis relating to the hypotheses of this chapter involved 
a three-way interaction between applicant race, conscious awareness, and SDO. Separate models 
were run testing SDO-D and SDO-E. With regard to SDO-D, a significant three-way interaction 
was evident. At mean levels of SDO-D, there is a significant pro-Black bias (b = -0.120, SE = 
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0.040, p < .01), and this bias is marginally stronger in Explicit blocks than in Implicit blocks. At 
low levels of SDO-D, there is a stronger pro-Black bias (b = -0.399, SE = 0.143, p < .01), but this 
bias is only significant in the Explicit blocks (b = 0.516, SE = 0.200, p < .01). Finally, among 
those high in SDO-D, there is no significant racial bias in either Implicit or Explicit blocks. 
Therefore, although individuals high in SDO-D unexpectedly showed no evidence of racial 
biases regardless of conscious awareness of race, individuals low in SDO-D exhibited the 
expected pattern of greater racial tolerance in Explicit compared to Implicit blocks. Figure 5.1 
illustrates this interaction.  
 
The y-axis indicates support for government assistance, and applicant race is plotted on 
the x-axis. Left panels indicate Explicit blocks and right panels indicate Implicit blocks. 
Top panels indicated -1 SD SDO-D, and bottom panels indicate +1 SD SDO-D. 
Figure 4.1: Interaction between Applicant Race, Conscious Awareness, and SDO-D 
 The same three-way regarding SDO-E was not significant. However, both two-way 
interactions comprising the three-way were significant. An applicant race by SDO-E interaction 
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showed that as should be expected, greater levels of SDO-E were associated with lower levels of 
pro-Black bias (b = 0.066, SE = 0.026, p < .05). Unexpectedly, a conscious awareness by SDO-E 
interaction showed that greater levels of SDO-E were also associated with greater support for 
government assistance in the Explicit blocks compared to the Implicit blocks, regardless of race 
(b = -0.067, SE = 0.026, p < .05). 
 Taken together, these behavioral results suggest that contrary to expectations, the 
predominant effect of applicant race was pro-Black/anti-White. Even among individuals high in 
SDO, there were no racial biases rather than pro-White racial biases. However, in line with 
expectations, and more importantly with regard to the framework of this dissertation, conscious 
awareness of race (i.e. explicit racial primes) was associated with more pro-Black evaluations, 
but only among individuals low in SDO-D (although this three-way interaction was not evident 
for SDO-E). 
fMRI Results 
  
 Two sets of analyses were conducted. First BOLD signal was modeled as a function of 
the interaction between applicant race and conscious awareness to see which brain regions 
exhibited significant activation for Black (compared to White) faces in Explicit blocks 
(compared to Implicit blocks) as well as Implicit (compared to Explicit) blocks. Then, the SDO 
extremity variable was added to the model to see which brain regions in the above contrast 
exhibited significant activation that was associated with SDO extremity. ROI analyses were done 
for each contrast for ACC and OFC in order to limited analyses to only the brain regions 
implicated in the critical tests of this chapter. Further, SDO analyses were carried out separately 
for SDO-D and SDO-E.  
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 In the aggregate, there was a small but significant cluster of activation in ACC for 
Implicit compared to Explicit trials, and contrary to the expectation that ACC would be more 
active in Explicit trials, significant activation was also found in ACC for Explicit compared to 
Implicit trials but it was only a single voxel. Thus, ACC activation was evident in both types of 
trials for Black compared to White faces, but this activation was stronger in Implicit trials. 
Regarding OFC, significant clusters of activation were evident for both contrasts (i.e. in both 
Explicit and Implicit trials), but as expected, activation was stronger for the Explicit > Implicit 
contrast than for the Implicit > Explicit contrast. Therefore, although ACC activation did not 
behave as expected, OFC activation did. These results are shown in Table 5.1, and the significant 
clusters of OFC associated with Explicit compared to Implicit trials are depicted in Figure 5.2. 
Table 5.1: Significant Clusters of Bold Activation n ROIs for Applicant Race*Conscious 
Awareness 
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Images were created by overlaying the thresholded Z-statistic image on a standard space 
template (MNI152). Images are centered on the peak voxel for each cluster from the ROI 
analyses. Areas highlighted in blue indicate the ROI for the analysis, and areas highlighted 
in green indicate regions of significant activation. 
Figure 5.2: BOLD Activation in OFC in Response to Explicit > Implicit Blocks for Black > 
White Trials 
 If the theoretical framework of this dissertation is correct, besides an interaction between 
applicant race and conscious awareness, it should also be evident that activation in ACC and 
OFC in Explicit (compared to Implicit) blocks for Black face (compared to White face) trials is 
associated with greater extremity in one’s ideological principles – in this case, SDO. Analyses 
were first conducted for SDO-D extremity. Small yet significant clusters of activation in ACC 
were found for both contrasts, suggesting some degree of ACC activity occurred in both Implicit 
and Explicit blocks was associated with greater SDO-D extremity. However, contrary to 
expectations, the cluster for the Implicit > Explicit contrast predicting SDO-D extremity was 
somewhat stronger. Conversely, patters of activation in OFC supported my hypotheses. That is, 
although significant activation in OFC was found to be associated with greater SDO-D extremity 
for both contrasts, this activation was somewhat stronger for the Explicit > Implicit contrast 
(despite involving fewer voxels).  
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 Regarding SDO-E, there were significant clusters of activation associated with SDO-E 
extremity across all contrasts for both ACC and OFC, but the relative strengths of activation 
varied entirely as expected. For ACC, activation associated with high SDO-E extremity was 
stronger for Explicit (compared to Implicit) blocks than it was for Implicit (compared to Explicit) 
blocks. Further, this same relative difference in strength of activation was evident for OFC. 
These associations between brain activation patterns and SDO-E extremity strongly support the 
hypothesis that greater controlled processing when race is explicitly (rather than implicitly) 
primed is associated with greater adherence to ideological principles regardless of the direction 
of those principles. These results are presented in Table 5.2, and the clusters of ACC and OFC 
for Explicit (compared to Implicit) blocks that are significantly associated with SDO-E extremity 
are illustrated in Figures 5.3 and 5.4, respectively.  
Table 5.2: Significant Clusters of Bold Activation n ROIs for Applicant Race*Conscious 
Awareness*SDO 
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Images were created by overlaying the thresholded Z-statistic image on a standard space 
template (MNI152). Images are centered on the peak voxel for each cluster from the ROI 
analyses. Areas highlighted in blue indicate the ROI for the analysis, and areas highlighted 
in green indicate regions of significant activation. 
Figure 5.3: BOLD Activation Associated with SDO-E Extremity 
In ACC in Response to Explicit > Implicit Blocks for Black > White Trials  
 
Images were created by overlaying the thresholded Z-statistic image on a standard space 
template (MNI152). Images are centered on the peak voxel for each cluster from the ROI 
analyses. Areas highlighted in blue indicate the ROI for the analysis, and areas 
highlighted in green indicate regions of significant activation. 
Figure 5.4: BOLD Activation Associated with SDO-E Extremity 
In OFC in Response to Explicit > Implicit Blocks for Black > White Trials  
Inside the Black Box of “Principles and Prejudice” 
 The results presented in this chapter are mostly consistent with the model laid out in this 
dissertation. The findings presented in chapters 3 and 4 have largely corroborated a theoretical 
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framework in which race-related political objects trigger automatic processes associated with 
ingroup favoritism but controlled processes allow individuals to defer to ideological principles. 
However, up to this point, the neural mechanisms thought to be responsible for deference to 
ideological principles have yet to be directly observed. The use of fMRI allowed for such 
observation, and an experiment was developed to distinguish between neural processes occurring 
during explicitly race-related political evaluations and neural processes occurring during political 
evaluations that are only implicitly related to race. Prior research in social neuroscience has 
established that whereas implicit racial cues are associated with automatic processing (e.g. 
amygdala and insula), explicit racial cues are associated with more controlled processing (e.g. 
ACC and PFC), which can lead to decreases in racial bias (e.g. Cunningham et al. 2004). 
However, it remained unknown whether controlled processing universally leads to inhibition of 
racial biases or to deference to ideological principles, as my model suggests.  
 The behavioral task results suggested that individuals were, as expected, less likely to 
express bias against a racial outgroup when racial primes were explicit than when they were 
implicit. However, the precise pattern of results was somewhat unexpected. Contrary to the 
hypothesis that anti-Black racial biases would be strongest during Implicit blocks, no anti-Black 
racial biases in support for government assistance were observed anywhere in these data. This 
could have been due to multiple reasons. First, although brain activation patterns indicated that 
participants did respond differently to Black than White faces in Implicit blocks, it could be the 
case that the primes were shown too fast for any behavioral consequences to manifest. This 
would be somewhat surprising given the pilot testing as well as the fact that quicker primes have 
been used in prior research to produce racial biases (e.g. Rohr, Degner, and Wentura 2015). 
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Another possibility is simply limited sample size. Although the within-subjects design allowed 
for a large sample in terms of trials, the limited between-subject variation may have made it 
difficult to detect anti-Black biases. Nonetheless, pro-Black biases were evident only in Explicit 
blocks, which suggests that on average, explicit racial primes led to more pro-Black evaluations.  
 The behavioral task results involving SDO told a similar story. Unexpectedly, individuals 
high in SDO-D or SDO-E exhibited no racial bias. Although this was contrary to expectations, it 
makes some sense for SDO-E because the ideology promoted by high SDO-E is thought to 
involve endorsement of existing group inequality rather than a preference to enhance or 
exacerbate inequality (Jost and Thompson 2000; Kugler, Cooper, and Nosek 2010). In that sense, 
a pro-Black bias among those low in SDO may indicate an acknowledgement of existing racial 
inequality and efforts to address it rather than simply a lack of racial prejudice. However, SDO-
D is thought to involve active degradation of groups perceived to be low in the societal 
hierarchy, and so the lack of racial bias among individuals high in SDO-D remains unexplained. 
This lack of bias may, as with the lack of anti-Black bias in the aggregate, be due to sample size 
issues. Nonetheless, SDO-D interacted with applicant race and conscious awareness in the 
expected direction, as pro-Black biases in support for government assistance among individuals 
low in SDO-D were primarily evident during Explicit blocks rather than Implicit blocks.  
 The primary contribution of this chapter centers on the fMRI results. It is first worth 
noting that across analyses, significant brain activation in both the ACC and OFC was evident 
for both Implicit and Explicit blocks, suggesting that in line with the IR model (Cunningham, 
Haas, and Jahn 2011; Cunningham and Zelazo 2007; Cunningham, Zelazo, Packer, and Van 
Bavel 2007), controlled processes seem to be active to some degree at all stages of race-related 
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evaluation (i.e. when race is implicitly primed as well as when it is explicitly primed). The main 
tests of the hypotheses of this chapter therefore involve relative strength of activation between 
Explicit > Implicit contrasts and Implicit > Explicit contrasts.  
In the aggregate, brain activation patterns in the OFC followed expectations, as activation 
for Black versus White face trials was substantially stronger in Explicit (compared to Implicit) 
blocks than in Implicit (compared to Explicit) blocks. However, only low levels of activation in 
ACC for Black versus White face trials were observed to differ across blocks, and activation was 
somewhat stronger for the Implicit > Explicit contrast. This result for ACC was unexpected, but 
may fit with understandings of the functions of the ACC. The findings described earlier in this 
chapter suggest the ACC plays sort of a mediating a role in racial evaluations by detecting 
conflict between automatic reactions and conscious beliefs. If this is the case, it would not be 
surprising if conflict detection was occurring during Implicit blocks, and by the time evaluations 
were made during Explicit blocks, conflicts had already been detected and the OFC kicked in to 
regulate one’s response. However, this finding would still be contrary to some existing work 
(e.g. Cunningham et al. 2004). It could also be the case that the ACC was responding simply to 
the “strangeness” of the Implicit trials, because a series of flashing black and white noise masks 
were shown prior to every applicant description.  
The fMRI analyses regarding SDO were done using extremity variables because my 
model suggests controlled processing should be evident when race is primed explicitly for 
individuals at either end of the ideological spectrum. My hypotheses for SDO were supported 
more strongly for SDO-E than for SDO-D, which is not surprising given the fact that SDO-E is 
thought to be associated with redistributive policies, as described in Chapter 2. Both ACC and 
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OFC showed stronger activation associated with SDO-E extremity in the Explicit > Implicit 
contrasts than in the Implicit > Explicit contrasts. This same pattern was evident for SDO-D 
regarding activation in OFC but not ACC. However, even with regard to the OFC results, the 
activation associated with SDO-D extremity in the Explicit > Implicit contrast was stronger than 
the activation in the Implicit > Explicit contrast but was observed in fewer voxels (i.e. less 
anatomical space). ACC activation was more strongly associated with SDO-D extremity in the 
Implicit > Explicit contrast than in the Explicit > Implicit contrast, and in all analyses activation 
was relatively weak. These results regarding SDO-D are not terribly concerning given that prior 
research has suggested SDO-D is more directly related to social identity motives than SDO-E 
(Jost and Thompson 2000; Kugler, Cooper, and Nosek 2010), and SDO-E has been the primary 
workhorse of group-based principles throughout this dissertation, but further research should 
nonetheless investigate these differences in the neural underpinnings of SDO-E versus SDO-D.  
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CHAPTER 6 
A Neural Toolkit for Change, Anchored in the Past 
“Nihilists! Fuck me. I mean, say what you want about the tenets of National Socialism, Dude, at 
least it’s an ethos.” 
- Walter Sobchak (John Goodman) in The Big Lebowski18 
 
 The question posed at the beginning of this dissertation was: how much control do people 
have over their racial attitudes and behaviors? A review of the literature, in conjunction with the 
results presented throughout this dissertation, suggests the answer is (in true academic fashion): 
it depends. It depends largely on the degree to which automatic versus controlled processes have 
influenced one’s attitudes or behavior. From work in social neuroscience, we know that attitudes 
exist on a spectrum from “more influenced by automatic processes” to “more influenced by 
controlled process,” and that where a particular attitude falls on this spectrum is largely a 
function of the degree to which over time, controlled processes are able to interact with 
automatic processes and thus influence evaluations (Cunningham, Haas, and Jahn 2011; 
Cunningham and Zelazo 2007; Cunningham, Zelazo, Packer, and Van Bavel 2007). Therefore, 
when it comes to the topic of this dissertation – race-related political attitudes – we should expect 
controlled, conscious processes to be quite powerful, but also for people’s attitudes to be 
grounded substantially in innate reflexes.  
I have argued that group-based principles such as SDO are the most dominant predictors 
of race-related political attitudes because they reflect the translation process between people’s 
automatic group biases and the controlled processes that allow them to interact with mass-scale 
                                                 
18 Coen, J. and Coen, E. (Writers and Directors). (1998). The Big Lebowski [Motion picture]. United States: 
Polygram Film Entertainment and Working Title Films.  
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society. More specifically, as people think about race in the domain of politics and how societal 
resources should be allocated across racial groups, automatic ingroup favoritism is translated 
through controlled processes into higher-order principles about how groups should be organized 
in society. Accordingly, people’s attitudes toward policies such as affirmative action and race-
based education spending are not simply the result of whether or not the policy benefits their 
group, nor are they the result solely of their beliefs about deservingness and the proper role of 
government. Instead, race-targeted policy attitudes seem primarily driven by individuals’ 
preferences regarding how groups in society should be organized hierarchically. The results of 
the studies presented in this dissertation have largely supported this theoretical framework.  
 In the remainder of this chapter, I elaborate on the implications of the theory and results 
of this dissertation. I start by summarizing the findings of each chapter. Then, I expand on the 
implications of this dissertation for the “principles or prejudice” literature, and how an 
acknowledgement that “principles” and “prejudice” operate together can benefit this literature. 
Next, I dive deeper into the distinct consequences of group-based principles as opposed to sheer 
ingroup favoritism. Turning to the “principled” component of group-based principles, I talk 
about what this dissertation suggests principles really are, and how this conceptualization of 
principles differs from the conceptualizations of prior work. I then describe how the findings of 
this dissertation call for more cross-fertilization between the NMSoT and CCSoT. Ultimately, I 
suggest this dissertation holds tremendous implications for how we might go about reducing the 
role of prejudice in politics, and so I conclude by discussing ways in which public policy may be 
informed by the theoretical model of this dissertation.  
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Summary of Results 
 In Chapter 2, I surveyed the landscape by pitting survey measures of various constructs 
against one another to see which factors were most strongly associated with race-based policy 
attitudes. Using data from a moderately sized online sample, I looked at three broad categories of 
factors: social identity motives, individualism, and group-based principles. I hypothesized that 
group-based principles, measured as SDO-E and SDO-D, would outperform the social identity 
motives (i.e. the role of ingroup favoritism) and individualism in predicting attitudes toward 
race-based policies. This hypothesis was strongly supported. SDO-E, in particular, was the 
foremost predictor of race-based policy attitudes. Social identity motives played a minor role, 
and the only independent effects of social identity motives were positive relationships between 
ingroup importance and commitment and support for race-based government assistance, which 
was unexpected. As for the role of individualism, work ethic and self-reliance both maintained 
weak but significant independent relationships with race-based policy attitudes. However, an 
experimental manipulation of how hardworking Blacks versus Whites were perceived to be had 
no effect on policy attitudes. Further, contrary to some existing research (Federico and Sidanius 
2002; Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996), the hypothesis that the role of individualism is explained 
by group-based preferences was not supported.  
These results suggest first and foremost that group-based principles rather than ingroup 
favoritism or individualistic values underlay race-targeted policy opinions. This finding, in 
particular, is central to the theoretical framework outlined in this dissertation. These findings also 
suggest that “principles,” as traditionally conceptualized in the “principles or prejudice” 
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literature, are not simply socially acceptable vehicles for the expression of group biases but are 
also not necessarily “pure” indicators of deservingness-based evaluations either.  
 In Chapter 3, I utilized the Minimal Groups Paradigm (MGP) to strip away any context, 
history, and stereotypes that might be attached to “real-world” groups and thus obtain purer 
estimates of the relationships between ingroup favoritism, perceptions of deservingness, group-
based principles, and race-based policy attitudes. I started by replicating the correlational results 
of Chapter 2 in a smaller, student sample (except for the unexpected results regarding ingroup 
importance and commitment, which did not replicate). SDO-E was the strongest predictor of 
race-based policy attitudes even when the measures of social identity motives were specific to 
the minimal groups in the experiment. In order to manipulate the perceived deservingness of the 
minimal groups, and thus gauge the degree to which individuals evaluated groups based on merit 
rather than sheer ingroup favoritism, I experimentally manipulated whether the participant was 
told their ingroup was relatively good or bad at a task they completed during the study. In the 
aggregate, participants showed significant ingroup bias and no sensitivity to the merit 
manipulations. However, most importantly for the purposes of this dissertation, the only 
component of the minimal groups task that significantly predicted race-based policy attitudes 
was implicit ingroup favoritism. Further, SDO was associated with implicit ingroup favoritism as 
well as some instances of explicit ingroup favoritism and sensitivity to the merit manipulations in 
a way indicative of merit-based evaluation.  
These results are important for two reasons. First, they suggest ingroup favoritism is not 
entirely unrelated to race-based policy attitudes, but instead its role is implicit and based in 
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automatic processes. Second, group-based principles seem to represent some combination of 
automatic (and to some degree controlled) group biases and higher-order principles, as expected.  
 Although Chapter 3 demonstrated that automatic group biases are associated with race-
based policy opposition, and group-based principles seem to embody some combination of 
ingroup bias and deservingness-based values, I was nonetheless unable to test the hypothesis that 
individuals become more “principled” in their evaluations as controlled processes interact with 
automatic group biases. Therefore, in Chapter 4, I used nationally representative data from the 
2008 ANES to gauge implicit racial ambivalence – or the discrepancy between one’s implicit 
and explicit racial attitudes – as it exists in the United States and its consequences for how 
people evaluate race-related political issues. Psychology work has shown that implicit 
ambivalence is associated with greater controlled processing aimed at resolving dissonance 
associated with the target of ambivalence, and so I use implicit ambivalence as a measure of the 
degree to which individuals’ controlled and automatic preferences have interacted. I 
hypothesized that individuals low in implicit racial ambivalence – i.e. those who are the most 
“resolved” in their racial attitudes – would be the most likely to rely on higher-order principles 
such as ideology and egalitarianism to evaluate race-related political objects.  
In support of this hypothesis, this was the case with regard to the role of ideology across a 
range of race-related political outcome variables. The role of egalitarianism was also moderated 
by implicit racial ambivalence but counter to expectations, such that the effects of egalitarianism 
were exacerbated at high levels of implicit ambivalence. I suggest this is because the 
egalitarianism items are inherently group-based and so this interaction actually depicts greater 
reliance on group biases at high implicit ambivalence.  
 
 
 
 
172 
These results suggest that the degree to which individuals defer to higher-order principles 
when evaluating race-related political objects is, as hypothesized, largely moderated by the 
degree to which they have used controlled processing to “adjust” their automatic biases. Further, 
the result of the interaction between controlled processing and automatic biases is not always 
inhibition of racial biases or more liberal policy attitudes. In half of the sample, explicit 
preferences were more biased relative to the mean of the explicit bias measure than implicit 
preferences, and having resolved racial preferences was associated with ideological polarization 
rather than simply more liberal policy positions. Returning to the data from the experiment in 
Chapter 3, I also was able to construct an implicit ambivalence variable using the implicit and 
explicit attitudes measures in the MGP and show that, as expected, individuals low in implicit 
ambivalence toward the minimal groups (i.e. those with more resolved attitudes) were the least 
likely to express ingroup favoritism behaviorally in the MGP. 
In Chapter 5, I directly examined the neural mechanisms thought to be at play throughout 
this dissertation by using fMRI. Specifically, I examined brain activation patterns in cortical 
areas of the brain – the ACC and OFC, in particular – when people evaluated applicants for 
government assistance who varied in race as well as whether their race was primed explicitly or 
implicitly. I found that in terms of decisions to support or oppose government assistance, 
contrary to expectations, no racial biases were apparent when race was primed implicitly, but 
more importantly for the purposes of this dissertation, pro-Black evaluations were greater when 
race was primed explicitly than implicitly, and this pattern was exacerbated among individuals 
low in SDO-D (but not SDO-E). In terms of fMRI results, I found that contrary to expectations, 
activation in ACC was greater when race was primed implicitly. However, in line with 
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expectations, OFC activation was greater when race was primed explicitly, and this pattern was 
exacerbated at high levels of SDO extremity (i.e. both ends of the SDO-E and SDO-D 
spectrums). This same pattern was evident for SDO-D for OFC, but not for ACC.  
Principles, Prejudice, or Principled Prejudice? 
 The questions addressed in this dissertation stemmed largely from the “principles or 
prejudice” literature. The central question of the “principles or prejudice” literature is: are 
people’s attitudes toward race-targeted policies like affirmative action due more to racial 
prejudice or individualistic values? Research aimed at answering this question has spanned 
decades, and ultimately the result has been a vast array of mixed findings.  
On the one hand, proponents of constructs like symbolic racism (Kinder and Sears 1981; 
Sears and Henry 2003) and modern racism (McConahay 1986) have argued that racial prejudice 
has become inherently fused with conservative, individualistic values, and that “principled” 
arguments against policies like affirmative action are in fact socially acceptable means of 
expressing racial prejudice (Bobo and Smith 1998; Kinder and Mendelberg 2000; Kinder and 
Sander 1996; Sears, van Laar, Carrillo, and Kosterman 1997). An array of empirical findings 
support these claims (e.g. Gilens 1999; Henry and Sears 2003; Rabinowitz et al. 2009; Sears et 
al. 1997). On the other hand, other research argues that constructs like symbolic racism confound 
racial prejudice with nonracial conservative values, and that when accounted for separately, 
individualism explains the bulk of variation in race-targeted policy attitudes (Sniderman and 
Carmines 1997; Sniderman et al. 1996).  
 I have proposed that the mixed findings that beset the “principles or prejudice” literature 
are largely due to limited, unidimensional conceptualizations of what “principles” and 
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“prejudice” are. Scholars have primarily been interested in whether racial biases underlay 
opposition to race-targeted policies or not, and so a simple dichotomy between racial prejudice 
and individualism has been functional. However, the limited conceptualizations of principles and 
prejudice (as well as the mechanisms of each) have prevented the literature from advancing 
along with work in political psychology and social neuroscience. By decomposing the multiple 
dimensions comprising common conceptualizations of prejudice and individualism, I have 
derived critical tests that may advance the “principles or prejudice” literature.  
 One critical test that a limited conceptualization of principles and prejudice has obscured 
is whether racial biases in support for government assistance (i.e. effects of prejudice) are due to 
social identity motives – motivations to favor ingroups and derogate outgroups – or broad 
ideologies about how groups in society should be organized hierarchically. The implications of 
this test are straightforward. If race-targeted policy attitudes are primarily due to ingroup 
favoritism, it suggests a sort of self-interest at play whereby individuals are mainly out for their 
own groups’ (and thus their own selves’) best interest and so will support policies that benefit 
their group and oppose policies that benefit other groups. Members of disadvantaged groups are 
thus, as Jost, Banaji, and Nosek put it, “revolutionaries- in-waiting” (2004, p. 883), who are in 
constant conflict with members of advantaged groups who cling onto their disproportionate share 
of resources. In terms of race-based policy attitudes, this suggests variation in support for 
policies that assist Blacks is a function of variation in race as well as the degree to which people 
identify with their racial ingroup. However, the findings in this dissertation suggest the role of 
prejudice is explained mainly by group-based principles, and so opposition to race-based policies 
is less about any kind of self-interest and more about efforts to instill order on society (Chapters 
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2 and 3). What is important is the system rather than the ingroup, and individuals who believe in 
maintaining group-based hierarchy will oppose government assistance to any disadvantaged 
group, regardless of whether or not they are a member of that group.  
 Another critical test allowed by a more comprehensive view of “principles” and 
“prejudice” is of what sorts of principles are most important with regard to race-based policy 
opinions. In the existing literature, the term “principles” has been used primarily to reflect the 
influence of any values not indicative of racial animus. Some work has deferred primarily to 
Weber’s ideas about the Protestant Work Ethic, or a high valuation of hard work and the belief 
that hard work is the key to success; other work has defined individualism more in terms of 
Tocqueville’s or Emerson’s conceptualizations of self-reliance and isolation from mass-scale 
society; still other work explicitly talks about both versions of individualism and then measures 
only one dimension of it. The implications of which version of individualism actually underlays 
people’s race-based policy opinions are substantial because it essentially determines which sort 
of principles a government assistance policy might be framed around in order to manipulate 
support for that policy.  
Results from this dissertation suggest that the most dominant form of principles driving 
race-based policy attitudes is group-based principles. Work ethic and self-reliance maintain 
independent but weak relationships with race-targeted policies when controlling for group-based 
principles (Chapters 2 and 3), and the only evidence of deservingness-based evaluations found in 
this dissertation was among individuals high in SDO (Chapter 3). Existing work thus seems to 
have missed the mark to some degree in postulating that the principles of individualism are the 
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primary values at work when people evaluate race-based policies. Instead, the principles people 
seem to be basing their opinions on have to do with how groups should be arranged in society.   
A final critical test made possible by broadening our view of “principles or prejudice” is 
of the mechanisms that drive the effects of ingroup favoritism, principles, and group-based 
principles on race-based policy attitudes. By acknowledging that principles and prejudice are 
multidimensional, interrelated constructs, we can ask the question: when are people more likely 
to evaluate government assistance policies based on group biases versus ideological principles? I 
have argued that based on research in social neuroscience as well as evolutionary psychology, 
we should expect the role of ingroup favoritism to be driven primarily by automatic processes 
and the role of higher-order principles to be driven primarily by controlled processes.  
Indeed, I found that only implicit measures of ingroup favoritism predicted race-based 
policy opposition (Chapter 3), and individuals who had utilized controlled processing to resolve 
discrepancies between their implicit and explicit racial attitudes (i.e. those low in implic it racial 
ambivalence) were the most likely to rely on ideology to evaluate a range of race-related political 
outcomes (Chapter 4). Further, group-based principles – the dominant predictor of race-based 
policy opinions – seem to consist of a combination of these forces (Chapter 3). Finally, by 
studying the neural processes thought to underlay automatic ingroup biases versus ideological 
thinking directly using fMRI, it was found that racial biases aligned with one’s ideology (in 
terms of SDO) most when race was primed explicitly, and that individuals at either extreme of 
SDO were most likely to exhibit brain activation in OFC (and to some degree ACC) when race 
was primed explicitly, which suggests ideological thinking is exacerbated by controlled 
processing (Chapter 5). Understanding the neural mechanisms of race-targeted policy attitudes 
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allows us to understand the potential for change in these attitudes, as well as the sorts of 
interventions most likely to create attitude change. In other words, instead of simply looking at 
the degree to which race-targeted policy opinions are primarily principled or prejudiced, we can 
start to investigate how to reduce the role of prejudice that exists.   
Other Group-Based Principles, Symbolic Racism, and System Justification 
 In this dissertation, the primary operationalization of group-based principles was SDO 
(more specifically, the two subdimensions of SDO-D and SDO-E). However, it is reasonable to 
wonder what other sorts of group-based principles exist and the role they would play in 
influencing race-targeted policy attitudes. Although SDO is likely one of the most influential 
constructs representing group-based principles, I would not suggest it is the end-all-be-all of 
group-based principles, or that the term “group-based principles” is simply a synonym for SDO. 
Instead, I use the term group-based principles to represent conscious beliefs about how groups in 
society should be organized, and I argue that they stem from interactions between innate group 
biases and higher-order values and beliefs.  
SDO is one manifestation of group-based principles and reflects the degree to which 
people think groups should be arranged hierarchically and high-status groups should dominate 
subordinate groups. However, it is also possible to imagine other group-based principles such as 
beliefs about how rigid group boundaries should be, whether diversity should be tolerated within 
groups, how conflicts between groups should be addressed (e.g. through hostility or diplomacy), 
whether groups should be integrated or stay separate from one another, or whether groups should 
even be defined in the first place. Only SDO is tested in this dissertation, and its dominant role in 
predicting race-based attitudes shows that broadly, beliefs about how groups should be organized 
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matter more than positive feelings toward ingroups. Yet if group-based principles comprise the 
interaction between automatic group biases and higher-order principles, it should be expected 
that this interaction results in other sorts of group-based principles as well, and so the roles of 
other group-based principles should be tested in future research. In fact, different types of group-
based policies may be driven by different group-based principles. Race-targeted government 
assistance such as affirmative action and race-based education spending has most directly to do 
with the distribution of resources across groups in a country, but other policies may be more 
aimed at integration between groups, equal protection under and enforcement of the law, or 
conflicts between warring nations of relatively equal status in terms of global hierarchy.  
Symbolic Racism: Not So “New” 
 Given the theoretical framework developed in this dissertation, I would also suggest that 
constructs such as symbolic racism in some ways tap the effects of group-based principles. As 
explained earlier, proponents of symbolic racism argue that it reflects a fusion between racial 
prejudice against Blacks and individualistic values. The theoretical model developed in this 
dissertation accounts for such a fusion. Specifically, the model suggests symbolic racism is a 
form of group-based principles specific to Blacks in the contemporary United States. Americans 
– especially White Americans – have internalized negative feelings toward Blacks, but these 
negative feelings run counter to social pressures to be unprejudiced, and so as Kinder and 
Mendelberg (2000) suggest, individualism becomes a socially acceptable vehicle for the 
expression of anti-Black prejudice. Indeed, implicit racial biases as well as explicit racial biases 
and ideology have been shown to contribute to symbolic racism (e.g. Ditonto, Lau, and Sears 
2013).  
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The model I propose interprets the origins of symbolic racism (and thus the implications 
of its effects) differently in three major ways. First, my model suggests that despite the fact that 
group biases and higher-order principles often interact, they are nonetheless separable 
components of group-based principles. Indeed, although non-group-based principles such as 
work ethic and self-reliance did not play a substantial role throughout my studies, they did at 
times exhibit independent relationships with race-based policy attitudes.  
Second, my model suggests the construct of symbolic racism is unnecessarily constrained 
to attitudes toward Blacks, because although the unique history of Blacks in the United States 
has undoubtedly influenced the particular stereotypes that are applied to them as a group, the 
interaction between principles and prejudice is not unique to attitudes toward Blacks and in fact 
is perfectly explained by evolutionary processes. Said differently, the processes underlying 
symbolic racism have likely been around for millennia, and so the term “new racism,” as 
symbolic racism has often been referred to, is in some ways misleading. My model proposes that 
since humans have interacted with one another in small-scale groups, automatic group-based 
adaptations have interacted with controlled processes that respond to the nuances of the 
immediate social context.  
Second, my model suggests the degree to which constructs like symbolic racism (and 
group-based principles more broadly) are driven by group biases versus higher-order principles 
like individualism depends on the amount of controlled processing applied to the attitude object 
(in this case, Blacks). As demonstrated in Chapter 4, the degree to which political ideology 
predicted constructs including symbolic racism was moderated by how resolved their implicit 
and explicit racial attitudes were.  
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SDO or System Justification? 
Another construct that should be addressed in relation to group-based principles is system 
justification. System Justification Theory (SJT) posits that individuals vary in the degree to 
which they strive to defend and rationalize the existing social, economic, and political systems as 
well as the status quo more broadly (Jost and Banaji 1994; Jost, Banaji, and Nosek 2004; Jost, 
Kay, and Thorisdottir 2009;). SJT has been incredibly influential and supported across a range of 
empirical tests in a variety of domains (e.g. Balabanis and Diamantopoulos 2016; Blasi and Jost 
2006; Feygina, Jost, and Goldsmith 2010; Jost et al. 2012; Jost and Kay 2005; Kay and Jost 
2003; Montieth, Burns, Rupp, and Mihalec-Adkins 2016).  
A critical difference between SJT and group-based theories revolving around ingroup 
favoritism or ethnocentrism is that according to SJT, members of disadvantaged groups will 
often favor the status quo even when it works against them because the structure and order 
provided by the system alleviates the distress associated with thinking the world is unfair (Jost 
and Banaji 1994; Jost and Burgess 2000). This tenet of SJT is nearly identical to what 
differentiates SDO from social identity motives. Although some work has recognized this 
similarity between SJT and SDO (Jost and Thompson 2000; Kugler, Cooper, and Nosek 2010), a 
thorough examination of the differences between the two constructs remains to be done and the 
most notable difference is simply that SDO has explicitly to do with groups as the unit of 
analysis whereas SJT does not necessarily use groups as the unit of analysis. Future research is 
needed to parse out the distinct implications of SJT compared to SDO, as SJT was not measured 
in this dissertation.  
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In fact, the model in this dissertation may be applied to SJT as a potential explanation of 
the mechanisms underlying system justification. Are system justification motives driven by the 
interaction between innate group biases and higher-order principles? Some SJT work suggests 
system justification motives can manifest implicitly (e.g. Jost, Banaji, and Nosek 2004; Jost, 
Pelham, and Carvallo 2002), suggesting the automatic components of system justification are not 
necessarily indicative of sheer ingroup favoritism. However, a comprehensive analysis of the 
degree to which system justification is driven by automatic or controlled processes has yet to be 
done. From an evolutionary standpoint, it makes sense that “the system” the brain is responding 
to automatically is not mass-scale society, but instead the reflection of some system that could 
exist in small-scale groups. My model suggests the brain might utilize controlled processes to 
adjust these automatic responses to address the social, political, and economic “systems” of 
contemporary mass-scale society. 
Rules for Radicals, and Reactionaries Too 
 Principles, values, ethoses, belief systems, philosophies, dogmas, ideologies, moral 
codes; regardless of what you call them, higher-order belief structures seem important to 
understanding attitudes toward government assistance. Through this dissertation, I have 
attempted to unify, to some degree, the divergent conceptualizations of “principles” that would 
be posited at the extreme ends of the NMSoT and CCSoT. The implications of my proposed 
model for how we should conceptualize principles flies in the face of the extreme forms of both 
schools of thought.  
I propose that reliance on principles to evaluate political objects stems from evolutionary 
adaptations aimed at adjusting behavioral rules to accommodate the needs of a complex 
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immediate environment. This conceptualization of principles is based on work in social 
neuroscience on the functions of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) regarding complex behavioral rules 
used by humans (Bunge and Zelazo 2006; Zelazo, Frye, and Rapus 1996; Zelazo, Muller, Frye, 
and Marcovitch 2003), and on work in evolutionary psychology on how political cognition 
largely emanates from adaptations suited for small-scale group interactions (Petersen 2014; 
Petersen and Aarøe 2012; 2013; Petersen et al. 2013). Essentially, my model’s conceptualization 
of principles comes from acknowledging that controlled processes are driven by millennia-old 
neural hardware that primarily serve the function of allowing humans to respond to a complex 
and rapidly changing environment in a nuanced way. Small-scale group interactions did not call 
for behavioral guidelines that extended beyond a handful of tribes, yet the contemporary political 
world often necessitates belief systems that apply universally and span the globe. Ultimately, I 
therefore suggest controlled processes do not necessarily simply lead people to express more 
egalitarian views. Instead, controlled processes lead people to adopt and adhere to a set of 
principles, whether those principles are progressive, conservative, radical, reactionary, capitalist, 
socialist, hierarchy-attenuating, hierarch-enhancing, or ideological in some other way.   
Acknowledging Factors Formerly “Beyond Our Scope” 
  This conceptualization of what principles represent is somewhat counter to the tenets of 
the CCSoT because it suggests that when individuals utilize controlled processing, it does not 
necessarily entail the deliberate weighing of costs and benefits or active choosing of one value 
system over another, and it certainly does not indicate processing that is detached from innate 
predispositions. As mentioned throughout this dissertation, most scholars – even those working 
mainly within the CCSoT – have acknowledged that predispositions and evolutionary forces 
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likely play a role in shaping political opinions but neglected to study such forces directly due to 
the lack of tools available for studying them (e.g. Zaller 1992). However, the tools for studying 
automatic processes, innate predispositions, and nonconscious motivations are no longer beyond 
the scope of political research, and so it seems overdue that a model accounting for these factors 
is applied to the study of race-targeted policy opinions.  
Social Desirability “Influence,” Not “Bias” 
 The conceptualization of principles offered in this dissertation also runs counter to some 
models that have focused on NMSoT factors. As referenced in the epigraph of the first chapter in 
this dissertation, Stephen Pinker (2008) has suggested that just because science has been 
uncovering the mysteries associated with what he refers to as the “temptation systems” in the 
brain, it does not mean we need to disregard the “inhibition systems” in the brain. In other words, 
the research by scholars of the NMSoT has advanced our understandings of automatic processes 
tremendously, but this does not mean we should neglect the role of controlled processes. Most 
scholars primarily focused on studying NMSoT factors have recognized this (e.g. Smith et al. 
2011). As mentioned in the caveats outlined in Chapter 1, my use of the term “controlled 
processing” should not be taken to indicate control in a metaphysical sense or “free will.” 
However, I do suggest (in line with work in social neuroscience) that controlled processes are 
more likely to reach conscious awareness. Individuals are sometimes, though not always, able 
and even willing to self-report their attitudes (mostly) “accurately.” Especially with regard to 
politics, individuals take enough time before reporting their attitudes that controlled processing 
are able to lay substantial claim to evaluations of a political object, whether it be a policy, a 
candidate, a party, or an issue.  
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 Some work has explicitly acknowledged the role of controlled processing but in a way 
that suggests it is less valuable than the role of automatic processing. One thing some researchers 
are particularly wary of with regard to surveys, and an example often held up as representing the 
limitations of self-report measures, is social desirability “bias.” The argument regarding social 
desirability “bias” is often that social desirability leads individuals to report responses that are 
somehow disingenuous. Social desirability, the argument goes, leads people to obfuscate or skew 
their self-reported attitudes away from their “true” attitudes, which are deep-seated, in order to 
appease conformity pressures or abide by perceived social norms (e.g. Greenwald et al. 2009). 
Or, alternatively, it is sometimes argued that people are simply unaware of their “true” attitudes. 
However, the model proposed in this dissertation suggests controlled processes are an inherent 
component of attitudes. Further, the concept of a single, coherent “true” attitude does not fit well 
with the model I propose, because the model suggests that due to the constant iterative process 
between automatic and controlled processes, any particular attitude will manifest differently 
depending on when and how it is expressed. In fact, evaluations that are heavily influenced by 
controlled processes are expected to differ substantially from evaluations made primarily at the 
automatic level, because over time controlled processes should adjust evaluations of an attitude 
object to fit the needs of the immediate environment (e.g. Cunningham and Zelazo 2007). Even 
in cases when individuals are consciously aware of how they feel yet report something different 
to exude a socially acceptable image, I suggest that this is nonetheless an example of controlled 
processing adjusting one’s evaluations (albeit evaluations that have already been somewhat 
influenced by controlled processing). Ultimately, this suggests social desirability “bias” would 
be better worded as social desirability “influence.”  
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 The model in this dissertation also holds substantial implications for what effects we 
should expect from controlled processes and social desirability influence. A common assumption 
of NMSoT work is that when people utilize controlled processing or tailor self-reports in light of 
social pressures, they tailor their attitude toward being more egalitarian and unprejudiced. A 
common assumption of scholars using implicit measures is that they are useful because at the 
conscious level, people realize it is socially unacceptable to be racially prejudiced so adjust their 
self-reports accordingly (e.g. Greenwald et al. 1998; Greenwald et al. 2009; Pasek et al. 2010; 
Payne et al. 2005; Payne et al. 2010; see Fazio and Olson 2003). According to Tali Mendelberg 
(2001), implicit racial cues in political campaigns are the most effective at evoking prejudice 
because when racial cues are explicit, controlled processes allow individuals to inhibit racial 
biases and abide by egalitarian norms (see also Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002). Even 
work in social neuroscience suggests that controlled neural processes are associated with 
individuals inhibiting automatic racial biases (Cunningham et al. 2004). However, if controlled 
processes are simply utilized to adapt automatic processes to the social pressures of the 
immediate environment, then should it be expected that controlled processes always lead to less 
prejudiced, egalitarian, liberal views? I suggest not.  
 Instead, I argue controlled processing can lead people to mimic culturally learned 
stereotypes, support group hierarchy, or defer to anti-egalitarian principles instead of egalitarian 
ones. Indeed, the results of Chapter 4 support this proposition. Although ingroup favoritism was 
diminished at low levels of implicit racial ambivalence (i.e. among those who had used 
controlled processing to resolve their racial attitudes), controlled processing seemed to lead some 
individuals (approximately half the sample in those data) to self-report racial attitudes that were 
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more (relatively) biased than their implicit racial attitudes. Further, the controlled processing 
associated with low implicit racial ambivalence was also related to a stronger role of political 
ideology. In other words, individuals who presumably underwent the most controlled processing 
to resolve their racial attitudes were not the most likely to report liberal race-based policy 
attitudes, but instead were the most likely to report race-based policy attitudes in line with their 
ideology. The result of having resolved racial attitudes was ideological polarization rather than 
universal inhibition of prejudice.  
 Given this broader understanding of controlled processing, I argue that the impact of 
social desirability is not greater egalitarianism and inhibition of group biases but instead the 
application of some broader set of principles to one’s automatic group biases. For some, this 
means appearing unprejudiced, and for others, it means “telling it like it is” and rejecting 
“political correctness.” For some, this means expressing pro-social attitudes, and for others, it 
means abiding by the “bootstraps” model of individualism. For some, it means striving to 
attenuate hierarchy, and for others, it means striving to enhance it. As advocated by Walter 
Sobchak in The Big Lebowski in the quote at the beginning of this chapter, what really seems to 
be universally socially desirable is just being “principled” in some way. 
Nudging Away Prejudice? 
 One of the ultimate goals of the model developed in this dissertation is to inform efforts 
to reduce the role of prejudice in politics. Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler, in their book 
Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness, suggest that through 
psychologically informed public policy, relatively minor adjustments in how policies are 
developed and implemented can allow government to take a proactive role in increasing the well-
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being of the public while also refraining from becoming invasive (2008; see also Sunstein 2013). 
If decreasing the role of racial prejudice in politics is a desirable outcome (at least for many 
people), then an understanding of the mechanisms of the role of prejudice could be quite useful 
to policymakers. The model developed in this dissertation offers several tangible tools for 
nudging people’s attitudes toward race-targeted policies. 
This dissertation advances our understandings of the mechanisms of how prejudice 
influences political attitudes – when people are most likely to abide by higher-order ideological 
principles when evaluating race-related political objects rather than resorting to innate, primal 
ingroup biases. Indeed, according to the model, humans are not helplessly bound by millennia-
old motivations to favor ingroups over outgroups. There is room for change. However, humans 
are also not detached from these millennia-old forces. Controlled processes allow individuals to 
adjust automatic, reflexive group biases in accordance with higher-order principles. The major 
role controlled processes are argued to play offers some room for optimism among those 
interested in reducing the role prejudice plays in driving policy opinions.  
Structuring (Not Simply Encouraging) Racial Thought 
Two of the major heuristics Sunstein and Thaler suggest are useful for policymakers are 
framing, which structures the way in which individuals think about a topic, and priming, which 
influences what issues come to mind when people evaluate a topic (see e.g., Iyengar and Kinder 
1987; Kahneman and Tversky 1984). In this dissertation, it is argued that prejudice and ingroup 
favoritism are least likely to drive people’s attitudes toward race-targeted policies when they 
have time to think about it, when controlled processes have a chance to “reiterate” automatic 
evaluations, and when individuals have had the opportunity to use controlled processes to resolve 
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disparities that exist between their gut-level preferences and their consciously held values. In 
terms of public policy, then, it seems efforts to frame policies in a manner that encourages 
effortful thought or prime relatively complex aspects of an issue may be useful in discouraging 
the role of prejudice.  
However, I suggest this conclusion would be problematic. As described above, it should 
not be assumed that controlled processing yields egalitarian, liberal political views. Instead, it 
may very well be the case that controlled processing can result in ideological polarization or 
even exacerbate racially prejudiced views. Getting people to “think more” about race or priming 
people to think about race explicitly has been upheld in much research as a tool for diminishing 
racial prejudice (e.g. Cunningham et al. 2004; Hurwitz and Peffley 2005; Mendelberg 2001; 
Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002). Yet as mentioned in Chapter 5, some of these findings 
likely exist in the aggregate but are limited by a range of factors linked to whether one embraces 
egalitarian views, such as education (Huber and Lapinski 2006).  
The results presented in this dissertation and the model more broadly suggest that 
although some controlled processing allows some individuals to abide by egalitarian norms, it 
also allows other individuals to abide by anti-egalitarian norms. The group-based principles 
people abide by can entail a range of beliefs, some of which explicitly exacerbate group-based 
inequality. As such, getting people simply to “think about race” is likely not enough to shift 
opinions in a conservative or liberal direction, or even in an unprejudiced direction. If the goal is 
simply to remove the influence of ingroup favoritism, the model suggests sheer encouragement 
of controlled processing will be effective, but racial biases may manifest through more 
“principled” means. If the goal is to diminish racial biases in support for government assistance, 
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or to encourage support for group-based equality more broadly, more direct restructuring of 
controlled processes through policy framing and priming is likely necessary.  
Further, careful consideration should be taken not to prime individuals to think in terms 
that are easily translatable into small-scale, tribal interactions. The automatic processes 
underlying people’s evaluations get “first dibs” when it comes to shaping policy attitudes, and so 
the easier it is for automatic group biases to take root, the less need there will be for controlled 
processing to step in. Indeed, Nelson and Kinder (1996) showed that group centrism was 
significantly more likely to play a role in people’s policy opinions when issues were framed in a 
way that drew attention to the policy’s beneficiaries. When it is easy for people to revert to 
thinking in terms of the ingroup-outgroup distinctions of millennia past, they likely will.  
Leveraging Social Desirability Influence 
 Another psychological phenomenon Sunstein and Thaler suggest might be useful to 
policymakers is the spotlight effect, whereby individuals tend to overestimate the degree to 
which others notice and assign importance to their actions (Gilovich, Medvec, and Savitsky, 
2000; Gilovich and Savitsky 1999). Since classic conformity studies like those conducted by 
Solomon Asch, Stanely Milgram, and Philip Zimbardo, social psychology research has shown 
that social pressure is a very powerful force (Asch 1956; Milgram 1964; Haney, Banks, and 
Zimbardo 1973), and can be leveraged even for political ends such as encouraging voter turnout 
(e.g. Gerber and Green 2008; Panagopoulos 2010). The model in this dissertation suggests 
individuals use controlled processing to translate their automatic group preferences into higher-
order, group-based principles that address the demands of their complex social environment. As 
such, if the social environment demands egalitarianism then we should expect controlled 
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processing to push people toward egalitarianism. In this way, social desirability can be thought 
of as a tool for persuasion rather than a “bias” to be avoided. “Public shaming” has in many ways 
become a problem in social media (e.g. Whittaker and Kowalski 2015), but at the same time it is 
largely through social influence that norms and principles are created (e.g. Benford and Snow 
2000). When individuals are “put on the spot” – when they perceive their attitudes and behaviors 
to have social consequences – they may be more likely to utilize controlled processing to adjust 
their deep-seated biases in a more egalitarian direction, as long as the social environment 
encourages egalitarianism.  
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APPENDIX 
Chapter 2 
Group Identification: 
1. I feel strongly affiliated with most groups I belong to.  
2. Other groups can learn a lot from the groups I belong to. 
3. Belonging to groups is an important part of my identity. 
4. In times of trouble, the only way to know what to do is to rely on the group leaders. 
5. I am glad to contribute to the groups I belong to. 
6. Compared to other groups of the same kind, the groups I belong to are particularly good. 
7. It is important to me that I view myself as a member of groups I belong to. 
8. All group members should respect the customs, the institutions, and the leaders of the 
group. 
9. I am strongly committed to the groups I belong to. 
10. Relative to other groups, the groups I belong to are very moral groups. 
11. It is important to me that others see me as a member of groups I belong to. 
12. It is disloyal to criticize the group. 
13. I like to help the groups I belong to. 
14. The groups I belong to are better than other groups in all respects. 
15. When I talk about the group members, I usually say “we” instead of “they.” 
16. There is usually a good reason for every rule and regulation that the group leaders 
propose. 
1 (Strongly Disagree) 
2 (Disagree) 
3 (Neither Agree nor Disagree) 
4 (Agree) 
5 (Strongly Agree) 
 
Importance – 3, 7, 11, 15; Commitment – 1, 5, 9, 13; Deference – 4, 8, 12, 16; Superiority – 2, 6, 
10, 14. 
Error covariance estimated between items 5 and 13. 
SDO: 
1. Some groups of people are just more worthy than others. 
2. It would be good if all groups could be equal. 
3. In getting what your group wants, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other 
groups. 
4. Group equality should be our ideal. 
5. Superior groups should dominate inferior groups. 
6. All groups should be given an equal chance in life. 
7. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups. 
8. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups. 
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9. If certain groups of people stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems. 
10. Increased social equality. 
11. It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the 
bottom. 
12. We would have fewer problems if we treated different groups more equally. 
13. Inferior groups should stay in their place. 
14. We should strive to make incomes more equal. 
15. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place. 
16. No one group should dominate in society. 
1 (Strongly Disagree) 
2 (Disagree) 
3 (Neither Agree nor Disagree) 
4 (Agree) 
5 (Strongly Agree) 
SDO-D – 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15; SDO-E – 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16. 
Error covariances estimated between items 3 and 7, items 2 and 4, and items 8 and 14. 
Individualism: 
1. To be truly successful, a person should be self-reliant. 
2. Nothing is impossible if you work hard enough. 
3. Self-reliance is the key to being successful. 
4. If one works hard enough, one is likely to make a good life for oneself. 
5. Hard work makes one a better person. 
6. People would be better off if they depended on themselves. 
7. One should live one's own life independent of others as much as possible. 
8. I do not like having to depend on other people. 
9. Working hard is the key to being successful. 
10. By working hard a person can overcome every obstacle that life presents. 
11. One must avoid dependence on other persons whenever possible. 
12. Any problem can be overcome with hard work. 
13. I strive to be self-reliant. 
14. If you work hard you will succeed. 
15. Anyone who is able and willing to work hard has a good chance of succeeding. 
16. Having a great deal of independence from others is very important to me. 
17. A person should always do the best job possible. 
18. Only those who depend on themselves get ahead in life. 
19. It is important to control one's destiny by not being dependent on others. 
20. By simply working hard enough, one can achieve one's goals. 
1 (Strongly Disagree) 
2 (Disagree) 
3 (Neither Agree nor Disagree) 
4 (Agree) 
5 (Strongly Agree) 
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Work Ethic – 2, 4, 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 17, 20; Self-Reliance – 1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 16, 18, 19. 
Error covariances estimated between items 8 and 16, items 7 and 13, items 11 and 13, items 10 
and 12, and items 2 and 12. 
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Chapter 3 
Affective Evaluations: 
*Asked with regard to the minimal ingroup and minimal outgroup.  
 
1. Please rate how "warm" or "cold" you feel toward each of the following groups on the 
below scales from 0-100. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you 
feel favorable and warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees 
mean that you don't feel favorable toward the group and that you don't care too much for 
that group. You would rate the group at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly 
warm or cold toward the group. 
 
 
 
Attitudes toward race-targeted policies: 
 
1. Affirmative action for Blacks in hiring for jobs. 
2. Increased federal education spending in neighborhoods predominantly populated by 
Blacks. 
3. Federally funded college scholarships for Blacks. 
4. Policies that make it illegal for law enforcement to profile Blacks (use the fact that an 
individual is Black to decide whether or not to engage in enforcement). 
1 (Strongly Oppose) 
2 (Moderately Oppose) 
3 (Slightly Oppose)  
4 (Neither Oppose nor Support) 
5 (Slightly Support) 
6 (Moderately Support) 
7 (Strongly Support) 
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Minimal Groups Logos and Description 
 
Minimal Groups Resource Allocation Task 
 *For detailed instructions used, contact author. 
 
As a reminder, on each matrix you are to award points (which are valuable in this experiment) to 
two other participants in this experiment. The top row of numbers within the boxes are the points 
awarded to a fellow member of your group, the [Ingroup], and the bottom row are points to be 
given to a member of the other group, the [Outgroup]. After looking at each box of the matrix, 
you must choose only one box that represents your choice of how you wish to award the points. 
Remember that you are distributing resources between members of your group and the 
other group, but no yourself. 
 
 
 
 
 
Points to member 
of the [Ingroup] 
 
19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 
Points to member 
of the [Outgroup] 
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 
Points to member 
of the [Ingroup] 
 
25 23 21 19 17 15 13 11 9 7 5 3 1 
Points to member 
of the [Outgroup] 
1 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
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Points to member 
of the [Ingroup] 
 
19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 
Points to member 
of the [Outgroup] 
25 23 21 19 17 15 13 11 9 7 5 3 1 
Points to member 
of the [Ingroup] 
 
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 
Points to member 
of the [Outgroup] 
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
Points to member 
of the [Ingroup] 
 
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
Points to member 
of the [Outgroup] 
16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 
Points to member 
of the [Ingroup] 
 
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Points to member 
of the [Outgroup] 
28 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 
 
 
 
 
209 
Chapter 4 
Symbolic Racism  
1. Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their 
way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.  
2. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it di cult for 
blacks to work their way out of the lower class.  
3. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.  
4. It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder 
they could be just as well o as whites.  
1 (Strongly Disagree) 
2 (Disagree) 
3 (Neither Agree nor Disagree) 
4 (Agree) 
5 (Strongly Agree) 
Influence of Blacks in U.S. Politics  
1. Would you say that blacks have TOO MUCH INFLUENCE in American politics, JUST 
ABOUT THE RIGHT AMOUNT of influence in American politics, or TOO LITTLE 
influence in American politics?  
Black Elected Officials  
1. Do you think that most white candidates who run for political office are better suited to 
be an elected official than are most black candidates, that most black candidates are better 
suited to be an elected official than are most white candidates, or do you think white and 
black candidates are equally suited to be an elected official?  
Respondents then asked how strongly they hold that position.  
Black Elected Officials - Intelligence  
1. Do you think that most white candidates who run for political office are better suited in 
terms of their intelligence to serve as an elected official than are most black candidates, 
that most black candidates are better suited in terms of their intelligence to serve as an 
elected official than are most white candidates, or do you think white and black 
candidates are equally suited in terms of their intelligence to serve as an elected official?  
Respondents then asked how strongly they hold that position.  
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Affirmative Action  
1. Some people say that because of past discrimination, Blacks should be given preference 
in hiring and promotion. Others say that such preference in hiring and promotion of 
Blacks is wrong because it gives Blacks advantages they haven't earned. What about your 
opinion - are you for or against preferential hiring and promotion of Blacks?  
Fair Job Treatment  
1. Some people feel that if black people are not getting fair treatment in jobs, the 
government in Washington ought to see to it that they do. Others feel that this is not the 
federal government's business. Have you had enough interest in this question to favor one 
side over the other?  
How do you feel? Should the government in Washington see to it that black people get 
fair treatment in jobs OR is this not the federal government's business?  
Respondents then asked how strongly they hold that position.  
Vote Obama  
1. How about the election for President? Did you vote for a candidate for PRESIDENT? 
Who did you vote for?  
Feeling Thermometers  
1. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm 
toward the person. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel 
favorable toward the person and that you don't care too much for that person. You would 
rate the person at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward 
the person.  
Need for Cognition  
1. Some people like to have responsibility for handling situations that require a lot of 
thinking, and other people don't like to have responsibility for situations like that. What 
about you? Do you like having responsibility for handling situations that require a lot of 
thinking, do you dislike it, or do you neither like it nor dislike it? Do you like it a lot or 
just somewhat?  
2. Some people prefer to solve simple problems instead of complex ones, whereas other 
people prefer to solve more complex problems. Which type of problem do you prefer to 
solve: simple or complex?  
Education   
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1. What is the highest grade of school or year of college you have completed?  
2. Did you get a high school diploma or pass a high school equivalency test?  
3. What is the highest degree that you have earned?  
Political Interest  
The political interest and political discussion variables were part of an experimental 
manipulation in the 2008 ANES, in which respondents were randomly assigned to 
receive either old or new versions of questions. For political interest, the old version 
asked only about how often respondents follow government and public a airs whereas the 
new version asked one item about how closely respondents follow government and 
politics and a second item about how often. Thus, for respondents in the new condition, 
political interest is measured as the mean of the two items. The old version for political 
discussion first asked whether or not respondents discuss politics with family and friends 
and then asked how often they did in the past week, whereas the new version just asked 
how often in a typical week.  
“old”  
1. Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the 
time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you 
say you follow what's going on in government and public a airs MOST OF THE TIME, 
SOME OF THE TIME, ONLY NOW AND THEN, or HARDLY AT ALL?  
“new”  
1. How closely do you pay attention to information about what's going on in government 
and politics? EXTREMELY CLOSELY, VERY CLOSELY, MODERATELY 
CLOSELY, SLIGHTLY CLOSELY, or NOT CLOSELY AT ALL?  
2. How often do you pay attention to what's going on in government and politics? ALL 
THE TIME, MOST OF THE TIME, ABOUT HALF THE TIME, ONCE IN A WHILE, 
or NEVER?  
Ideology  
Where would you place YOURSELF on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? 
Extremely liberal, Liberal, Slightly liberal, Moderate; middle of the road, Slightly conservative, 
Conservative, Extremely conservative  
Egalitarianism  
1. Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal 
opportunity to succeed.  
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2. We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.  
3. One of the big problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance.  
4. 'This country would be better o if we worried less about how equal people are.  
5. 'It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than 
others.  
6. If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems.  
Table A4.1: Full Model Predicting Symbolic Racism 
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Table A4.2: Full Model Predicting Perceived Influence of Blacks in Politics 
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Table A4.3: Full Model Predicting Attitudes toward Black Elected Officials  
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Table A4.4: Full Model Attitudes toward Black Elected Officials – Intelligence 
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Table A4.5: Full Model Predicting Support for Affirmative Action 
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Table A4.6: Full Model Predicting Support for Fair Job Treatment for Blacks  
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Table A4.7: Full Model Predicting Self-Reported Vote for Obama 
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Chapter 5 
Applicant Descriptions  
[All descriptions were preceded by the phrase, “A man that:”, which was shown constantly at 
the top of the screen below the response options] 
has never left the United States. almost never eats vegetables. 
has 3 pet birds. cannot tell his left from his right. 
likes to travel to exotic places. chews with his mouth open. 
claims to have seen a ghost. is a vegetarian. 
is eccentric. once hallucinated from a bad fever. 
loves to go to parties. prefers ice cream in a cup rather than a cone. 
never learned to ride a bike. has a habit of nail biting when nervous. 
is known to march to his own drummer. has been described as very sensitive. 
has a hard time remembering birthdays. enjoys playing sports. 
enjoys making jokes at family gatherings. enjoys playing video games. 
winks a lot. has never seen the ocean. 
hums when eating. is deeply religious. 
has an unusually high-pitched voice. collects insects. 
tends to follow the crowd. has a stutter. 
prefers heat over cold weather. enjoys science fiction novels. 
talks to his mother once per week. was once bitten by a venomous spider. 
hates the feel of velvet. believes in many conspiracy theories. 
only wears brown shoes. performs magic as a hobby. 
enjoys dressing in many different styles. enjoys solving crossword puzzles. 
hates people who complain a lot. wanted to be an astronaut as a child. 
has never had a cavity. reads many philosophy books. 
tends to mumble. does not like solving puzzles. 
talks very fast. was in a rock band as a teenager. 
talks with his hands. was in the marching band in high school. 
has a lot of body hair. is very flirtatious. 
accidentally stares at people often. spends a lot of time looking in the mirror. 
believes he has a long lost brother. never wears shorts. 
will be the best man at a wedding. is prone to severe allergies. 
makes odd noises while sleeping. is very shy around strangers 
has a loud voice. has had many romantic relationships. 
has poor hand-eye coordination. is known to be quirky. 
has never been in a fist fight. does not believe in any religion. 
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has a large scar on his shoulder. thinks tattoos are disgusting. 
has no sense of rhythm. is color-blind. 
is allergic to cats. lost his left foot to diabetes. 
was once on TV as an extra in a sitcom. keeps his opinions to himself. 
takes a long time to make decisions. wanted to be a movie star as a child. 
stays informed about sports news. often speaks in rhymes. 
enjoys extreme sports. hates the idea of bottled water. 
enjoys romantic comedies. loves classic movies. 
is obsessed with the size and shape of chairs. wore braces throughout high school. 
whistles all of the time. is fascinated by history. 
is a very picky eater. knows every state capital. 
prefers Coca-Cola over Pepsi. cannot swim. 
has won several pie-eating contests. claims not to fear death. 
is a huge comic book fan. prefers to be indoors. 
is said to make the best grilled cheese. has never been kissed. 
regrets not exercising more. is an only child. 
dated a woman with 11 toes. has four siblings. 
plays chess once per week. prefers dogs over cats. 
thinks surfers are very courageous. had a pet pitbull as a teenager. 
spent last weekend at a funeral. plays drums in a jazz band. 
makes bird houses. has written several romance novels. 
still remembers his high school prom. writes poems on napkins. 
knew someone who wound up being famous. is afraid of germs. 
enjoys the fine arts. is afraid of open spaces. 
has an outie belly button. has a collection of leather jackets. 
can run a mile in 6 minutes. hates puns. 
plays video games with his nephew. is afraid of thunder. 
enjoys writing fiction in his spare time. falls in love easily. 
did not like the movie Titanic. has trouble choosing clothes that match. 
always thinks about the big picture. spends a lot of time thinking about life. 
is a sculptor in his spare time. often daydreams about flying. 
is considered a tree hugger. has never won a game of bingo. 
plays many musical instruments. prefers not to wear shoes. 
smoked cigarettes as a teenager. likes to analyze people. 
used to be nicknamed Smiley. enjoys spicy food. 
spent last weekend helping a friend move. squints a lot. 
took karate lessons as a child. always has mints in his car. 
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prefers driving over being a passenger. cannot hear out of his left ear. 
received a speeding ticket two months ago. does not believe love is real. 
tends to be vague when speaking. is great at impressions. 
likes looking at the clouds. collects scented candles. 
has an odd fashion sense. prefers camping over staying in a hotel. 
always falls asleep during movies.  
is always making nicknames for people.  
enjoys pulling pranks on people.  
does not like roller coasters.  
stands close to people when talking to them.  
believes time travel will exist soon.  
enjoys standup comedy.  
is bad at keeping secrets.  
often wears sunglasses indoors.  
does not need glasses but wears them 
anyway. 
 
has a large collection of action figures.  
believes strongly in Zodiac signs.  
 
